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Banking the Poor 
Michael S. Barr†
Low-income households often lack access to banking accounts and 
face high costs for transacting basic financial services through check 
cashers and other alternative financial service providers. These families 
find it more difficult to save and plan financially for the future. Living 
paycheck to paycheck leaves them vulnerable to medical or job 
emergencies that may endanger their financial stability, and lack of 
longer-term savings undermines their ability to improve skills, purchase a 
home, or send their children to college. Additionally, high cost financial 
services and inadequate access to bank accounts may undermine widely 
shared societal goals of reducing poverty, moving families from welfare to 
work, and rewarding work through incentives such as the Earned Income 
Tax Credit. This Article calls for the transformation of financial services 
for the poor. The Article first explores the dual financial services market in 
which insured depository institutions largely serve middle- and upper-
income persons, and check cashers and other alternative service providers 
largely serve low- and moderate-income households. The Article argues 
that the social benefits of breaking down barriers between these markets 
exceed the costs of doing so. The Article also contends that network 
externalities in electronic payment systems help explain why some 
technologies that would help low-income consumers have not been as 
rapidly adopted as would be socially beneficial. In response to this 
problem, the Article recommends governmental incentives for private 
sector financial and technological innovation to help lower banking and 
savings barriers for the poor. Better access to financial services is critical 
for low-income persons seeking to enter the economic mainstream. 
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Introduction 
 Access to financial services is critical to success in the modern 
American economy. Most households can take access to a bank account 
for granted. Yet 22% of low-income families—over 8.4 million families 
earning under $25,000 per year—lack the most basic financial tool, a bank 
account.1 These “unbanked” households and other “underbanked” low- 
and moderate-income individuals face high costs, relative to their income, 
for basic financial services. For example, a worker earning $12,000 a year 
would pay approximately $250 annually just to cash payroll checks at a 
check cashing outlet.2 Low-income workers often turn to tax preparation 
services and costly refund loans to access their government tax refund 
check under the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The costs of these 
basic financial transactions can undermine public initiatives that help 
families move from welfare to work, and can diminish the effectiveness of 
the EITC in lifting families out of poverty and encouraging workforce 
participation.  
Low-income families, particularly those without bank accounts, often 
lack any regular means to save. These families, often lacking alternative 
forms of financial resources, need to save, however, as a cushion against 
short-term crises, such as injury or job loss, as well as for longer-term 
goals, including buying a home, sending their children to college, or 
retirement. Of course, a central reason that low-income people find it 
 
 1 Arthur B. Kennickell et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Results from the 
1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 9-11 (2000); see also Ana M. Aizcorbe et 
al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer 
Finances, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 1, tbl.5 (2003) (noting that the percentage of unbanked decreased to 
9.1%, though data based on dollars of income are not fully comparable across surveys). The term 
“bank account” is used here to refer to an account at an insured depository institution, including thrifts 
and credit unions. A word on scope: This Article focuses largely on basic transactional services and 
short-term consumer credit. I take up the related question of savings policies in a work in progress with 
Michael Sherraden, MICHAEL SHERRADEN & MICHAEL S. BARR, INSTITUTIONS AND INCLUSION IN 
SAVING POLICY (Harvard University, Joint Center for Housing Studies, Working Paper, 2003), and the 
matter of access to home mortgage credit in another work in progress, MICHAEL S. BARR, 
DEMOCRATIZING ACCESS TO CAPITAL (Harvard University, Joint Center for Housing Studies, Working 
Paper, 2003). The boundary between these topics is permeable. 
 2 See DOVE CONSULTING, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, SURVEY OF NON-BANK 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 34 fig.6.5 (2000) [hereinafter DOVE REPORT] (finding that fees for cashing a 
$500 check ranged from $8 to $14). 
3
Barr:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
C:\Documents and Settings\johnloyd\My Documents\attach\Banking the Poor JREG FINAL PRINTER PROOF (March 7, 2004).doc 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 21:121, 2004 
124 
                                                                                                                        
difficult to save is that they have low incomes, but evidence suggests that 
low-income people can save if they have structured mechanisms to do so.3 
The unbanked are also largely cut off from mainstream sources of credit, 
whether for short-term consumer borrowing or home ownership, because, 
without a bank account, it is more difficult and more costly to establish 
credit or qualify for a loan. Even those low-income persons who have an 
account may, in effect, be “underbanked”: They may rely on check cashers 
to cash their payroll checks; they may lack an institutionalized means to 
save, such as through payroll deduction plans; or they may not have, or 
may have tapped out, credit cards, and turn to relatively high cost forms of 
short-term credit, such as payday loans, to meet their liquidity needs. 
 Alternative financial service (AFS) providers—including check 
cashers, money transmitters, payday lenders, title lenders, and tax 
preparation services that provide refund anticipation loans—are providing 
a wide range of financial services in low-income communities.4 For 
example, check cashers provide a means for unbanked employees to 
convert their paychecks to cash. Payday lenders provide short-term credit 
to borrowers who cannot access credit cards or are already at credit limits. 
There are benefits to this market segmentation, and for low-income 
consumers, it is likely that without such services, they would be even less 
able to fulfill their financial services needs. Still, such services often come 
at a high cost to low- and moderate-income borrowers. Some portion of 
these high costs may be endemic to the nature of the transactions. These 
are paper- and labor-intensive transactions involving small dollar amounts, 
conducted on behalf of consumers with low wealth and often uncertain or 
poor credit history. These transactions are undertaken largely by financial 
service providers, which, unlike insured depositories, lack direct access to 
the payments system for check clearance. Moreover, the fixed costs of 
lending show up in higher prices for loans of short duration and small 
amounts. Yet some portion of the costs—and consumer problems—can be 
traced to the patchwork of state and federal law that governs these 
providers.  
 While the mainstream financial system works extraordinarily well for 
most Americans, many low- and moderate-income individuals face a 
number of barriers to bank account ownership. First, regular checking 
accounts may not make economic sense for many lower-income families. 
For example, consumers who cannot meet account balance minimums pay 
high monthly fees, and most banks levy high charges for bounced checks, 
which families living paycheck to paycheck can ill afford. Second, many 
 
 3 See infra Section I.B.  
 4 The “AFS” label comes from Roger Swagler et al., The Operations, Appeals and Costs of 
the Alternative Financial Sector: Implications for Financial Counselors, 6 FIN. COUNSELING & 
PLANNING 93 (1995).  
4
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unbanked persons may not qualify for conventional bank accounts because 
of poor credit history or prior problems with managing a bank account. 
While some persons undoubtedly pose undue risk for account ownership, 
many could responsibly use bank accounts structured for their needs. In 
particular, accounts that do not permit overdrafts would reduce the risk 
associated with customers despite previous problems with the banking 
system and would diminish the need to sort out customers who had 
bounced checks in the past, except for those who were judged to have 
committed fraud. Third, while many low-income communities contain 
both banking institutions and alternative financial services providers, in 
some communities, banks, thrifts, and credit unions are not as readily 
accessible as in higher-income areas. Fourth, financial institutions may be 
reluctant, given low expected returns, to invest in research, product 
development, account administration, bank personnel training, marketing, 
and financial education necessary to expand financial services to lower-
income clientele. That is, banking the poor is unlikely to be seen as 
sufficiently profitable for many banks to incur the up-front costs of 
entering this market, particularly because most banks are not institutionally 
organized to focus on this market segment. Fifth, the technologies that 
would make it less costly for low-income persons to use banking services 
are subject to positive network externalities. These externalities may slow 
the adoption of electronic forms of income receipt and payment. 
 The legal literature on issues regarding access to financial services for 
the poor focuses largely on debates over usury laws and consumer 
protections in the alternative financial services sector.5 In this Article, I 
hope to shift the debate toward ways in which governmental incentives can 
harness market and technological forces to expand access to financial 
services for the poor. The Article begins by systematically exploring the 
demand for financial services, building on John Caskey’s foundational 
study of the alternative financial services industry6 and the work of a few 
other sociologists who in recent years have begun to explore the financial 
services usage of the unbanked population.7 I examine the supply of 
financial services by the alternative financial services and banking sectors. 
 
 5 See, e.g., Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial 
Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the 
Role of Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589 (2000) (arguing for usury laws). But see 
James J. White, The Usury Trompe L’Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445 (2000) (arguing that usury laws are 
illusory given federal pre-emption and ill-advised in any event). For studies of the economic effects of 
usury laws, see, for example, Edward L. Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower Nor a 
Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws, 41 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1998). 
 6 See JOHN CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE 
POOR (1994) [hereinafter CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING]. 
 7 See, e.g., sources cited infra note 20. Until recently, there has been little research focused 
on the financial service needs of low-income households. I will contribute to this research in a survey 
that I will be undertaking in 2005 as the faculty investigator for the Detroit Area Survey. 
5
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I next analyze changes in payments and distribution systems that influence 
the provision of financial services for the poor.  
 On this empirical foundation, I argue that the federal government 
should act as a catalyst in encouraging the private sector to transform 
financial services for low-income persons. The case for governmental 
intervention rests primarily on four arguments.  
 First, bank account ownership contributes to optimal income 
redistribution policies. Bank account ownership (or a similar means of 
receiving income) can be thought of as logically prior to the receipt of a 
governmental transfer of income. The Article takes as a given that our 
society has a goal, as evidenced by such policies as the 1996 Welfare 
Reform law8 and the EITC, to increase workforce participation and reduce 
poverty among the working poor.9 Generally, providing government 
assistance in the form of income enhances social welfare more than 
providing assistance in kind, both because administration is likely to be 
less costly and because income assistance provides the recipient with the 
freedom to spend the income however she desires.10  
 Given the high cost of converting income into liquid form, however, 
promoting bank account ownership for the poor is probably more efficient 
than simply transferring income. The form in which “income” is 
transferred changes its value. A governmental check is worth its face value 
less the cost of converting it to cash. In addition, one unit of in-kind 
assistance, in the form of sufficient governmental incentives to induce a 
bank to offer a bank account to a low-income person, would provide the 
benefit of liquidity to all subsequent income transfers whether from 
government programs, wages, or other sources. Thus, the concept of 
income transfers being more efficient than in-kind assistance breaks down 
when one needs to deliver that income to people in the real world. 
Moreover, the government saves money by transferring funds 
electronically, rather than by paper check. 
 Although paternalism forms the basis of much savings policy, and 
may be justified under some circumstances, paternalism is not the impetus 
for favoring subsidizing account ownership. The thrust of the argument in 
 
 8 The Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
 9 See, e.g., V. JOSEPH HOTZ & JOHN KARL SCHOLZ, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8078, 2001) (summarizing evidence that EITC 
increases workforce participation and reduces poverty); George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery 
of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals To Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 
AM. J. TAX POL’Y 225 (1994). But see Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the 
Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV 533 (1995) (questioning use of tax 
code). 
 10 See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 167-71 (4th ed. 1995). On income transfers as a 
means of redistribution, see, for example, Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 989 (2001). I defend my argument more fully in Part V. 
6
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favor of subsidies for bank accounts is to increase the supply of bank 
accounts tailored to the needs of the poor, not primarily to change demand 
of the poor for existing types of traditional accounts that many of them 
currently do not want or for which they may not qualify.11  
 Second, high-cost financial services reduce effective take-home pay 
and thus may undermine employment incentives contained in such 
measures as the EITC and the Welfare Reform law, although further 
empirical research is needed to confirm this hypothesis. The costs of 
changing the delivery system for financial services for the poor are small 
relative to the likely gains to be had for these programs. More broadly, 
improved access to bank accounts can reduce the costs of financial 
services for the poor, expand access to lower-cost forms of credit and 
increase opportunities for saving—all key to reducing poverty and 
expanding social mobility.12 Evidence to date suggests that low-income 
people can save, but lack the institutional mechanisms available to middle- 
and upper-income Americans to do so. Providing a better opportunity for 
the poor to save is likely both to reduce their short-term exposure to 
liquidity shocks, and to increase their long-term prospects for building 
their human capital and saving for homeownership or other assets that can 
help them get out of poverty.13  
 The positive network externalities in payments systems that the 
Article identifies as promising for expanding access to the banking system 
for the poor—online debit at automatic teller machines (ATMs) and 
merchant point of sale (POS) terminals, and the automated clearinghouse 
(ACH) system for direct deposit and bill payment—provide a third 
justification for governmental intervention.14 The social benefits of wide 
adoption of these systems exceed the private benefits that can be captured 
by their owners. While many of the network externalities inherent in these 
systems have already been internalized, further government policies to 
 
 11 See infra Sections I.A, III.A, & V.A (discussing financial services needs of unbanked, 
inadequacy of existing accounts, and need for reform). 
 12 Government policies to promote financial services for the poor may also have expressive 
benefits, by helping to promote the sense that basic instruments for success in our economy are open to 
the poor. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Summers, Secretary of the Treasury, Remarks at the U.S. Conference 
of Mayors (Jan. 18, 2000) (describing bank accounts as the “passport” to the modern American 
economy), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ls356.htm. On “expressive” benefits 
generally, see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1503 (2000). But see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 
U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000). The content of the “expressive” benefit, if any, depends in part on how its 
intended beneficiaries view the nature of the benefit. How low-income households would view the 
benefit of increased access to banking services is one aspect of the questions I will pose in the Detroit 
Area Survey, see supra note 7.  
 13 See infra Section I.B (discussing lack of savings mechanism as one cost of being 
unbanked). I take up the broader question of savings policy for low-income households in a working 
paper. See SHERRADEN & BARR, supra note 1. 
 14 See infra Part IV. 
7
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reduce these externalities would have wide social benefits and should be 
adopted. With distributive goals for the poor in mind, I also suggest 
additional steps. These electronic payment and delivery systems matter in 
expanding financial services for the poor because they are lower risk and 
lower cost to consumers, employers, and financial institutions than checks 
or off-line debit forms of payment systems.  
 Fourth, the patchwork of state laws governing the alternative financial 
services sector, gaps in federal law, and complicated regulations governing 
federal programs may also increase the costs and problems associated with 
providing financial services for the poor. Regardless of one’s views about 
the merits of income redistribution, one ought to favor certain legal 
reforms. For example, state geographic restrictions on locations of check 
cashers needlessly inhibit competition among check cashers in low-income 
communities. In another vein, complicated federal rules governing the 
EITC and delays in tax refund processing may drive low-income taxpayers 
to take out expensive refund anticipation loans offered by paid preparers. 
Thus, the Article recommends changes in several regulatory areas.  
 The Article rejects two common approaches to thinking about 
financial services for the poor. First, the Article disputes the proposition 
that the financial services currently provided in low-income communities 
are necessarily efficient or desirable. That is, while there are benefits to 
market segmentation, there are also social costs to the current system. 
Second, the Article disputes the proposition that the remedy for perceived 
problems in the alternative financial services sector is a return to usury 
laws. Rather, the Article contends that the financial service system could 
serve at least some segments of low- and moderate-income households 
better with modest governmental incentives to the banking sector to spur 
innovation in serving the poor. 
 The Article makes several key policy recommendations to help 
transform financial services for the poor.  
 First, governmental incentives should be offered to encourage 
financial institutions to offer electronically based transaction accounts 
designed for low- and moderate-income persons. For example, debit-card-
based accounts accessed at ATMs and at merchant POS terminals can be 
offered at much lower cost, and with lower risk to banks and consumers, 
than checking accounts. Such electronically based accounts may be 
particularly suited to low-income unbanked persons. Yet the fixed costs of 
offering these accounts may currently be too high to be borne by banks 
and their low-income customers, and banks have been largely unwilling to 
take on the opportunity costs of shifting bank resources toward serving 
low- and moderate-income persons. Further technological and financial 
innovation spurred by these incentives can help to drive down costs, 
reduce risks, and increase competition.  
8
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 My view, which I defend in Part V, is that tax credits to financial 
institutions would be the preferable means for delivering the subsidy. 
Although tax credits could most readily be employed to create a larger 
scale initiative, other helpful steps short of a new tax credit could be taken. 
For example, the Treasury Department’s “First Accounts” pilot could spur 
experimentation, but needs to be funded on a multi-year basis. The 
incentives that I propose could also build on revamped governmental 
programs designed to move federal and state-run government benefit 
recipients from receiving certain government income transfers by paper 
check to electronic benefit transfer (EBT). State EBT programs—focused 
on welfare recipients and other beneficiaries of state-run benefit 
programs—should shift away from electronic benefit cards towards 
provision of debit-card based bank accounts that could be used to receive 
all forms of income transfer as well as privately earned wages. Treasury 
should enhance the incentives in the federal Electronic Funds Transfer 
(EFT) initiative—currently focused on moving Social Security recipients, 
federal retirees, and other beneficiaries of certain federally run programs to 
direct deposit—for banks to offer low-cost, electronically based bank 
accounts to a wider range of low-income households, including those who 
receive the EITC. 
 Second, taking account of the positive network externalities 
associated with online debit cards, direct deposit, and bill payment, while 
recognizing the risk that government intervention in these networks may 
miss the mark, adjustments may be needed in Federal Reserve Board 
pricing of both check and ACH services. ACH services are likely still 
priced too high in relation to checks. In addition, now that VISA and 
MasterCard have settled the suit brought by Wal-Mart and other merchants 
alleging antitrust violations arising from the credit card companies’ “honor 
all cards” policies, federal antitrust officials and the courts should pay 
particular attention to ensuring that the terms of the settlement foster 
competition among different electronic payment methods. Depending on 
how the market evolves in the wake of the settlement, there may also be a 
case for subsidizing the further expansion of online debit infrastructure.  
 Third, regulatory reform could play a secondary but useful role in 
altering the provision of financial services to the poor. For example, both 
the elimination of anti-competitive restrictions and the more consistent 
regulation and enforcement of disclosure could reduce some of the costs 
and problems associated with alternative financial service providers. 
Moreover, simplification of state welfare-to-work programs and the 
federal EITC, and IRS steps to facilitate the timely direct deposit of tax 
refunds, could help to reduce transaction costs, lower barriers to account 
ownership, and reduce demand for costly tax preparation and refund 
anticipation loan services. Furthermore, federal banking regulators should 
9
Barr:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
C:\Documents and Settings\johnloyd\My Documents\attach\Banking the Poor JREG FINAL PRINTER PROOF (March 7, 2004).doc 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 21:121, 2004 
130 
                                                                                                                        
increase attention on how the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) could 
encourage banks and thrifts to provide innovative financial services to the 
unbanked under the existing regulatory framework. 
 Lastly, studies show that financial education, if coupled with 
structured opportunities to save, can increase participation in saving plans 
and increase the level of saving, particularly for low- and moderate-
income persons.15 Financial education is costly, and the benefits of a 
financially-educated consumer cannot be captured by a financial institution 
offering education because the consumer may shop for financial services at 
other institutions. Further, the positive externalities created by the 
provision of financial education make it unlikely that such education will 
be offered in a socially optimal quantity by private parties. Although 
financial education is unlikely to be successful against the backdrop of 
existing high-cost alternatives, such education focused on new banking 
products designed to meet the financial needs of the poor may be helpful.
 This Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the low- and 
moderate-income population who use alternative financial service 
providers as a substitute for, or in addition to, banks, and explores the costs 
and benefits to consumers of using this sector. Part II analyzes the 
alternative financial services industry in depth and proposes changes to 
regulation of that sector. Part III explores barriers to low- and moderate-
income persons using financial services at insured depository institutions 
and proposes strategies to lower these barriers. Part IV analyzes changes in 
the payments system and electronic financial services networks that could 
enhance financial services for the poor. Part V focuses on the Article’s key 
policy recommendations for financial services, savings, and financial 
education. The Article then concludes.  
I. The Unbanked16
A. Patterns of Account Ownership 
Twenty-two percent of low-income families—over 8.4 million 
families earning under $25,000 per year—do not have either a checking or 
 
 15 See infra note 567. 
 16 Throughout this Article, I use the term “unbanked” to refer to individuals who do not 
have an account (savings, checking, or otherwise) at a depository institution. Despite the scope of the 
title, I also discuss problems of the “underbanked,” those with an account at a depository institution but 
who also rely for their financial services on other financial services providers (such as check cashers, 
payday lenders, auto title lenders, refund anticipation lenders, and rent-to-own companies) that largely 
serve low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. Problems faced by the “unbanked” and 
“underbanked” overlap significantly but diverge in important respects that I explore throughout the 
Article. I use the term “bank” generically to refer to all depository institutions, including commercial 
banks, thrifts, and credit unions. Where differences among these types of depository institutions 
matter, I use the specific terms. 
10
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savings account.17 Most of the unbanked are low-income: 83% of the 
unbanked earn under $25,000 per year.18 The unbanked may be especially 
concentrated in low-income neighborhoods; in low-income areas of Los 
Angeles the unbanked represent nearly a third of the population, and the 
unbanked represent over 40% of the population in low-income 
neighborhoods in New York.19
Among low- to moderate-income families, households are more likely 
to be unbanked when they have lower incomes, less wealth, less education, 
are not working, are younger, have more children, rent their home, and are 
a racial or ethnic minority.20 Broadly speaking, the most common reason 
persons cite for lacking a checking account is not having enough money to 
be able to afford the costs of account ownership.21 Other factors cited by 
 
 17 Kennickell et al., supra note 1, at 2, 12; see also Aizcorbe et al., supra note 1. The GAO, 
using the 1998 and 1999 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) estimated that “about 11 
million benefit recipients, over half of all federal benefit check recipients in 1998, were unbanked. This 
estimate is substantially higher than Treasury’s 1997 estimate, which showed that 24% of federal 
beneficiaries (5.2-6.5 million) lacked bank accounts.” GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTRONIC 
TRANSFERS, REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE 
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, GAO-02-913, at 3 (2002) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available 
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02913.pdf. GAO extrapolates from its SIPP estimates to suggest 
that among all U.S. adults, 22.2 million households, or 55.9 million individuals, are unbanked, 
representing 20% of all households, and 28% of all individuals. Id. at 55-56. 
 18 TODD VERMILYEA & JAMES A. WILCOX, WHO IS UNBANKED, AND WHY (Conference on 
Bank Structure and Competition, Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2002). 
 19 Constance R. Dunham, The Role of Banks and Nonbanks in Serving Low- and Moderate-
Income Communities, in CHANGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: A 
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM COMMUNITY AFFAIRS CONFERENCE 31 (Jackson L. Blanton et al. eds., 
2001), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/2001/Dunham.pdf. 
 20 Findings from demographic surveys of the unbanked are generally consistent with one 
another. See CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 6; WILLIAM H. GREENE ET AL., THE IMPORTANCE 
OF CHECK-CASHING BUSINESSES TO THE UNBANKED: RACIAL/ETHNIC DIFFERENCES (Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Chicago, Working Paper No. 2003-10, 2003), available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/workingpapers/papers/wp2003-10.pdf; Jeanne M. Hogarth & 
Kevin A. O’Donnell, Banking Relationships of Lower-Income Families and the Government Trend 
Toward Electronic Payment, 85 FED. RES. BULL. 463 (1999); John P. Caskey, Reaching Out to the 
Unbanked, in CHANGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: A FEDERAL 
RESERVE SYSTEM COMMUNITY AFFAIRS CONFERENCE 81 (Jackson L. Blanton et al. eds., 2001) 
[hereinafter Caskey, Reaching Out], available at http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/2001/Caskey.pdf; 
Sherrie Rhine et al., The Role of Alternative Financial Service Providers in Serving LMI 
Neighborhoods, in CHANGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: A FEDERAL 
RESERVE SYSTEM COMMUNITY AFFAIRS CONFERENCE 59 (Jackson L. Blanton et al. eds., 2001), 
available at http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/2001/Rhine.pdf; Jeanne M. Hogarth et al., Who Has a 
Bank Account? Exploring Changes over Time, 25 J. FAMILY & ECON. ISSUES (forthcoming 2004). But 
cf. Dunham, supra note 19 (containing some different analysis but generally consistent with other 
studies). These descriptions of the unbanked do mask heterogeneity of the population. For example, 
mentally ill unbanked persons or prisoners face a host of problems making it difficult to bring them 
into the banking system that I do not address here. Nor do I address policy responses to persons who 
choose not to use banks because the individuals are engaged in illegal activity, or wish to hide their 
income from spouses, for example. 
 21 See John Caskey, Reaching Out to the Unbanked 22 tbl.2 (Apr. 2001) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Caskey, Reaching Out Manuscript]. The most commonly 
cited reasons for lacking a bank account are “do not have enough money” (about half of respondents in 
BOOZ-ALLEN HAMILTON, SHUGOLL RESEARCH, U.S. TREASURY, MANDATORY EFT DEMOGRAPHIC 
11
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respondents include distrust of banks, not wanting to deal with banks or 
privacy concerns.22  
Efforts to reach the unbanked also need to pay attention to the racial 
and ethnic composition, and immigration status, of segments of the 
unbanked. Recent evidence suggests that, irrespective of the race of the 
individual, families living in neighborhoods with higher concentrations of 
Blacks or Hispanics are less likely to own a checking account.23 Among 
the banked, low-income minorities are less likely than whites to have a 
checking account, but more likely than whites (all else being equal) to 
have savings accounts.24 By contrast, proximity to a bank branch seems 
not especially predictive of being banked.25 Low-income immigrants are 
more likely than other low-income persons to be unbanked. Moreover, 
significant immigration in the late 1990s may have contributed to the 
persistence in the size of the unbanked population.26  
 
STUDY OMB 1510-00-68, at 56 (1997)), “no savings” (53% of respondents in Caskey, Reaching Out 
Manuscript, supra, at 22 tbl.2), “do not write enough checks to make it worthwhile” (28.4% of 
respondents in Kennickell et al., supra note 1, at 9), “do not have enough money” (12.9% of 
respondents in Kennickell et al., supra note 1, at 9), “bank fees are too high” (23% of respondents in 
Caskey, Reaching Out Manuscript, supra, at 22 tbl.2), “bank minimum balance requirements are too 
high” (22% of respondents in Caskey, Reaching Out Manuscript, supra, at 22 tbl.2), “the bank requires 
a high balance (to avoid fees)” (VERMILYEA & WILCOX, supra note 18, at tbl.6), and unfavorable 
account features and costs (62% of respondents in Rhine et al., supra note 20, at 13). Coupled with 
data about actual costs of existing bank services, see infra Section I.B., which are relatively high for 
low-income persons, this suggests that the driving force behind the lack of account ownership is not 
consumer ignorance of available options. That is, many low-income persons are not able to afford 
existing bank products. I contend in this Article that it is worth changing the account options available 
to low- and moderate-income households.  
 22 See, e.g., Rhine et al., supra note 20, at 13 (reporting that 30% of respondents cited 
distrust of banks, an aversion to dealing with banks, and privacy concerns). These factors counsel 
caution about new types of accounts in and of themselves being attractive to all of the unbanked, and 
only some of these concerns might be addressed with increased financial education or exposure to 
positive experiences with banks. Some portion of the unbanked population may, of course, choose to 
remain unbanked even if faced with additional options. Still, as I explore more fully below, any 
bankers’ hesitancy, whether legitimate or not, about having low-income people using bank branches, 
or low-income consumers’ cultural aversion, if any, to the imposing nature of bank branches, can be 
mitigated by focusing on all-electronic accounts, which use ATMs and merchant POS terminals to 
provide access to accounts. See infra Part V. For those seeking to avoid attachment of funds by 
creditors, or who have privacy concerns, bank account ownership is likely to remain unattractive.  
 23 See VERMILYEA & WILCOX, supra note 18, at 17-18. Data are insufficient to determine 
whether the racial neighborhood effect is related to any reluctance by neighborhood merchants to 
accept checks from minorities or from any person in minority neighborhoods, or is related to consumer 
preferences, which suggests the need to explore whether discrimination, or shared community-wide 
practice in poor neighborhoods, may influence the availability of, or individual decisions about, 
account ownership. See id. 
 24 Id. at 19. 
 25 Id. at 16. This suggests the need to look beyond “bricks and mortar” for explanations of 
banking patterns, including at the structure of accounts offered.  
 26 See Kennickell et al., supra note 1. Immigrants may face linguistic barriers to becoming 
banked, in addition to concerns about their immigration status. Surveys of the unbanked thus far have 
tended to focus more on English- and Spanish-speaking persons than on other immigrant communities. 
In particular, the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances may not fully reflect the high 
number of immigrants without accounts. As I explore below, low-income immigrant families rely 
12
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While important challenges remain, some progress has been made in 
recent years in expanding access to financial services. The period 1995 to 
1998 marked a decline in the percentage of low-income families who are 
unbanked from 25% to 22%.27 This decline in the percentage of unbanked 
may reflect, in part, strong economic growth during the late 1990s that 
improved the incomes of households at the bottom of the income 
distribution for the first time in decades (although these gains eroded in the 
last two years).28 Increases in the EITC increased the take-home pay of 
low-income workers and helped to increase labor force participation. 
Welfare reform, beginning with waivers for states to use welfare-to-work 
strategies and culminating with the 1996 Welfare Reform law, increased 
the percentage of welfare recipients entering the workforce. Greater 
workforce attachment and higher incomes may have increased the benefits 
of bank account ownership and also may have provided more low-income 
persons with the wherewithal to meet bank minimums or afford bank fees. 
Account ownership grew most quickly among groups at or below the 
poverty threshold and the next largest gains came from those just over the 
poverty line.29
In addition to these economic gains, advances in technology, the 
spread of ATMs and POS terminals, and improvements in payments 
system efficiencies have lowered the cost and improved the distribution of 
payments systems that could benefit the poor. Some small-scale 
governmental and private initiatives may have contributed to this trend. 
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s efforts to increase electronic 
payment of federal benefits and a Treasury “First Accounts” pilot project 
to reach the unbanked have also helped to spur innovation.30 Recently, 
partly in response to these government initiatives, some banks, thrifts, and 
credit unions, as well as community-based organizations, have begun to 
experiment with products designed to serve the needs of low-income 
individuals, and to serve the growing Hispanic market in ways that may 
benefit low-income persons generally. These nascent efforts provide the 
 
heavily on financial services (in particular, wire transfers) to send remittances back to family members 
in their country of origin. Recent efforts to expand financial services for Hispanic immigrant 
communities, therefore, may be critical to expanding bank account ownership to some segments of the 
poor. See infra Subsection III.B.4. 
 27 See Kennickell et al., supra note 1, at 2, 12. The percentage of unbanked families 
continued to decline somewhat through 2001. See Aizcorbe et al., supra note 1, at 9. 
 28 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLE-FAMILIES, TABLE F-3, MEAN 
INCOME RECEIVED BY EACH FIFTH AND TOP 5 PERCENT OF FAMILIES (ALL RACES): 1966 TO 2001, 
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/f03.html (last modified Sept. 30, 2002). 
Median household incomes dropped, and the poverty rate increased, in 2001 and 2002. See Carmen 
DeNavas-Walt et al., Income in the United States: 2002, 2003 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU P60-221; 
Bernadette D. Proctor & Joseph Dalaker, Poverty in the United States: 2002, 2003 U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU P60-222. 
 29 Hogarth et al., supra note 20, at 19. 
 30 See infra Subsection III.B.1. 
13
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context for understanding the challenges that lie ahead. 
B. The Costs of Being Unbanked 
The consequences of not having access to mainstream financial 
services can be severe. High-cost financial services reduce disposable 
income for those least able to afford it. Such services reduce the value of 
government transfer programs, including the EITC, and may undermine 
federal and state initiatives to improve workforce participation and reward 
work. Lack of access to mainstream financial services also undermines the 
ability of the poor to save and to access credit, reducing their long-term 
wealth. Low-income people using check cashers may be more susceptible 
to robbery because they tend to cash their entire paycheck at regular time 
periods. Additionally, reducing inefficiencies in the payments system for 
the poor may have modest positive effects on the economy.  
First, the “unbanked” face high costs for basic financial services.31 
For example, a 2000 Treasury study found that a worker earning $12,000 a 
year would pay approximately $250 annually just to cash payroll checks at 
a check-cashing outlet,32 in addition to fees for money orders, wire 
transfers, bill payments, and other common transactions.33 Almost all of 
the checks cashed at check cashers pose relatively low risk: Payroll 
payments—with low credit risk that could be directly deposited by 
electronic means, instead of by check, into bank accounts, at significantly 
lower costs to the payment system—constitute 80% of checks cashed at 
these check cashing outlets. Another 16% are government benefit checks, 
which again pose low risk.34 A large portion of these checks could 
 
 31 Total estimated fringe banking transaction costs, including check cashing, payday 
lending, pawn loans, rent-to-own transactions, and auto title lending are $5.45 billion annually. JAMES 
H. CARR & JENNY SCHUETZ, FANNIE MAE FOUND., FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED 
COMMUNITIES 10 (2001).  
 32 See DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 34 fig.6.5 (finding that fees for cashing a $500 check 
ranged from $8 to $14).  
 33 The use of check cashers may vary considerably by region and by urban or rural location. 
Compare Rhine et al., supra note 20, at 76, and Hogarth et al., supra note 20, at 10-11 (nearly three-
quarters of unbanked but less than a fifth of banked use check cashers in Chicago) with Dunham, supra 
note 19, at 53 fig.5 (greater use of check cashers by banked individuals in New York and Los 
Angeles), and MICHAEL A. STEGMAN & ROBERT FARIS, WELFARE, WORK, AND BANKING: THE 
NORTH CAROLINA FINANCIAL SERVICES SURVEY 54 (2001) (reporting that only 1.4% of unbanked 
low-income households in North Carolina use check cashers). In North Carolina, some 12.5% cashed 
checks at grocery stores. Id. at 54. Caskey notes that most grocery stores in that state charge fees for 
cashing checks and that those stores constitute 600 of 1,000 check cashing licenses issued in that state. 
Thus, a much higher proportion of unbanked households pay to cash checks, either at grocery stores or 
check cashers. E-mail from John Caskey, Professor of Economics, Swarthmore College, to Michael S. 
Barr, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School (Apr. 8, 2003) (on file with 
author). 
 34 DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. Direct deposit is discussed in more detail below. See 
infra Section IV.D. Check cashers focus on these checks to reduce credit risk. These operations, 
however, often also require additional efforts to reduce risk of fraud, and to reduce credit risk from 
14
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presumably be directly deposited into bank accounts at relatively low 
cost—if low-income people had bank accounts.35
The costs of these basic financial transactions reduce the effectiveness 
of federal income transfer programs such as the EITC and may undermine 
public initiatives to move families from welfare to work. High cost 
financial services reduce effective take-home pay. Moreover, studies of the 
EITC suggest that higher take-home pay from the EITC helps to induce 
labor force participation.36 One survey found that forty-four percent of a 
sample of EITC recipients in inner city Chicago used a check cashing 
service to cash their government refund check.37 Nationwide, in 1999, 
nearly half of the $32 billion in EITC refunds provided to over 18 million 
low-income families were distributed through refund anticipation loans, 
costing EITC recipients $1.75 billion for tax preparation services, 
electronic filing, and loan fees.38 The high price of converting income 
checks into liquid form (e.g., cash) may reduce the efficacy of the EITC in 
encouraging workforce participation because it reduces take-home pay 
(and reduces it more, the more the person earns), or at the very least these 
transaction costs significantly increase the taxpayer’s costs (the 
“compliance” costs) of the program.  
Similarly, although the jury is still out on the long term effects of the 
1996 Welfare Reform law, some studies suggest that welfare programs 
that encourage work, coupled with policies that let families keep more of 
their earnings before benefits are reduced or eliminated, have helped to 
increase workforce participation and job retention.39 The positive effects of 
welfare reform on workforce participation and income generation, 
however, may be undermined by high-cost check-cashing services that 
reduce the effective income of those who are beginning to earn wages.40
 
checks from unknown and/or small employers. 
 35 See infra text accompanying notes 401-402 (discussing conversion of checks to direct 
deposit).  
 36 See HOTZ & SCHOLZ, supra note 9, at 49-50 (summarizing wide range of studies finding 
consistent evidence that EITC increases labor force participation and hours worked, particularly for 
single mothers). Empirical work is needed to document the labor force effect, if any, of high-cost 
financial services. In addition to the federal EITC, seventeen states (including the District of 
Columbia) have state EITCs, usually structured as a percentage of the federal credit. See CENTER ON 
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, A HAND UP: HOW STATE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDITS HELP 
WORKING FAMILIES ESCAPE POVERTY IN 2003 1 (2003), at http://www.cbpp.org/3-3-03sfp.pdf. The 
federal EITC was responsible for lifting 4.3 million individuals out of poverty in 1997. See COUNCIL 
OF ECON. ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 114 (1999). 
 37 Timothy M. Smeeding et al., The EITC: Expectation, Knowledge, Use and Economic and 
Social Mobility, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1187, 1202 tbl.5 (2000). 
 38  ALAN BERUBE ET AL., BROOKINGS INST. & PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., THE PRICE OF 
PAYING TAXES: HOW TAX PREPARATION AND REFUND LOAN FEES ERODE THE BENEFITS OF THE EITC 
(2002). See infra Section II.D (discussing tax preparation services). 
 39 See Rebecca Blank, Evaluating Welfare Reform in the U.S., 40 J. ECON. LIT. 1105 
(2002). 
 40 There is some evidence that check cashers may see the welfare-to-work population as a 
15
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Even in the bulk of states that have moved to EBT for welfare 
payments, welfare recipients may still face high costs for financial 
services: First, administrative problems in some state programs make it 
hard to withdraw sufficient funds for bill payment (e.g., monthly rent). 
Second, most EBT programs do not link recipients to bank accounts, 
which means that these recipients need to find other means to convert their 
work income to cash, to pay bills, to save funds, and to access credit. 
Third, once welfare recipients are working, payroll checks and EITC 
refunds to these individuals would push them towards high cost transaction 
services. In turn, welfare recipients may be dissuaded from opening a bank 
account because they believe, sometimes mistakenly and sometimes 
correctly, that their bank account balances will cause them to exceed state 
welfare program asset limits.41
Second, low-income families need to save to cushion themselves 
against personal economic crises, such as injury or loss of a job, and for 
key life events, such as buying a home, sending their children to college, 
or entering old age.42 Low-income households face key barriers to 
increased saving,43 and their low income leaves them little opportunity to 
save. Because they are poor, they face higher opportunity costs for putting 
their funds toward savings rather than current consumption. In turn, 
because the poor accumulate little, financial institutions face high costs in 
collecting their savings relative to the amounts saved, and will thus be 
reluctant to expend the resources to open accounts for them or will offer 
them low returns on their savings, further reducing any incentives the poor 
have to save. Low-income families, particularly those without bank 
accounts, often lack any regular mechanism to save, such as payroll 
deduction plans, further reducing the likelihood that they will do so.44  
 
new market. See JEAN ANN FOX & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. & U.S. PUBLIC 
INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, RENT-A-BANK PAYDAY LENDING: THE 2001 PAYDAY LENDER SURVEY 
AND REPORT 6 & n.15 (2001) [hereinafter CFA/PIRG REPORT]. 
 41 JOHN CASKEY, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., BEYOND CASH-AND-CARRY: FINANCIAL 
SAVINGS, FINANCIAL SERVICES, AND LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN TWO COMMUNITIES, at i (1997); 
Hogarth et al., supra note 20, at 8. In some states, account balances will cause recipients to lose 
eligibility under some circumstances. See CORP. FOR ENTER. DEV., 2002 FEDERAL IDA BRIEFING 
BOOK: HOW IDAS AFFECT ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS 3-5. Where asset limits are a barrier 
to account ownership, they should be reformed; in other states, financial education for welfare 
recipients should be undertaken. Similarly, the federal food stamp program, the Supplemental Security 
Income program of Social Security, and Medicaid contain counterproductive asset limits. 
 42 I address further policy responses to these issues in an article in progress, see 
SHERRADEN & BARR, supra note 1.  
 43 For a fuller exposition of this argument, see generally ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE, 
CONTRACTING CONSTRAINTS, CREDIT MARKETS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (MIT Dep’t of 
Econ., Working Paper No. 02-17, 2001). 
 44 See generally Sondra G. Beverly & Michael Sherraden, Institutional Determinants of 
Saving: Implications for Low-Income Households and Public Policy, 28 J. SOC. ECON. 4 (1999). One 
means of changing this pattern is for foundation or governmental programs to provide matching funds; 
increasing the size of funds saved will make account provision more cost effective for financial 
16
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In a survey of New York and Los Angeles low-income 
neighborhoods, 78% of the banked held some form of savings, broadly 
defined, while only 30% of the unbanked had savings.45 Obviously, the 
ability to save is a function of income. But differences remain even after 
controlling for income. Across income ranges, being banked is highly 
correlated with saving.46 Of course, bank account ownership may well be 
correlated with willingness and ability to save. Thus, one would need to 
measure differences in propensity to save in order to determine whether 
and to what extent account ownership itself is a strong factor in increasing 
savings.47
Bank accounts can be important entry points for the provision of 
regular savings plans for low-income workers through payroll deduction. 
Still, most low-income workers work for firms without savings plans or 
are themselves not covered by such plans even when their employers have 
savings plans. Even the tax system, through which the bulk of government 
savings benefits are provided, disproportionately subsidizes savings for 
higher- rather than low-income households. The Treasury Department 
estimates that more than two-thirds of tax expenditures for pensions go to 
households in the top 20% of the income distribution, while the bottom 
40% get only 2% of the tax benefit.48  
Promoting low-income household savings is critical to lowering 
reliance on high-cost, short-term credit, lowering risk of financial 
dislocation resulting from job loss or injury, and improving prospects for 
longer-term asset building through homeownership, skills development, 
and education. Evidence to date suggests that low-income individuals can 
save if given the opportunity to do so, at least if offered a significant 
matching contribution. Some 73% of federal employees earning $10,000 
to $20,000 annually participated in the federal government’s Thrift Saving 
Plan, which provides a government matching contribution, and over half of 
those earning under $10,000 also participated.49 The 2001 Survey of 
Consumer Finances found that 30% of families in the bottom income 
quintile saved in the prior year, and 53.4% of those in the next quintile 
 
institutions and may increase the level of personal saving by low income households. See infra Section 
V.A. 
 45 See Dunham, supra note 19, at 39-40. 
 46 Id. at 41.  
 47 For evidence that financial planning influences wealth accumulation, see JOHN AMERIKS 
ET AL., WEALTH ACCUMULATION AND THE PROPENSITY TO PLAN (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 8920, 2002). 
 48 Peter Orszag & Robert Greenstein, Toward Progressive Pensions: A Summary of the U.S. 
Pension System and Proposals for Reform, in INCLUSION IN THE AMERICAN DREAM: ASSETS, 
POVERTY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 8-10 (Michael Sherraden & Lisa Morris eds., forthcoming 2003).  
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saved.50 Savings account features have an appeal for the unbanked. In a 
Treasury survey of unbanked federal check recipients, respondents were 
aware that an ETA savings feature would only pay a nominal rate of 
interest (explicitly posed in the survey as “$2 annually on a $100 
deposit”), but this feature would account for approximately 25% of the 
typical respondent’s decision on whether to enroll in the ETA.51
Some lower-income individuals use alternatives to bank accounts to 
facilitate savings. Anecdotal evidence exists that low-income people 
purchase money orders with their paychecks at the beginning of the month 
and hold them for later use. In so doing, they convert their income and 
benefits into a more illiquid and protected form, either for bill payment 
later in the month or as “savings” for planned and unplanned expenditures 
in the future.52 Researchers have also found that low-income taxpayers 
over-withhold their income taxes more frequently than higher income 
taxpayers; some economists suggest that these taxpayers use withholding 
as an automatic savings mechanism. This may suggest that demand for 
savings products among the poor is high enough that some will accept a 
zero or negative interest rate.53
Third, without a bank account, it is more difficult and more costly to 
establish credit or qualify for a loan. A bank account is a significant 
factor—more so, in fact, than household net worth, income, or education 
level—in predicting whether an individual also holds mortgage loans, 
automobile loans, and certificates of deposit.54 After controlling for key 
factors, one study determined that low-income households with bank 
accounts were 43% more likely to have other financial assets than 
households without bank accounts.55 Low-income persons without bank 
accounts face higher costs of credit than low-income persons with 
accounts,56 and in any event, low-income households generally face higher 
 
 50 Aizcorbe et al., supra note 1, at 5, tbl.1. 
 51 ED BACHELDER & ISABELLE AGUERRE, DOVE ASSOCS., ETA CONJOINT RESEARCH 60 
(1999) [hereinafter ETA CONJOINT RESEARCH]. 
 52 Postal savings orders offer protection if lost or stolen and are backed by the USPS. 
 53 See Jannett Highfill et al., Tax Overwithholding as a Response to Uncertainty, 26 PUB. 
FIN. REV. 385 (1998). 
 54 Hogarth & O’Donnell, supra note 20, at 463. There may be personal characteristics of 
those owning bank accounts—such as propensity to plan, budget, be thrifty, and save—that are not 
fully captured by this analysis and that may account for better savings and credit outcomes. 
 55 See WILLIAM G. GALE & STACIE CARNEY, ASSET ACCUMULATION AMONG LOW-
INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 22 (Benefits and Mechanisms for Spreading Asset Ownership in the United 
States, Ford Found. Conference, 1998), available at http://www.brookingsinstitution.org/views/papers/ 
gale/19991130.pdf. 
 56 Credit scoring innovations may increase the benefits of account ownership for low- and 
moderate-income persons. For example, Experian has developed a credit scoring system using 
transaction account records. Given the limited credit histories of low-income customers, they are often 
turned down for loans even though they might be good credit risks, simply because their credit 
histories are “thin.” If the credit-worthiness of low-income customers with bank accounts can be 
assessed based on transaction performance, they will have increased access to credit. Thus far, 
18
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costs of credit than households with higher incomes.57 In effect, low-
income individuals must pay more to transform their labor into productive 
capital and are thus “under-rewarded for their talent.”58 Moreover, as noted 
above, the savings products, including bank accounts, that low-income 
persons can access generally provide low levels of return, which reduces 
their income growth and may lower incentives to save. This lower saving 
rate is a problem itself and further increases the cost and reduces the 
availability of credit to these households, which is at least in part a 
function of their savings. 
Low-income families find it difficult simply to make ends meet each 
month and lack access to short-term credit at a reasonable cost to smooth 
out earnings. The main complaint of low-income families, for example, in 
Caskey’s study, was the “insecurity and stress associated with living from 
paycheck to paycheck.”59 Most low- and moderate-income households 
manage to spend all their income each month.60 Bank account ownership 
will not suddenly change that, but account ownership may make it easier 
for low-income households to manage their finances, save even if in 
modest amounts, and access lower-cost forms of credit.  
It is difficult to determine causation, but a lack of account ownership 
is correlated with credit problems. Either unbanked low-income persons 
have lower propensities to plan financially than other low-income 
households, or lack of a bank account makes it harder to plan and save. In 
turn, once credit problems emerge, credit-impaired individuals have a 
harder time getting access to bank accounts.61 In Caskey’s survey of low-
income households, 42% of unbanked households were two months late on 
bills in the last year, compared with 28% for banked households; 41% of 
unbanked households were contacted by a debt collection agency in the 
past year, compared with 25% for banked families.62 When low-income 
unbanked families need to borrow, they must turn to expensive forms of 
credit. Only 14% of unbanked poor families carry credit cards that might 
help them smooth out payment for short-term increases in consumption or 
to weather occasional dips in income, while 59% of low-income banked 
 
Experian reports that its credit scoring system is only half as predictive of credit behavior as traditional 
scores but still provides better information than would otherwise be available for loan applicants with 
“thin” files, who without more credit information would be turned down for a loan. See W.A. Lee, 
Debit Scores May Gauge Subprime Market, AM. BANKER, Feb. 28, 2002, at 10. 
 57 BANERJEE, supra note 43, at 8-9. 
 58 Id. at 27. 
 59 Caskey, Reaching Out, supra note 20, at 83. 
 60 Hogarth et al., supra note 20, at 23 (75-83% of low and moderate-income households 
reported spending all their income each month); Sherrie L.W. Rhine et al., The Role of Alternative 
Financial Services Providers in Serving LMI Neighborhoods 17-18 (Mar. 2001) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (noting that 22% experienced financial distress in past year). 
 61 See infra note 287 and accompanying text (discussing ChexSystem and related barriers to 
account ownership). 
 62 Caskey, Reaching Out Manuscript, supra note 21, at 5.  
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households carry credit cards.63 Again, we do not know whether unbanked 
households without credit cards would be able to handle such cards if they 
became banked. 
Account ownership in and of itself is no panacea, however; even low- 
and moderate-income individuals with bank accounts often lack savings 
and turn repeatedly during the year to payday lenders (who charge on 
average 474% APR), and to other forms of high-cost credit.64 Low-income 
families often lack health insurance, and those without savings or access to 
informal networks of family and friends often use payday loans when 
faced with expenses related to birth or illness.65 Individuals may also 
borrow, of course, for less basic reasons, such as entertainment, splurges, 
gambling, and the like. Policy cannot, even if it were desirable, easily 
distinguish between the two kinds of borrowing. In my view, it is 
appropriate to increase opportunities for low-income persons to borrow at 
lower cost, even if some portion of the borrowing is taken out for reasons 
some may disfavor. Thus, I argue in Part V that strategies to bring low-
income persons into the financial services mainstream need to include 
initiatives designed to increase savings for short-term financial stability 
and to improve access to less expensive forms of credit where 
appropriate—for example, with overdraft protection, account-secured 
loans, credit cards or loans with automatic withdrawals from pay directly 
deposited into accounts, but with significantly longer terms than payday 
loans. 
Fourth, low-income families who cash their paycheck may face high 
risk of robbery or theft.66 By transitioning into bank accounts where they 
can store a portion of their earnings, withdraw funds in smaller amounts, 
 
 63 Id. See also Giving Consumers Credit: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 12, 12-14 
(2001) (statement of Delores S. Smith, Director, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, 
Federal Reserve Board) (noting that 28% of families in lowest income quintile have credit cards); 
Kennickell et al., supra note 1. Low-income holders of credit cards may also be at the maximum limit 
for those cards. 
 64 See CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 3. This APR is the equivalent of a $36 fee for a 
two-week, $200 loan. Indiana’s Department of Financial Institutions found that consumers took an 
average of thirteen loans per year, ten of which were rollovers of earlier loans, IND. DEP’T OF FIN. 
INSTS., SUMMARY OF PAYDAY LENDER EXAMINATION (1999), available at http://www.in.gov/dfi/ 
legal/paydaylend/Payday.pdf, and an Illinois Department of Financial Institutions survey found an 
average of 12.6 loan contracts over an eighteen to twenty-four month period, WOODSTOCK INST., 
Unregulated Payday Lending Pulls Vulnerable Consumers into Spiraling Debt, REINVESTMENT ALERT 
No. 14, at 3 & n.6 (2000). Payday lending and alternative forms of credit are discussed in more detail 
infra Sections II.B-D. 
 65 Rhine et al., supra note 60, at 18 & tbl.12 . 
 66 See, e.g., Rick Badie, Hispanics Frequently Targeted for Robbery; Fear of Banks, Police 
Raises Vulnerability, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 14, 1999, at 1JJ; Richard Craver, Safety and 
Numbers: Hispanics Caught Between Risks of Carrying Cash and Banking It, WINSTON-SALEM J., Jan. 
22, 2003, at D1; Christian Davenport, Seeking a Secure Financial Foothold; Banking Barriers Leave 
Area Immigrants Vulnerable to Crime, Economic Disparities, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2001, at T12; Joe 
Sexton, Report Shows Check Cashers Filling a Void, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1994, at B1. 
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pay for goods or services directly using debit, and withdraw funds outside 
of the concentrated time periods during which benefit checks and 
paychecks are commonly cashed, these families can decrease their 
exposure to risk of crime. 
Fifth, inefficiencies in the payments system impose costs on the 
national economy. Increasing the efficiency in the payments system for the 
poor could have modest positive effects on the economy as a whole. A 
Federal Reserve Board study suggests that the U.S. economy would save 
over $1 for each check that is converted to an electronic payment.67 The 
study estimates savings of $30 billion per year if one-half of current check 
volume is converted to electronic payment.68 Check processing costs 
between 0.25% and 1% of U.S. GDP, in addition to losses from fraud.69 
While low-income check volume is only a small fraction of the total, 
electronic payments for the poor could help, and, because of positive 
network externalities, funds spent converting the poor to electronic 
payment might speed conversion to electronic payments more generally. 
Helping low-income households to leapfrog over checking to electronic 
payments, just as some poor countries have been able to leapfrog over 
conventional telephone lines to cell or satellite phones, may thus have 
broader societal benefits. These effects, though positive, are of course 
likely to be quite small in relation to the overall economy. 
II. The Alternative Financial Sector 
The previous Section summarized the costs of being unbanked. This 
Part explores in depth the growing number of AFS providers, offering a 
wide range of services, including short-term loans, check cashing, bill 
payment, tax preparation and rent-to-own consumer goods, in low-income 
urban neighborhoods.70 These AFS providers, and others like them, are 
currently the only means available for many low-income persons to access 
 
 67 See Deborah Matthews, Financial Institutions Partnering with Corporations: Innovative 
Strategies for Promoting Direct Deposit, in NACHA, EBT IN THE STATES: SURVEY RESULTS, 2002 
ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS REVIEW AND BUYER’S GUIDE 46 (2002). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Governor Laurence H. Meyer, The Future of Money and of Monetary Policy, Remarks at 
Swarthmore College (Dec. 5, 2001), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/ 
2001/20011205/default.htm. 
 70 See Swagler et al., supra note 4. I focus on check cashers, payday lenders, auto title 
lenders, and refund anticipation lenders. AFS also include pawnbrokers. See generally CASKEY, 
FRINGE BANKING, supra note 6. This Part is largely focused on urban areas. Rural areas have different 
characteristics. See, e.g., CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 6; Michael A. Stegman, Banking the 
Unbanked: Untapped Market Opportunities for North Carolina’s Financial Institutions, 5 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 23 (2001). Most Native American reservations are essentially devoid of insured 
depositories. See U.S. TREASURY & HUD, ONE-STOP MORTGAGE CENTER INITIATIVE IN INDIAN 
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basic financial services. Understanding the costs and benefits of such 
services is critical to assessing the need, if any, for alternatives.  
A. Check Cashers 
1. Industry Overview 
For many years, check cashers have been used by low-income 
individuals who seek to conduct basic financial transactions such as 
cashing checks, paying bills and wiring funds. John Caskey referred to 
these customers as employing the “cash and carry” method of financial 
management. Upon receiving a paycheck, they cash the check and pay 
their bills immediately. While check cashers offer essential services, the 
fees involved in converting paper checks into cash are high, relative to an 
alternative world in which low-income households would be able to rely 
more on direct deposit into bank accounts.  
 The check-cashing industry grew dramatically during the 1980s and 
1990s. Today, there are almost 10,000 stores in the U.S. that classify their 
primary line of business as check cashing, about double the number there 
were six years ago, and almost five times the number there were fifteen 
years ago.71 The industry reports that it processes 180 million checks 
totaling $55 billion annually, generating $1.5 billion in fees.72 Most of 
these checks are low-risk payroll or government benefit checks: 80% of 
checks cashed at surveyed check cashers in the 2000 Treasury study were 
payroll checks, while 16% were government benefit checks.73 While even 
payroll checks are not without some credit and fraud risk, average losses 
from “bad” checks at check cashing firms are low. For example, Ace Cash 
Express (ACE) reports that 0.5% of the face value of checks bounce, but 
net losses after collection are 0.2%.74 By comparison, 0.64% of the face 
value of interbank checks were returned in 2000.75
Like the banking industry, the check cashing industry has undergone 
consolidation in recent years. Larger players are benefiting from greater 
 
 71 DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 13-14. This figure excludes the many thousands of 
convenience stores, liquor stores and grocery stores that offer check cashing services, for a fee or with 
purchases, to their customers. While these alternative providers are important financial service points 
for much of the low-income population, this Section focuses largely on the growing industry 
represented by “full-time” check cashers that offer a broader variety of financial services. 
 72 See Fin. Serv. Ctrs. of Am. (FiSCA), About FISCA, at http://www.fisca.org/about.htm 
(last visited Dec. 8, 2003). 
 73 DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. 
 74 See ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 19 [hereinafter ACE ANNUAL 
REPORT]. 
 75 There were 42.5 billion check payments in 2000 for a total of $39.3 trillion; 0.85% were 
returned for insufficient funds (some checks were returned more than once). The average value of a 
returned check was $700. Geoffrey R. Gerdes & Jack K. Walton II, The Use of Checks and Other Non-
Cash Payment Instruments in the United States, 88 FED. RES. BULL. 360, 360, 364-65 (2002).  
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economies of scale, shared technology platforms, and their ability to 
negotiate alliances with service providers (lenders, money transfer 
services, and ATM networks, among others).76 ACE, the largest check 
cashing chain in the country, grew from 452 outlets in 1995 to 1,163 
outlets in 2001, largely through acquiring independent stores and smaller 
chains. While check cashing remains a fragmented market overall, with 
80% of the market divided among independent operators and small 
regional chains, national chains such as ACE capture a disproportionate 
share of check cashing revenues with their strategic and numerous 
locations, broader product lines, higher volumes, and generally higher 
prices for check cashing.77
The industry’s growth has been accompanied by growing 
diversification of the products and services offered. Nearly all respondents 
to the 2000 survey provided a core of services: check cashing, money 
orders, and wire transfer.78 Many also provided an array of other products 
including lottery tickets, postage stamps, prepaid telephone cards, payday 
loans, bill payment, municipal services (such as the paying of parking 
tickets), and distribution of state benefits. These ancillary services increase 
revenue per customer while also broadening the industry’s customer base 
beyond the unbanked population. For instance, Dollar Financial claims 
that 50% of its customers have bank accounts.79 The most notable 
development in recent years has been the rapid growth in check cashers 
offering payday loan products.80 For ACE and Dollar Financial, revenues 
derived from loan products increased from an average of 4% of total 
revenue in fiscal year 1997 to an average of 29% of total revenue in 2001. 
Nearly 45 to 50% of revenue growth at these two firms over that period 
was attributable to the expansion in payday loan originations.81  
Check cashers typically have high transaction volumes and high profit 
margins, but often on a relatively small revenue base. The average chain 
outlet in 2000 processed over 8,000 transactions per month, for estimated 
 
 76 For instance, Ace Cash Express has an exclusive agreement with MoneyGram, and 
Dollar Financial with Western Union, for transmission and receipt of wire transfers. Information on 
Dollar Financial and Ace Cash Express in this Subsection is drawn from the companies’ annual 
reports. See ACE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 5; DOLLAR FIN. GROUP, INC., 2001 ANNUAL 
REPORT 10 [hereinafter DOLLAR ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 77 See DOLLAR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 15 (noting that chains control only 20% 
of the market); see also DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 64-65 (revealing that, compared to 
independently owned outlets, surveyed chains charged on average of 25% more for check cashing and 
generated two-and-half times the check-cashing volume). For money orders, surveyed chains charged 
20% less than independently owned outlets, and generated over three times the revenue, id. at 37 
fig.6.9, 40 tbl.6.8. 
 78 DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 25. 
 79 DOLLAR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 6-7. 
 80 For more on the payday lending industry generally, see infra Section II.B. 
 81 Author’s calculations based on DOLLAR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 22, and ACE 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 5. 
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annual revenue of $242,500. The estimated pre-tax return on sales for 
these chain outlets was 28.5%. On average, revenues and returns for 
independent check cashers were far lower.82  
2. Customers 
Check-cashing industry clientele are drawn, for the most part, from 
lower-income urban households. ACE describes its core customer group as 
having annual family incomes of approximately $30,000, and Dollar 
indicates that its check-cashing customers’ median household income is 
$22,500. In most cities, check cashers locate in neighborhoods with below-
median incomes and above-average minority population shares.83 Dollar 
describes its store base as a “mix of urban sites, which are located in high-
traffic shopping areas, and suburban sites, which are located in strip malls 
near multi-family housing complexes.”84
Check cashers do not provide financial services to only unbanked 
consumers, nor do all unbanked consumers obtain their financial services 
primarily through check cashers. The story is much more complex, and 
local context seems to matter greatly. In lower-income neighborhoods of 
New York and Los Angeles, for instance, 71% of unbanked individuals 
who cashed checks primarily used check-cashing outlets, as did 28% of 
banked individuals.85 In Atlanta, Oklahoma City, and eastern 
Pennsylvania, only 17% of unbanked individuals cashed checks at a check 
casher; almost half used a bank.86 In Chicago, about two-thirds of all 
households who accessed some form of financial services at check cashers 
were found to have bank accounts, but, as one would expect, unbanked 
households are much more likely to use check cashers than are banked 
households.87 Banco Popular reports that 38% of the customers at Popular 
Cash Express own a checking account, and 33% own a savings account.88
 
 82 DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 65. 
 83 DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 16, 19; see also Check Cashers: Moving From the 
Fringes to the Financial Mainstream, COMMUNITIES & BANKING, Summer 1999, at 2, available at 
http://www.bos.frb.org/commdev/pdf/summer99.pdf. 
 84 DOLLAR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 4. 
 85 Dunham, supra note 19, at 36-37. 
 86 JOHN CASKEY, FILENE RESEARCH INST., LOWER INCOME AMERICANS, HIGHER COST 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 22 (1997) [hereinafter CASKEY, FILENE INSTITUTE REPORT]. This finding that 
half of the unbanked cash their checks at a bank is echoed in a survey of current and former North 
Carolina welfare recipients. See STEGMAN & FARIS, supra note 33. 
 87 Rhine et al., supra note 20, at 68. Unbanked households are 14.6 percentage points more 
likely than banked ones to use check cashers. Unbanked households in LMI areas are 7.6 percentage 
points more likely to use check cashers than unbanked elsewhere. Unbanked black households are 17.8 
percentage points more likely than unbanked white households to use check cashers. Unbanked 
Hispanic households are 7.5 percentage points more likely than unbanked white households to use 
check cashers. Id.  
 88 Banco Popular, Presentation to the Financial Access Planning Group, San Juan, Puerto 
Rico (Jan. 11, 2002) (notes on file with author). 
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Not all of the unbanked use or pay for these services or pay high fees. 
While there is great regional variation and much further study is needed, a 
large portion of the unbanked manage to avoid paying high costs for at 
least some of their financial services. For example, in one study, Caskey 
found that only 20%-40% of unbanked survey respondents paid fees to 
cash checks.89 In another study, in New York and Los Angeles, more than 
half of the unbanked reported incurring no cost to cash checks, either 
because they receive their income in cash or have no income (33%) or 
cash their checks for free at banks and grocery stores (16%).90 The 
unbanked mostly use check cashers to cash checks. When low-income 
households use banks to cash checks, they usually use the bank of issue, 
rather than their own or some other bank.91 Most likely, these represent 
efforts by workers to cash payroll or personal checks “on-us” at the 
employer’s bank. For the portion of such checks that are payroll checks, 
rather than personal checks, direct deposit could become an alternative to 
check-cashing, or to the costly use of bank teller and processing time (for 
which some banks are beginning to charge non-customers).  
Check cashers appear to capture both some portion of the unbanked 
population and some portion of the banked population as customers. Why 
might individuals with bank accounts be drawn to check cashing outlets? 
Some may be living from paycheck to paycheck, do not have direct 
deposit offered by their employer(s), and find that they lack sufficient 
liquidity to wait the two-to-three days for their bank to clear access to 
funds from a deposited check. Others might regularly wire money to 
relatives abroad, which, until recent adoption of dual ATM-technology at 
some banks, was generally less expensive at check cashers than at banks.92 
Still others may not be able to afford the fees or minimum balances 
associated with checking accounts and thus might own only a savings 
account without any capacity for transactional services. Some may need to 
make bill payments by purchasing money orders at a check casher, either 
because they live in a neighborhood where personal checks are generally 
not accepted, or because they do not have a checking account. A portion 
may favor the more convenient hours, locations, culture, or languages 
spoken at check cashers, and not be willing to use ATMs.  
One attribute that may distinguish some users of check cashers, both 
banked and unbanked, from other low-income workers who use banks, 
may be the nature of their work arrangements. Dollar Financial states that 
“many of its customers are workers or independent contractors who 
receive payment on an irregular basis and generally in the form of a 
 
 89 See Caskey, Reaching Out, supra note 20, at 83. 
 90 Dunham, supra note 19, at 53 fig.6.  
 91 Id. at 36-37.  
 92 See infra Subsection III.B.4. 
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check.”93 Although little independent analysis exists to corroborate 
Dollar’s assertion, it makes sense on its face.94 These workers do not have 
the benefit of a steady relationship with an employer that would tend to 
support a direct-deposit relationship with a bank, nor do they generally 
have the employment references that are often required to open a bank 
account. In addition, many undocumented immigrants work within this 
informal economy and, in many cases, their undocumented status makes it 
less likely that banks will open bank accounts for them.95 A Treasury study 
found a significant correlation between outlet location and the percentage 
of working adults in the neighborhood who annually worked less than fifty 
weeks total, although the report also found such a connection between 
outlet locations and low neighborhood income; the two variables are likely 
correlated rather than independent.96 Given that 80% of checks cashed at 
check cashers are payroll checks, and another sixteen percentage points are 
government checks, it should be possible to convert a large portion of 
these checks to direct deposit if low-income workers had access to bank 
accounts. Even for part-time workers, large employers or temporary 
employment firms can convert income checks to direct deposits. 
3. Costs  
As with most businesses in the retail sector, regional variations 
abound in the prices that consumers pay for services offered through check 
cashers.97 The Dove survey revealed that, across the four markets studied 
(Atlanta, Boston, San Antonio, and San Diego), check cashing prices were 
sensitive to differences in cost-of-living and level of competition. In San 
Antonio, where wages were lower and AFS competition greater, fees to 
cash payroll and government checks averaged about 1.5% of the check 
face value. In Boston, where higher costs of living prevailed and one chain 
dominated the AFS market, average fees were 2.5% of the check value. 
Atlanta and San Diego fell somewhere in between these figures. Fees to 
cash personal checks were much higher, but most outlets refuse to cash 
such checks given their greater risk. Across the four markets, chain outlets 
charged a higher percentage fee on average than did independent 
 
 93 DOLLAR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 8.  
 94 There is, however, a great deal of evidence that users of check cashers are much more 
likely to be unemployed than those who use banks. See John Caskey, The Future of Commercial 
Check-Cashing (Jan. 2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
 95 For progress in this regard, however, see infra text accompanying notes 298-301 
(discussing matricular identification and growth of competition for delivery of remittances). 
 96 See DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 49, 54, 57, 60. 
 97 Available sources focus on large chains of stand-alone check cashers and do not reveal a 
great deal about the variability in pricing for check casher products, nor do they reflect the differential 
effects of state regulation on check casher prices. However, they are sufficient to give a sense of what 
some consumers pay to access basic financial services in the AFS.  
26
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 49 [2004]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art49
C:\Documents and Settings\johnloyd\My Documents\attach\Banking the Poor JREG FINAL PRINTER PROOF (March 7, 2004).doc 
 Banking the Poor 
147 
                                                                                                                        
operators.98 ACE’s fees for cashing payroll checks average 2.2% of the 
face amount of the check, and Dollar’s fees average 3.3%.99  
Chain check cashers processed an average of 3,400 money orders per 
month. Fees for money orders were only fifty to sixty cents, and were 
lower at chains due primarily to the favorable contracts they are able to 
negotiate with money order suppliers.100 Money order fees at check 
cashers are lower than those charged by most banks, whose customers 
mostly do not use them. In addition, the U.S. Postal Service, for purposes 
of comparison, charges ninety cents for a domestic money order under 
$500, and $1.25 for money orders of $500 to $1,000.101
Overall costs for using check cashers vary dramatically by patterns of 
usage. With respect to bill payment services, only 36% of the unbanked 
surveyed in New York and Los Angeles overall incur money order or bill 
payment fees from check cashers.102 Many of the unbanked in that survey 
received cash income, had no income, or were able to cash their income 
checks at banks or stores, often at little or no fee.103 Of those paying check 
cashing fees at check cashers, two-thirds incurred costs of less than $100 
annually. The one-third of those surveyed who incurred more than $100 
annually comprise only 11% of the total unbanked participants in the 
survey. Thus, the study suggests that, at least in New York and Los 
Angeles, the highest cost of using alternative financial service providers 
may be relatively concentrated among a portion of the unbanked.104  
To get a sense of the costs to a consumer who conducts most of his 
financial business through a check-cashing outlet, however, consider a 
customer that Dollar might describe as among its typical clients—a young, 
immigrant day laborer with intermittent income and a family at home in 
Mexico. He perhaps earned about $18,000 last year, but some of it was in 
cash, and some of it was paid in checks that he could cash for no fee at a 
local issuing bank. Altogether, he used a check casher to cash $12,000 in 
checks, at an average fee of 2% of the check face value—$240 total. Once 
a month, he wires $500 home to his family, at an average fee of $20, or 
 
 98 See DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 34, 48-61, 64. 
 99 See ACE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 4; DOLLAR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 
76, at 8. ACE’s average fee has remained flat, while Dollar’s has grown over the last five years. ACE 
paradoxically imposes surcharges to cash tax refund checks, ACE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 
5, which are often large and low-risk; ACE’s ability to surcharge for cashing these checks may be 
derived from its relationship with major tax preparation services. See infra Section II.D. 
 100 The Dove finding is corroborated by data from ACE, which indicates an average fee of 
57 cents per money order in 2001. DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 10 fig.1.3, 33 tbl.6.5, 38 tbl.6.6; 
ACE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 24-25. Dollar’s average fee was higher, at 93 cents. DOLLAR 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 10. 
 101 U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL § 816.0 (2002). Because postal money 
orders are replaced if lost or stolen, they may also be used by the unbanked simply as a store of value. 
 102 See Dunham, supra note 19, at 55 fig.9. 
 103 Id. at 35-36, 43-44, 53 fig.6, 56 fig.11. 
 104 See id. at 14. 
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$240 annually. His share of the rent is paid in cash, but he purchases three 
money orders a month to pay the apartment’s electric bill, his cellular 
phone bill, and his car insurance. At fifty-five cents each, he pays $20 for 
money orders annually. All together, these fees would add up to $500 
annually for this low-income consumer, nearly 3% of his annual income. 
4. Regulation 
The regulatory structure governing check cashing may have some 
influence on fees. A number of states cap fees that may be charged by 
check cashers. However, check cashers also partner with national banks, 
which are permitted to set non-interest charges according to “sound 
banking judgment”; the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
takes the position that state laws limiting or prohibiting such charges are 
pre-empted.105 Other state laws governing check cashers may have an 
effect on fees. For example, to the extent that they are enforced, state rules 
limiting the number of check cashers that can operate in a given area may 
decrease AFS competition and increase check cashing fees.106  
5. Reforms  
Given the high cost structure of a paper- and labor-intensive industry, 
it is doubtful that costs of check cashing can be brought down significantly 
with existing technology.107 Reduced state regulatory barriers to entry may 
help enhance competition if they are accompanied by consistent disclosure 
requirements and enforcement that would make it easier for consumers to 
shop for financial services. Some have suggested that banks themselves, 
with cheaper (direct) access to the payments system, might effectively 
compete for check-cashing services.108 This Article argues that it would be 
cheaper, and the services provided more useful, if banks were to compete 
 
 105 The OCC’s position on non-interest charges is functionally similar to a national bank’s 
authority to “export” the interest rate permissible for the national bank to charge in its home location to 
the state where it is making the loan. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001 (2003); see also 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994) 
(defining permissible rates of interest as determined by state where bank is “located”); Marquette Nat’l 
Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978) (finding that national bank may “export” 
usury law of state in which bank is headquartered to customers in another state). Exportation is also 
available to state-chartered banks, 12 U.S.C. § 1463(g) (2003). Interest rate exportation is discussed in 
further detail below, infra Sections II.B (discussing payday lending) and II.C (discussing title loans). 
 106 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:15A-41.e (West 2003) (determining check casher may not 
be licensed to operate within 2,500 feet of another check casher); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 369 (Consol. 
2001) (determining check casher may not be licensed to operate within three-tenths of a mile of 
another check casher).  
 107 See infra Section IV.B (discussing technological developments). Many of the 
technological developments thus far employed by payday lenders and check cashers do not seem to 
have brought down prices for consumers.  
 108 See Caskey, Reaching Out, supra note 20. 
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with check cashers by offering electronically based banking services, 
instead of competing with them as check cashers. Advances in direct 
deposit, debit card infrastructure, and electronic bill payment will also be 
required to bring down the costs of income conversion. 
B. Payday Lending 
Payday lenders provide short-term consumer loans to low- and 
moderate-income working people who have bank accounts. In the 
traditional “payday loan” transaction, the borrower writes a postdated (or 
undated) personal check to a lender. In return, the lender advances the 
borrower a cash amount equivalent to the face value of the check minus a 
finance charge. The lender holds the check before either depositing it or, 
more commonly, receiving cash repayment directly from the borrower, 
usually on the borrower’s payday. In an updated form of the traditional 
transaction, no check is written; instead, the borrower signs an 
authorization that permits the lender to debit his bank account on a future 
date for the amount of the loan plus the finance charge. Loan terms are 
typically two weeks. Payday lending has become controversial because of 
concerns that the loans are expensive; that the structure of the product—a 
short term loan with a balloon payment and high fees—leads to defaults or 
borrowers falling into a “debt trap” as they repeatedly “roll over” the loan; 
and that payday lenders use misleading disclosures and aggressive 
collection. 
1. Industry Overview 
Commercial check-cashing outlets have been in the United States 
since the 1930s. Payday lenders, on the other hand, did not operate as a 
formal industry until the early 1990s, although the short-term lending 
function has long been filled by pawnshops, auto title lenders, retail 
installment credit, and loan sharks, to name a few.109 As Caskey notes, 
most payday lenders prior to the 1990s were check cashers that made 
payday loans as a casual extension of their core business; he estimates that 
there were probably fewer than 200 at the time.110 By 2000, there were 
more than 10,000 payday lenders doing business in the U.S., with $2 
 
 109 As an illustration of payday lenders’ recent emergence as a formal sector, the Nexis news 
search service finds no occurrences of the word “payday loan” prior to a few articles in 1994 in some 
newspapers in the southern U.S. (although as noted in the text, other forms of short-term lending were 
certainly available). By contrast, the word “check casher” turns up in New York Times articles dating 
back to the late 1960s—as far back as the database goes. 
 110 JOHN CASKEY, FILENE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE ECONOMICS OF PAYDAY LENDING 4 
(2002) [hereinafter CASKEY, PAYDAY LENDING].  
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billion in revenue.111 Major pawn chains recently have entered the payday 
lending business.112
Payday lenders annually make about sixty-five million loans to 
between eight and ten million households, totaling more than $10 billion in 
loan value in recent years.113 The industry reports gross margins of 30%-
45% of revenue, with losses at 1%-1.3% of receivables and return on 
investment of 24%.114 As in the check-cashing industry, consolidation has 
created a few large payday lender chains with an important presence 
across markets, although the industry overall remains rather fragmented. 
The three largest “monoline” chains have 2,600 outlets combined.115 While 
the payday loan industry nationwide grew significantly in the 1990s, its 
growth was uneven, with widely varying penetration rates in different 
states. Florida and Illinois, for instance, are each home to about 500 
outlets, while the smaller states of North Carolina and Missouri have 900 
and 800 outlets, respectively.116 The State of California, home to about one 
in eight persons in the U.S., is home to about one in five of the nation’s 
payday lenders. As Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr., has 
noted, “California alone has more payday loan offices—nearly 2,000—
than it does McDonalds and Burger Kings . . . .”117 This patchwork of 
growth and concentration may be related to divergent and changing state 
regulations governing payday lending.118
Payday loan prices in a number of states would have routinely 
exceeded the statutory limits on permissible interest rates codified in state 
usury laws. In the 1990s, however, the industry focused on carving out 
exceptions from these laws for their loans.119 Moreover, payday lending 
has occurred at rates above state usury ceilings through arrangements 
 
 111 Jerry L. Robinson & G.L. Lewis, Stephens, Inc., The Developing Payday Advance 
Business (1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 112 See CASH AM. INT’L, INC., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 2-3 (2002) [hereinafter CASH 
AMERICA ANNUAL REPORT] (anticipating 2002 payday loan volume of $100 million, representing 20-
25% of Cash America’s loan volume). Two other major pawnbroking chains, EZCorp and First Cash 
Financial, also now derive significant revenue from payday lending. See EZCORP, INC., 2002 ANNUAL 
REPORT 35 (2002) (reporting payday lending at 4% of total revenue); FIRST CASH FIN. SERV., INC., 
2002 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (2002) (reporting significant growth in payday lending). 
 113 See CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 4-5; Robinson & Lewis, supra note 111, at 9; 
FiSCA, Deferred Deposit/Pay Day Advance Fact Sheet, available at 
http://www.fisca.org/defdepfacts.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2003). 
 114 See Robinson & Lewis, supra note 111, at 10. 
 115 CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 4.  
 116 Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model That 
Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 9, 11 (2003). 
 117 John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the ABA National 
Community and Economic Development Conference (Mar. 18, 2002), available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2002-24a.txt.  
 118 See supra text accompanying notes 105-06 (discussing state check cashing laws) and 
infra notes 163-87 (discussing state payday lending laws). 
 119 CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 27. 
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between out-of-state banks, thrifts, and payday loan originators. Generally 
speaking, under the National Bank Act, the payday lender may arrange a 
loan between the bank and the borrower at terms that are subject to the 
interest rate ceiling (if any) in the home state of the bank, not to interest 
rate ceilings of the state in which the payday lender is located.120 Under 
many of these arrangements, however, once the loan is booked, the payday 
lender immediately purchases the entire loan from the bank, with the bank 
retaining little or no risk. In effect, the lender has “rented” the bank’s name 
for purposes of making a legal loan.121 State-level efforts to restrict payday 
lending had been stymied by partnerships between national and state-
chartered banks and thrifts, and payday lenders, many of which have now 
been shut down by banking regulators.122
The advent of bank-nonbank partnerships in payday loan origination 
has led to increased technological sophistication to compete with payday 
lenders that approve loans “on the spot.” When a potential borrower 
completed a loan application at an ACE location, ACE transmitted the 
borrower’s data electronically to its former partner Goleta National 
Bank.123 If Goleta approved the loan, it opened a bank account in the name 
of the borrower, and activated a debit card and PIN connected to that 
account. ACE delivered the card and PIN to the borrower, who could 
withdraw the funds at the store or at another retail ATM. The annual report 
states that this process, from start to finish, took only twenty minutes.  
The drive towards consolidation in the payday lending industry might 
be expected to improve industry standards. Smaller independent 
businesses may be more likely to write out loan forms manually, which 
may increase the likelihood of error and violation of truth-in-lending laws. 
Smaller firms also may not have access to the TeleTrack service, a tool 
that many lenders use to reduce their risk by determining whether the 
applicant has other outstanding payday loans or credit problems.124 In 
theory, partnerships with insured depositories could have improved 
standards, but evidence to date suggests the opposite. For example, a 
 
 120 See supra note 105. 
 121 In January 2002, the OCC directed Eagle National Bank, partner with Dollar Financial 
Group in such an arrangement, to cease its payday lending operations. News Release, OCC, OCC 
Orders Eagle To Cease Payday Lending Program, NR 2002-01 (Jan. 3, 2002), available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2002-01.doc. Comptroller John D. Hawke, Jr. said: “The bank 
essentially rented out its national bank charter to a payday lender in order to facilitate the nonbank 
entity’s evasion of the requirements of state law that would otherwise be applicable to it.” Id. For a 
similar arrangement under which the payday lender assumes most of the loan risk, see CASH AMERICA 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 27 (“The Bank assigns each advance that remains unpaid after its 
maturity date to the Company at a discount from the amount owed by the borrower.”). The OCC has 
essentially shut down payday-national bank partnerships. See infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 122 See CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 18-20. 
 123 ACE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 5. 
 124 TeleTrack is a credit-reporting agency specializing in subprime credit transactions. See 
CASKEY, FILENE REPORT, supra note 86, at 6. 
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central basis for the OCC’s termination of one bank’s payday lending 
partnership was that the bank was rolling over payday loans multiple times 
without any assessment of the borrower’s ability to repay.125
What explains the incredible boom in payday lending in the 1990s? A 
combination of factors was at work, probably not dissimilar from the 
factors that Caskey found were responsible for the rise in check cashing in 
the 1980s and early 1990s.126 Deregulation in the banking industry 
increased competition and decreased the availability of less-profitable 
products, such as short-term, small loans.127 Retailers have largely 
replaced sales installment contracts with sales by credit cards, limiting 
financing options for those without credit cards.128 Finance companies, 
while once essential providers of small loans, over the last decade have 
focused on home equity financing,129 which can be an important source of 
liquidity for consumer purchases or debt consolidation, but only for those 
who are home owners and have equity in their homes. A number of studies 
in the 1980s and early 1990s found that nearly 20% of U.S. households 
were credit-constrained.130 Moreover, a growing number of individuals 
have little to no liquid savings. In a financial emergency, they have no 
“backup” funds to meet their immediate needs, and may see a payday loan 
as the only viable solution.131 Moreover, the number of borrowers with 
adverse credit histories is on the rise.132 Some payday borrowers may be 
bad risks. Despite the rapid growth of credit card availability, even among 
low-income families, many of these credit-impaired borrowers are not able 
to take advantage of credit alternatives such as credit card advances or 
overdraft lines on their checking accounts. For some credit-impaired 
individuals, establishing a history of managing a bank account, coupled 
with financial education may permit them over time to gain access to 
credit. For others, such access is unlikely ever to occur. 
On the supply side, payday lending is a highly profitable enterprise, 
 
 125 See In re First National Bank in Brookings, OCC Consent Order No. 2003-1 (Jan. 17, 
2003). 
 126 See CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 6, at 7. 
 127 See FIN. SERV. CTRS. OF AM. (FiSCA), FREEDOM OF CHOICE FOR CONSUMERS: THE 
TRUTH ABOUT DEFERRED DEPOSIT SERVICES (1999), at http://www.fisca.org/ddresponse.htm (last 
visited Dec. 8, 2003) [hereinafter FISCA REPORT] (noting that less than 0.1% of California bank loans 
in 1996 were for less than $1,000). 
 128 See White, supra note 5, at 449. 
 129 CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 6, at 108. 
 130 See, e.g., Tullio Jappelli, Who Is Credit Constrained in the U.S. Economy?, 105 Q.J. 
ECON. 219 (1990).  
 131 See GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, CREDIT RESEARCH CTR., 
GEORGETOWN UNIV., PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER DEMAND 
54-55 (2001) [hereinafter CFSA STUDY]. 
 132 See Kennickell et al., supra note 1, at 26 (noting rising percentage of families with 
payments late by more than sixty days). 
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with a return on sales of 30%.133 Check cashers may see payday loans not 
only as a profitable product, but also as a way to diversify their customer 
base, especially in light of a long-term relative decline in the market for 
checks (as compared to electronic payments).134
2. Customers 
The first thing that distinguishes payday loan customers from many 
check casher customers is that the former must, by definition, have bank 
accounts. Lenders are generally unwilling to advance funds to individuals 
who cannot provide them with proof of account ownership. While payday 
loan consumers are not unbanked, they could well be referred to as 
“underbanked”: They may lack the savings, credit history, or financial 
know-how to avoid purchasing a high-cost credit instrument. 
Customers that use payday lenders tend to be low- or moderate- 
income, younger than the average age of the population, and otherwise 
credit constrained. One study found that half the customers surveyed had 
household incomes between $25,000 and $50,000.135 Average annual 
income for customers in studies done by several states was consistently 
lower, around $25,000 in each case.136 Most customers were below the age 
of forty-five.137 While younger than the U.S. population as a whole, 
customers were well into their working life. 
With respect to ownership of assets and access to alternative forms of 
credit, the CFSA study reported that 42% of respondents indicated that 
they owned their home,138 consistent with the Illinois finding. In 
Wisconsin, 26% of respondents were homeowners. Some payday 
borrowers could tap into their home equity for emergency credit, but bad 
credit records may preclude that option for others, and the sub-prime home 
equity loans held by some of these homeowners have their own high costs 
 
 133 See Stegman & Faris, supra note 116, at 10. 
 134 See generally FED. RESERVE SYS., RETAIL PAYMENTS RESEARCH PROJECT: A SNAPSHOT 
OF THE U.S. PAYMENTS LANDSCAPE (2002) [hereinafter RETAIL PAYMENTS STUDY] (noting the 
relative decline of checks as compared to electronic payments, despite continued growth in the 
absolute number of checks cleared). 
 135 CFSA STUDY, supra note 131, at 28. Results from the survey should be treated with 
caution. From a random sample of 5,430 payday loan customers, the study surveyed only 427 
individuals—not a representative sample. The study was sponsored by the Community Financial 
Services Association of America (CFSA), the industry trade association for payday lenders. The 
survey was conducted during the Christmas shopping season.  
 136 See CASKEY, PAYDAY LENDING, supra note 110, at 10-12. Caskey notes that because the 
CFSA study interviewed only customers of monoline payday stores, it may have captured a higher-
income population than if payday borrowers from check cashing outlets had been included. Id. at 11 
n.24. 
 137 CFSA STUDY, supra note 131, at 29. 
 138 CFSA STUDY, supra note 131, at 42. 
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and risks.139 In the Illinois study, only 11% of customers had a bank-issued 
revolving credit card,140 much lower than overall rates reported for the 
general population even at the lowest income levels.141 In one study, 56% 
of payday customers had credit cards, but payday borrowers were three 
times as likely to have debt payment-to-income ratios of 30% or higher, 
and four times as likely to have declared bankruptcy, as compared to the 
adult population at large.142
Another study, controlling for socioeconomic variables, indicated that 
African-American families, families who had bounced one or more checks 
in the past five years, and families in neighborhoods where new check 
cashers and payday lenders had opened were significantly more likely to 
borrow from a payday lender.143 Some anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the decision to use payday loans may be influenced more by past credit 
problems than by income.144  
In summary, payday loans are not products for the poorest of the 
poor. But they seem to be an increasingly popular credit tool among a 
growing moderate-income working population that has credit problems, 
often has little savings, and may view payday loans as a convenient, or 
perhaps only, option for accessing cash in a financial crunch. 
3. Costs 
Payday loans carry high implicit annual interest rates. A 2001 survey 
of payday lenders revealed that nearly all charged APRs in excess of 
300%. The most common APR quoted by lenders was 390%—the 
equivalent of a $15 fee on a two-week $100 loan.145 Nearly a third, 
however, quoted fees that amounted to APRs of at least 500%; the average 
APR was 470%. At an average loan size of about $300, the average fee for 
 
 139 See BARR, supra note 1 (addressing the problem of sub prime home equity lending).  
 140 ILL. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., SHORT TERM LENDING FINAL REPORT 22 (1999), available at 
http://www.state.il.us/dfi/ccd/pdfs/Shorterm.pdf (last accessed Dec. 17, 2003) [hereinafter ILLINOIS 
REPORT].  
 141 Those holding credit cards constitute 28% of the lowest income quintile, 58% of the next 
income quintile, and 68% of the adult U.S. population. Thomas A. Durkin, Credit Cards: Use and 
Consumer Attitudes, 1970-2000, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 623, 626 (2000). Credit card holding among low-
income families has been increasing, with the advent of risk-passed credit card pricing, at the same 
time as payday lending. Bank-type credit card holding increased from 2% in 1970 to 17% in 1989 and 
28% in 1995, where it remained in 1998; but the share of outstanding balances of those in the lowest 
income quintile increased only slightly, from 2% in 1970 to 5% in 1998. In the second lowest income 
quintile, bank-type credit card ownership increased from 9% in 1970 to 36% in 1989, 54% in 1995, 
and 58% in 1998; the share of outstanding balances increased from 9% to 13% over the period. Id. 
 142 CFSA STUDY, supra note 131, at 44-46. 
 143 See Stegman & Faris, supra note 116, at 18 tbl.5. 
 144 Peter T. Kilborn, New Lenders with Huge Fees Thrive on Workers with Debts, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 18, 1999, at A1. 
 145 CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 3. 
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the average loan is about $54.146
These APRs are, of course, high compared to more traditional credit 
options like credit cards.147 This is due, in part, to the higher transaction 
costs associated with underwriting and servicing payday loans compared 
to other forms of credit. Payday loans, unlike credit cards, require lenders 
to interact face-to-face with borrowers each time they originate a new 
payday loan. They need to conduct more follow up with borrowers than 
other lenders, and must charge enough to cover loan losses.148 
Notwithstanding these differences, high store profitability indicates that 
prices may be higher than one would expect in more efficient segments of 
the financial services market. Further research is warranted on possible 
barriers to further price reductions, including the possibility that variations 
in state laws raise the costs to national chains seeking to pursue payday 
lending on a national basis; the possibility that disclosures are not 
adequately policed so that consumers are not fully informed of prices; and 
the possibility that these price structures are inherent in the labor-intensive 
nature of the transaction. 
Payday lenders argue that their prices are comparable to one possible 
alternative for a cash-strapped consumer—bouncing a check.149 Bounced 
check fees, according to a Federal Reserve study, averaged $20.73 at 
banks in 2001,150 so depending on the face value of the bounced check, a 
payday loan could be a more or less expensive short-term option. 
Moreover, bouncing a check is not the only response other than a payday 
loan to the problem of credit constraints.151 Payday lenders also argue that 
an annualized percentage rate is not a fair tool for assessing the price of 
short-term credit.152 APRs are widely used for other short-term credit, 
 
 146 In its annual report, Ace Cash Express notes that its average loan amount in fiscal year 
2001 was $269. ACE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 4. 
 147 Rhine reports that 68% of payday loan customers in Chicago had credit cards. Rhine et 
al., supra note 60, at 17. Credit card interest rates averaged between 13-16% during 1997-2002. BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE PROFITABILITY OF CREDIT CARD OPERATIONS OF 
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 7 (2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ 
rptcongress/creditcard/2002/ccprofit.pdf. 
 148 The high APRs and balloon payments that payday lenders charge and their loan losses are 
mutually reinforcing. That is, costly credit induces loan losses. Loan losses increase the cost of credit. 
See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981). 
 149 The consequence of not being able to pay when a payday loan comes due—unless a 
rollover occurs—is either bounced check fees paid to one’s bank (and the payday lender) or other 
forms of collection that are even more costly to borrowers. 
 150 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON 
RETAIL FEES AND SERVICES OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 5 (2002), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/2002fees.pdf [hereinafter RETAIL FEES STUDY]. 
 151 See infra Subsection II.B.5.  
 152 See FISCA REPORT, supra note 127. 
Computing charges on an annual basis simply does not make sense in evaluating 
the real cost of a short term product whose anticipated usage will seldom exceed 
14 to 30 days at the most. . . . [T]here is a theoretical APR for a deferred deposit 
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however, such as the monthly balance on bank-type revolving credit cards, 
even though nearly 60% of card holders pay off their balances at the end of 
each month.153
Many borrowers, moreover, take out payday loans repeatedly 
throughout the year. The high incidence of loan renewals, or “rollovers,” 
in the payday loan industry is one of its most salient features. Upon 
maturity of the loan, many borrowers find themselves unable to repay the 
loan principal in full. As a result, the lender allows them to pay the finance 
charge on the loan, and to roll the remaining principal—plus a new finance 
charge—over into a new loan. A “same-day advance” is a functional 
equivalent of the rollover. The borrower pays the loan in full, but that 
same day takes out another payday loan in an amount equivalent to the 
balance paid earlier. Still other borrowers pay off the loan with proceeds 
from another payday lender. 
Evidence from multiple states points to the fact that significant 
proportions of payday loan consumers roll their loans over on a frequent, if 
not habitual, basis.154 A study of payday borrowers in Illinois found that 
the median borrower had more than ten loan contracts over a two-year 
period, and that one-fifth of borrowers had twenty or more contracts in that 
time.155 In Wisconsin, 56% of payday borrowers took out at least eleven 
loans in one twelve-month period.156 In Indiana, 77% of all payday 
transactions were rollovers, and the average annual number of loan 
renewals was ten.157 In North Carolina, the typical payday loan customer 
took out seven loans in one year from one lender.158 The CFSA study 
found that three-quarters of payday borrowers rolled over their loan at 
least once, and that 30% had seven or more rollovers.159 Using the 
 
service advance, but nobody enters into a transaction with the intent to pay or 
receive anything like that amount. 
 153 Durkin, supra note 141, at 625 (noting that 58% pay balance in full); see also Thomas A. 
Durkin, Consumers and Credit Disclosures: Credit Cards and Credit Insurance, 88 FED. RES. BULL. 
201 (2002) (finding that consumers are generally aware of APR disclosures on credit cards and find 
disclosures useful). 
 154 See CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 7. These statistics may understate the number 
of rollovers, because the states capture information only on same-lender rollovers, not on customers 
using multiple lenders. Id. at 8. 
 155 See WOODSTOCK INST., supra note 64.  
 156 WIS. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., REVIEW OF PAYDAY LENDING IN WISCONSIN (2001). This 
study, among others, does not account for the fact that by only looking within a specified time period, 
rather than at a specified group of borrowers over time, it discounts the experiences of first-time 
borrowers who begin borrowing near the end of the period. To the extent that they have similar 
borrowing patterns to those who borrowed throughout the period, the prevalence of rollovers may be 
understated. See Caskey, Reaching Out, supra note 20. 
 157 Senate Forum on High-Interest Paycheck Loans, 106th Cong. (Dec. 15, 1999) (opening 
statement of Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman).  
 158 Stegman & Faris, supra note 116, at 20-21. This statistic does not take into account the 
frequent use of multiple lenders by one consumer either for simultaneous borrowings or for serial 
borrowing—borrowing from firm B to pay firm A.  
 159 CFSA STUDY, supra note 131, at 39. 
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Wisconsin statistic as an example, the typical payday loan consumer, who 
takes out eleven two-week payday loans per year, for the average loan 
amount of $300, at the average 470% APR from the Consumer Federation 
of America (CFA) survey, spends nearly $600 annually in fees. 
Frequent-use customers are the revenue drivers for payday loan 
businesses. In North Carolina in 2000, 40% of all payday loan revenues 
were generated by the 18% of customers who took out an average of at 
least one loan per month.160 Each 1% increase in the share of customers 
who borrow at least monthly from the company increased the outlet’s 
bottom line by $790.161
The frequent use of payday loans should perhaps not come as a 
surprise. On its face, the typical transaction appears to be the product of 
underwriting that assumes that the borrower will not be able to repay the 
loan within two weeks, but will have to rollover the loan. Most lenders 
would be rightly skeptical that a moderate-income borrower who turns to a 
payday lender for $300 would be able to afford an additional $50 out of 
her next paycheck to cover the finance charge, beyond the $300 balloon 
payment she must make to repay the principal, a mere two weeks hence. If 
she is in fact able to repay the loan principal and the fee on time, the 
amount she pays may be enough to send her back to a payday lender when 
cash runs short before her next pay day. 
Over time, one would expect a market with returns on sales exceeding 
30% to attract new entrants who charge lower prices, or to convince 
existing participants to lower prices to attract new customers. Currently, 
competition takes place for location, convenience, and, perhaps, size of 
loan. Price competition would lead to downward pressure on prices 
marketwide, presumably making these loan products more affordable for 
credit-constrained families. At the same time, however, the available 
evidence indicates that frequent users of payday loans account for a 
disproportionate share of industry revenues, and that stores in search of 
greater profits would market repeated use to more of their clients. If 
product prices were lowered by an appreciable amount, more customers 
would be able to repay their loans, and the number using the products 
frequently to repay prior loans would decrease. However, the number of 
customers using payday loans for other uses would presumably rise with a 
decline in loan costs. Consolidation in the payday loan industry suggests 
that the large chains would increasingly use proprietary technology to 
 
 160 Stegman & Faris, supra note 116, at 21.  
 161 Promoting rollovers was also uncovered in the OCC’s action against Eagle National 
Bank: “The OCC also found that Dollar actively promoted rollovers of the Bank’s payday loans—
without the Bank’s knowledge—by providing an incentive to Dollar’s employees, which resulted in a 
higher volume of rollovers than new loan originations and a misuse of the loan product for long-term 
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deliver loans faster and reduce losses.  
Even with greater competition among payday lenders, however, loan 
prices might remain high, given that borrowers usually are not able to 
develop positive credit histories. Payday lenders usually do not report 
these histories to the credit bureaus. Positive credit histories could 
otherwise be used to lower their cost of borrowing by seeking better rates 
from competing lenders based on their solid credit history.162 Moreover, 
lower prices alone would not address the basic problem created by these 
short term loans—the debt trap most borrowers find themselves in as they 
repeatedly rollover payday loans during the course of the year. 
4. Regulation.  
The regulatory landscape for payday lenders is evolving, as states 
react in divergent ways to the growth of payday lending, and as the OCC 
and other federal bank and thrift regulators respond to partnerships 
between AFS providers and insured depository institutions.  
The evidence on the prevalence of rollovers has led many states to 
adopt limits on the number of consecutive times a payday lender may 
renew a loan, and has led the industry’s trade association to adopt a four-
rollover limit in its “best practices.” But these efforts have been to little 
effect. These rules leave open a big loophole: They do not bar lenders from 
accepting cash or a check from a borrower to “pay off” the existing loan 
and then immediately providing a “new” payday loan. Same-day advances 
do not appear to be covered under state laws, and the industry “best 
practices” are silent on the matter. Moreover, the rules do not prevent 
another firm from providing a payday loan to pay off the first firm’s loans. 
State-enacted rollover limits, perhaps as a consequence, do not appear to 
affect the percentage of payday borrowers renewing loans or the average 
number of loans taken out.163
State regulation of price has not fared any better. There has been a 
great deal of state legislative action over the last few years regarding 
payday lending, but no clear trend in state laws is emerging; some states 
tightened restrictions while others loosened them to permit greater 
flexibility for payday lenders.164 Seventeen states, Puerto Rico, and the 
Virgin Islands have small loan interest rate caps or other usury limits that 
effectively prohibit payday loans;165 five states have no small loan or usury 
 
 162 See BANERJEE, supra note 43, at 15 (noting that competition for the provision of loans 
reduces ex ante rents, but once loan performance information is captured and not shared, the borrower 
cannot cheaply switch to a competitor, so ex post rents remain).  
 163 See CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 7. 
 164 Id. at 9. 
 165 Id. at 26-31 (summarizing all state laws relating to payday lending). Since the report, 
three more states have enacted laws authorizing payday lending. Deferred Presentment Services Act, 
38
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cap but require licensing of lenders;166 and twenty-eight states and the 
District of Columbia have specific laws or regulations authorizing payday 
lending.167  
Of the twenty states and the District of Columbia in CFA’s survey, 
six states have usury laws governing small loans; two states had no laws 
governing payday lending; and twelve states (and the District of 
Columbia) have implemented payday lending laws or regulations.168  
 
Table 1. Average Payday Loan APRs by State Regulatory 
Environment, 2001 
 
Regulatory Environment States Surveyed Avg. 
APR  
Usury ceiling on small loans 
prohibits payday lending 
GA, MA, MD, NY, PA, VA 606% 
No usury ceiling, payday lending 
permitted 
NM, WI 504% 
“Safe harbor” permits payday 
lending, caps fees 
AZ, CA, CO, DC, FL, IA, IL, 
KY, NC, OH, OR, SC, TX 
443% 
 National average 470% 
Source: CFA/ PIRG, 2001 
In the states surveyed in which usury ceilings were low enough to 
effectively prohibit payday lending, rates on payday loans to residents of 
that state were, paradoxically, the highest. Payday lenders in these states 
were either violating state usury laws or had partnered with insured 
depository institutions that “exported” the regime of the bank’s home state 
to originate payday loans, effectively operating outside state usury laws 
but with added costs incurred to form partnerships with out of state 
lenders. In the states surveyed that had no usury ceilings for small loans—
and therefore effectively lacked any price regulation for payday loans—
payday lenders generally charged higher-than-average interest rates on 
loans. In states in which safe harbor laws or regulations permitted payday 
lending but capped fees, interest rates were somewhat below average. State 
usury laws seem to have perverse effects on payday loan pricing and 
                                                                                                                         
2003 Ala. Acts 359 ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 961, 976, 2227, 2235A (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-
444 (Michie 2003). 
 166 CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 26. 
 167 Id. at 27. 
 168 The CFA/PIRG REPORT survey sample was not representative. Many states were 
excluded from the survey, different numbers of lenders were surveyed in each state, and within a given 
state surveyed lenders were often concentrated in one or more geographic areas. The survey 
nonetheless remains the most comprehensive source of information on interstate pricing differences for 
payday loans. See id. at 1. 
39
Barr:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
C:\Documents and Settings\johnloyd\My Documents\attach\Banking the Poor JREG FINAL PRINTER PROOF (March 7, 2004).doc 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 21:121, 2004 
160 
                                                                                                                        
operations, while states with licensing laws fare somewhat better than 
average in terms of surveyed prices. 
State usury and payday lending laws collided with federal bank and 
thrift regulation as a result of partnerships between payday lenders and a 
small number of depository institutions. Initially, a handful of national 
banks were exporting high interest rates to payday lending companies in 
states with usury laws,169 thus circumventing those states’ implicit 
restrictions on payday lending.170 Some small, state-chartered banks had 
also become involved in payday lending,171 as had some thrifts. At first, 
the regulators issued guidance explaining the risks involved in payday 
lending.172 After about a year of experience supervising these partnerships, 
the regulators became increasingly concerned with the risks involved. The 
OCC,173 and then the OTS174 and Federal Reserve Board,175 in turn, all 
effectively ended these partnerships. Today, only FDIC-regulated 
depositories are still engaged in this market.176 One state-chartered bank, 
after being ordered by the Federal Reserve to end payday lending, 
 
 169 Under the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994), a national bank may charge interest 
at a rate permitted by the state in which it is located, notwithstanding rates set by the state in which its 
customers reside. See Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735 (1996) (holding late payment fees are interest 
for purposes of § 85); Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp, 439 U.S. 299 (1978); 
Hudson v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., 2002 WL 1205060 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2002) (applying Marquette 
to uphold export of national bank’s interest rate to transactions conducted with payday lending 
partner). 
 170 See Nicole Duran, OCC Orders Bank To Exit Payday Biz, AM. BANKER, Jan. 4, 2002, at 
1; see also CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 21. 
 171 See Press Release, CFA, Local Groups Target State Banks That Rent Their Charters to 
Payday Lenders (Apr. 10, 2002), at http://www.consumerfed.org/fdic_pr041002.PDF; see also 
CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 15-17. 
 172 See Payday Lending, OCC Advisory Letter, AL 2000-10 (Nov. 27, 2000) (alerting 
national banks to OCC concerns over payday lending programs, including the involvement of third-
party vendors); Payday Lending, OTS Memorandum for Chief Executive Officers No. 132 (Nov. 27, 
2000), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/25132.pdf; Third-Party Relationships, OCC 
BULLETIN, OCC 2001-47 (Nov. 1, 2001) (advising national banks on establishing procedures to 
analyze and manage risks of dealing with third parties), available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/2001-47.doc [hereinafter OCC, Third-Party Relationships].  
 173 See, e.g., In re Peoples National Bank, OCC Consent Order No. 2003-2 (Jan. 30, 2003); 
In re Advance America, Cash Advance Centers, Inc., OCC Consent Order No. 2003-3 (Jan. 24, 2003); 
In re First National Bank in Brookings, OCC Consent Order 2003-1 (Jan. 17, 2003); In re Eagle 
National Bank, OCC Consent Order No. 2001-104 (Dec. 18, 2001) (ordering bank to cease payday 
lending in partnership with Dollar Financial Group); News Release, OCC, OCC Takes Action Against 
Ace Cash Express, Inc. and Goleta National Bank, NR 2002-85 (Oct. 29, 2002). 
 174 See FIRST PLACE FINANCIAL CORP., Form 10-Q, for the period ending Dec. 31, 2002, 
dated Feb. 14, 2003, at 12 (noting that OTS had directed it to discontinue making payday loans in 
partnership with another company). 
 175 See REPUBLIC FIRST BANKCORP, Form 8-K, June 27, 2003, at 1 (noting that it ceased its 
payday lending partnership because of heightened regulatory requirements). 
 176 The FDIC has issued guidance on how state chartered, FDIC-insured banks can partner 
with payday lenders consistent with safe banking practice. See FDIC, Guidelines for Payday Lending 
(Jan. 29, 2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/payday/index.html (last accessed 
Dec. 19, 2003); see also Press Release, CFA, New Guidelines Allow Payday Lenders To Ignore State 
Laws (Mar. 17, 2003) (criticizing draft guidelines), available at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/031703fdic.html.  
40
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withdrew from the Federal Reserve System and was approved by the FDIC 
for federal insurance as a state non-member bank in order to continue to 
operate its payday lending.177 What is the basis for shutting down these 
partnerships? Regulators have cited three basic reasons. First, the OCC has 
explained that banks should not “rent” their names to payday lenders to 
evade state usury and consumer protection laws,178 but should take 
responsibility as the lender for ensuring proper underwriting and 
disclosure, as well as appropriate consumer protections.179 Second, the 
OCC argued that firms engaged in such partnerships are exposed to 
“significant reputation, strategic, transaction, and compliance risk” when 
“nonbank vendors may target national banks . . . in order to avoid state law 
standards that would otherwise apply to their activities.”180 Third, the OCC 
warned that payday lending could be unsafe and unsound. The OCC put 
national banks on notice that it reserved the right to examine and regulate 
both the bank and the third party service provider and to assess special fees 
for such supervision.181 Using its safety and soundness supervisory 
authority—rather than any consumer protection rationale—the OCC has 
now shut down all known national bank-payday lending operations, and 
the OTS and Federal Reserve have followed suit. It remains to be seen 
whether the FDIC will find similar safety and soundness concerns after it 
has experience in supervising banks engaged in these partnerships. 
In the meanwhile, questions regarding federal pre-emption are 
unlikely to go away. Before it had ended national bank-payday 
 
 177 See Jonathan D. Epstein, First Bank To Continue Payday Loans, Switch to FDIC Keeps 
Practice Alive, NEWS J. (Wilmington, Del.), Oct. 15, 2003, at 10B.  
 178 See In re Eagle National Bank, OCC Consent Order No. 2001-104 (Dec. 18, 2001) 
(ordering bank to cease making payday loans in partnership with Dollar Financial Group); Paul 
Beckett, Risky Business: Exploiting a Loophole, Banks Skirt State Laws on High Interest Rates—
”Payday Loans” Are a Big Hit with Many Consumers, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2001, at A1; Duran, 
supra note 170 (“‘The bank essentially rented out its national bank charter to a payday lender.’”) 
(quoting Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr.); Michele Heller, OCC Crackdown on 
“Lending” of Charters, AM. BANKER, Nov. 5, 2001, at 8 (“‘National banks should not be renting out 
their charters to third parties for the purpose of allowing the third party to evade some state law that 
otherwise would be applicable to them.’”) (quoting Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr.); 
News Release, OCC, OCC Files Notice of Charges Against People’s National Bank of Paris, Texas, 
NR 2002-26 (Mar. 18, 2002) (charging national bank with unsafe and unsound practices in rapid 
expansion of its payday lending operation with Advance America without adequate capital, 
underwriting, and appropriate safeguards); see also supra note 173.  
179 The OCC warned that: 
[S]ome product vendors engage in practices that may be considered predatory, 
abusive, or unfair and deceptive to consumers. . . . National banks should be 
extremely cautious before entering into any third party relationship in which the 
third party offers products or services through the bank with fees, interest rates, 
or other terms that cannot be offered by the third party directly. Such 
arrangements may constitute an abuse of the national bank charter.  
See OCC, Third-Party Relationships, supra note 172, at 6. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
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partnerships, the OCC had taken the position that the National Bank Act 
did not pre-empt state usury claims against the payday lending partner of 
national banks.182 Plaintiffs had sued the payday lender under state law. 
The District Court remanded to state court for lack of federal question 
jurisdiction183 and ACE settled, agreed to pay $1.3 million in restitution, 
cease its relationship with Goleta National Bank and comply with 
Colorado’s licensing and usury laws.184 By contrast, in another case, the 
same parties successfully argued that the National Bank Act pre-empted 
state law claims against both the national bank and the payday lender.185 
Furthermore, in Anderson v. H&R Block,186 the court held that plaintiffs’ 
claim that H&R Block and Beneficial National Bank’s refund anticipation 
loans were usurious was governed by the National Bank Act, but since 
there was no complete pre-emption, the claims could be heard in state 
court. The Supreme Court overturned the Eleventh Circuit in Beneficial 
National Bank v. Anderson,187 holding that the National Banking Act fully 
pre-empted state law claims for usury pleaded against national banks and 
thus provided a basis for removal of the case—including supplemental 
state claims against other defendants—to federal court, where presumably 
the defendant believes the claims will bear less weight. 
5. Reforms 
With respect to any remaining bank or thrift partnerships with payday 
lenders,188 given the bank and thrift regulators’ strong assertions of pre-
emption of state payday lending laws affecting insured depository 
institutions, it is incumbent on the regulators to use their authority under 
the Federal Trade Commission Act to take action against banks and thrifts 
that are engaged in “unfair and deceptive trade practices” in the course of 
 
 182 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Comptroller of the Currency, Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. Ace 
Cash Express, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2001) (No. 01-1576) (successfully 
arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction); see also Long v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., No. 3:00-CV-
1306-J-25TJC, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24617 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 2001) (remanding case to state court 
on the grounds that National Bank Act pre-emption does not apply to state law claims against ACE).  
 183 Salazar, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1285-86. 
 184 Press Release, Colorado Attorney General, Ace Cash Express To Pay $1.3 Million in 
Restitution to Consumers (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.ago.state.co.us/PRESREL/ 
presrl2002/prsrl40.stm; see also supra note 182. 
 185 Hudson v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., No. IP 01-1336-C HS, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11226 
(S.D. Ind. May 30, 2002) (holding that National Bank Act pre-empted Indiana usury law as applied to 
ACE and Goleta despite ACE’s 95% participation in loan). 
 186 287 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 187 123 S. Ct. 2058 (2003). 
 188 Although only FDIC-regulated banks currently engage in payday lending, with 
heightened regulatory focus on “renting” charters, at least one payday lender sought to own a bank. See 
Ben Jackson, Can’t Rent? Payday Shop Files To Buy a Charter, AM. BANKER, July 9, 2002, at 1 
(noting that Cincinnati BancGroup, a subsidiary of CNG Financial Inc. and an affiliate of Check’nGo, 
applied to the Federal Reserve Board to buy a bank). 
42
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payday lending activities.189 Regulators should pay particular attention to 
the problem of short-term balloon payments, repeated refinancing, and 
inadequate or misleading disclosures under the Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA).190 In addition, greater attention to the CRA service test could help 
to shed light on bank practices.191 For example, if repeated rollovers 
indicate that the lender failed to underwrite the payday loan by 
determining a borrower’s ability to repay, contrary to safety and soundness 
guidelines,192 then the bank may have engaged in an “illegal credit 
practice”193 for purposes of the CRA. Such an illegal practice should 
adversely affect the bank’s CRA rating. Congress should also consider 
legislation mandating that payday lenders report borrowers’ performance 
to the credit bureaus, so that responsible borrowers have the opportunity to 
pursue alternative credit products based on their credit history. 
With respect to state regulation, the picture is mixed. Although a 
number of states have sought to invalidate bank-payday lender 
partnerships,194 given the Court’s strong interpretation of the pre-emptive 
effect of the National Bank Act on state usury laws,195 these laws are 
unlikely to withstand legal challenge. State regulators are likely to be more 
successful in directly acting against the non-bank partner in such 
arrangements.196 Given the ineffectiveness of state rollover laws, some 
states are now focusing on legislation that would provide for longer 
minimum terms for payday lending to prevent short-term balloon loans 
that are repeatedly refinanced from becoming a “debt trap.” 
In my view, over the long term, banks could compete with payday 
lenders by offering alternative, lower cost and lower risk products. In 
principle, one such alternative might be bank overdraft protection. 
Although there is currently much controversy surrounding the adequacy of 
 
 189 Cf. In re Providian National Bank, OCC Stipulation and Consent to the Issuance of a 
Consent Order (June 28, 2000) (asserting violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Truth in 
Lending Act and its implementing Regulation Z, and state law concerning credit card abuses), 
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2000-49c.pdf. 
 190 See, e.g., Brown v. Payday Check Advance, 202 F.3d 987 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that 
TILA covers payday loans). 
 191 See infra Subsection V.A.2. 
 192 See 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B. 
 193 12 C.F.R § 25.28(c). 
 194 Indiana has passed a law barring such partnerships. North Carolina has filed suit arguing 
that its usury laws bar payday lending. See Jackson, supra note 188. 
 195 See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 123 S. Ct. 2058 (2003) (holding that usury cause 
of action against national bank necessarily arises under federal, not state, law); see also Ass’n of Banks 
in Ins. v. Duryee, 270 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding pre-emption of Ohio law banning sale of 
title insurance by banks); Metrobank v. Foster, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (finding that 
Iowa ATM fee prohibition pre-empted); Wells Fargo Bank Texas, N.A. v. James, 184 F. Supp. 2d 588 
(W.D. Tex. 2001) (finding that Texas law bars banks from charging fees to non-account holders for 
cashing checks drawn on bank pre-empted by National Bank Act). 
 196 See Brown v. ACE Cash Express, CA No. 24-C-01-004036 (Md. Cir. Ct. Aug. 20, 2001); 
CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 21.  
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disclosures and the cost of current bank overdraft policies,197 in theory 
overdraft policies could be provided at lower cost than payday loans 
because, since there is no need for face-to-face interaction, the transactions 
can take place electronically and automatically at low risk and cost to 
banks. Moreover, repayment of the overdraft could be scheduled so that 
regular minimum payments (through automatic debiting of the customer’s 
account) repay the overdraft over a reasonably long time period, rather 
than the current payday loan of two weeks or bank overdraft practice of 
thirty days. Overdraft protection should also be disclosed as an extension 
of credit using APRs consistent with the requirements of TILA. 
C. Title Lenders 
Title lenders represent a variation on payday lenders.198 Instead of 
holding a check or a debit authorization until payday, title lenders hold 
collateral—in most cases, an automobile title (and/or the keys to the car, or 
in some cases a device permitting the title lender to disable the car)—for a 
typical term of one month.199 Some title lenders loan money collateralized 
by other household assets, such as appliances.200 Title loans range from 
$250 to $1,000, and are generally over-secured. If the borrower fails to 
repay the loan at maturity, the lender will often extend the loan for another 
fee, in the same way that a payday loan is rolled over. Should the borrower 
be unable to make payment, or should the lender decide to stop renewing 
 
 197 See Michele Heller, Amsouth Wins Latest Fight in Check-Fee War, AM. BANKER, Aug. 2, 
2000, at 1; Laura Mandaro, In Brief: Wamu Overdraft Policy Legal, Court Says, AM. BANKER, Aug. 7, 
2002, at 19; Laura K. Thompson, Overdraft Play Looks Better to Small Banks, AM. BANKER, Apr. 2, 
2001, at 1. Compare Tom McGrath, Overdraft Coverage Preys on the Weak, AM. BANKER, Apr. 6, 
2001, at 17, with Paul Nadler, Comment: In Defense of Check Overdraft Coverage Policies, AM. 
BANKER, Jan. 29, 2003, at 7, Letters to the Editor: Bounce Coverage Ensures Equitable Treatment for 
All, AM. BANKER, Apr. 20, 2001, at 16, and Comment: Don’t Be Afraid To Charge Fees for 
Overdrafts, AM. BANKER, Oct. 3, 2000, at 6. See also Federal Reserve Board Proposed Revisions to 
Regulation Z, Truth in Lending Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 72,618 (Dec. 6, 2002) (soliciting comments on 
disclosures required for overdraft or “bounced check” services), and Final Rule, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/board/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2003/20030328/attachment.pdf (noting 
that rules for such disclosure are still under advisement at the Federal Reserve Board). 
 198 See Payday Lending, AL 2000-10, supra note 172 (advising national banks about the 
risks of partnerships with payday lenders); Title Loan Programs, OCC Advisory Letter, AL 2000-11 
(Nov. 27, 2000) (advising national banks about the risks of partnerships with title lenders), available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2000-11.doc; see also Joint Release, Office of the Comptroller 
of Currency and Office of Thrift Supervision, Agencies Urge Banks and Thrifts To Evaluate Risks 
with Vendors Engaged in Practices Viewed as Abusive to Consumers, NR 2000-88 (Nov. 27, 2000) 
(discussing title lending and payday lending supervisory concerns), available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2000-88.doc. 
 199 Drysdale & Keest, supra note 5, at 598. 
 200 See Holden Lewis, Sale Leaseback: A Dangerous New Form of Consumer Debt, 
BANKRATE.COM, Apr. 24, 2001, at http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/pf/20010424a.asp. Appliance 
title loans often take the form of “sale-leaseback” arrangements, wherein the borrower transfers 
ownership of the appliance to the lender and then either “repurchases” the item at loan maturity or 
renews the “lease” by paying the finance charge for an additional fifteen days or one month.  
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the loan, the lender repossesses the collateral, sometimes “retain[ing] the 
proceeds of the sale, even if the value of the automobile exceeds the loan 
amount.”201 Some auto title lenders sell repossessed cars in the retail 
market.202
The title industry grew out of pawnbrokers’ efforts to lend larger 
amounts than televisions or jewelry could collateralize.203 In a traditional 
pawn transaction, the pawnbroker makes a fixed-term loan to a consumer 
who leaves collateral in the hands of the broker. If the customer does not 
repay the loan at maturity, the collateral becomes the property of the 
broker.204 Given the similarity between pawn transactions and title loans, 
title lenders have been able to claim the advantage of pawnbrokers’ 
exemptions from, or special limits under, many states’ usury laws,205 while 
using quite different underwriting processes.206
The title loan industry originated in the southeastern United States, 
and burgeoned most rapidly in Florida. Between 1995—when legislation 
was adopted to legalize the industry—and 1999, 600 title loan outlets 
opened in Florida. In 2000, however, the state passed a new law limiting 
allowable interest to 30% annually, and the practice has all but disappeared 
since then.207 Yet it still thrives in Georgia and Tennessee, the two states 
that legalized the practice early.208 Title lenders have sprouted up in other 
states—for example, in Missouri, Illinois, and Oregon. While no title 
lenders are publicly held, Title Loans of America is the largest lender. In 
1999, the firm had 300 outlets.209  
Prices for title loans appear to be similar to those for payday loans. 
 
 201 Title Loan Programs, AL 2000-11, supra note 198, at 2. 
 202 See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 5, at 600. 
 203  See Joseph B. Cahill, License To Owe: Title-Loan Firms Offer Car Owners a Solution 
That Often Backfires, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1999, at A1. The average pawn loan size is $70. See CASH 
AMERICA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 6. 
 204 See CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 6. Cash America International reports that 
39% of its revenue is derived from the sale of merchandise not redeemed by customers. CASH 
AMERICA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 7. 
 205 See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 5, at 598. 
 206 Pawnbrokers tend to be smaller in scale than the other financial services providers 
discussed in this Article, although a few large pawnbroking chains exist. Given the need for labor-
intensive and judgmental decisions about pawn collateral, pawnbrokers may play a role in the low-
income financial services marketplace that is unlikely to be replicated by mainstream financial service 
providers. See White, supra note 5. Because pawnbrokers are unlikely to be fundamentally equivalent 
to banks, I do not discuss pawnbrokers in detail. The pawnshop sector stagnated in the late 1990s with 
the rise of payday and title lending alternatives. See John Caskey, Fringe Banking a Decade Later 12 
(Apr. 8, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 207 Fla. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Licensing and Registration: Title Loan Companies, at 
http://www.dbf.state.fl.us/licensing/titleloanco.html (last modified Jan. 2003); Cahill, supra note 203, 
at A13. The Florida Department of Financial Institutions has licensed only three title lenders under the 
new law since enactment. Fla. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Currently Licensed Title Loan Companies, at 
http://www.dbf.state.fl.us/licensing/titleloancocurrent.html (last accessed Dec. 17, 2003).  
 208 See Cahill, supra note 203, at A13. 
 209 See id. 
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The OCC has found that rates often exceed 25% per month,210 for an APR 
of 300%. In Illinois, for instance, a 1999 survey revealed an average APR 
of 290% on title loans.211 In Florida, the typical fee in 1998 for a one-
month $400 loan was $88, or 264% APR.212 Some title lenders have 
developed partnerships with national banks, raising concerns similar to 
those raised by partnerships with payday lenders.213 Several lawsuits and 
articles document the fact that problems with rollovers are just as prevalent 
as in the payday lending industry.214 As with payday lending, title lending 
is often undertaken without an assessment of the borrower’s ability to 
repay (other than by seizure of the collateral).215 With title lending, 
however, the borrower risks losing her car, which may be her regular way 
to get to work, and to transport children to and from school or child care. 
Alternative credit products or savings might help low-income families to 
reduce reliance on title lenders. 
D. Tax Preparers and Refund Anticipation Lenders 
The EITC provided a critical supplement to income for twenty 
million low-income households this year. While tax preparation firms 
provide important services to low- and moderate-income persons, tax 
refund anticipation loan (RAL) fees lower take home pay from the EITC, 
cutting against the distributive goals of the program, and may somewhat 
reduce its effectiveness as a work incentive for RAL borrowers, although 
further empirical research is needed to explore this question. 
1. Industry Overview  
Tax preparation services can be distinguished from other AFS 
services in a few important ways. First, they are the only type of provider 
examined in this Part whose core functions are not usually thought to be 
providing services for income receipt, conversion of income into cash, bill 
payment, saving, or credit. Tax preparers do, however, play important 
roles in each of these financial services. Tax preparers facilitate the 
taxpayer’s receipt of income tax refunds; they help to convert tax refunds 
owed to taxpayers into liquid form. They transmit payments to Treasury 
 
 210 Title Loan Programs, AL 2000-11, supra note 198, at 2. 
 211 ILLINOIS REPORT, supra note 140, at 26. 
 212 Drysdale & Keest, supra note 5, at 599. 
 213 See Title Loan Programs, AL 2000-11, supra note 198 (alerting national banks to OCC 
concerns over title loan programs, including the involvement of third parties). 
 214 In 2000, John C. Bersia of The Orlando Sentinel won a Pulitzer Prize for an editorial 
campaign attacking title lending and other practices in Florida. Pulitzer Board, Pulitzer Prize Winners, 
2000, Editorial Writing, available at http://www.pulitzer.org/year/2000/editorial-writing (last accessed 
Dec. 17, 2003). 
 215 See Title Loan Programs, AL 2000-11, supra note 198. 
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for sums taxpayers owe on their tax returns. They arrange for credit to be 
provided to many taxpayers in the form of refund anticipation loans. 
Second, tax preparers also cater to middle or upper-income clientele, as 
well as the lower-income population that is the focus of this paper. Third, 
they generally cost less on an average annual basis for lower-income 
clients than check cashers or payday lenders cost for the typical client they 
serve. In large part, this is because most customers seek their services only 
once a year, at tax time. Fourth, low-income client use of tax preparation 
services and refund anticipation loans offered by such preparers appears to 
be higher among recipients of the federal EITC than other taxpayers, 
although almost all taxpayers earning under $30,000 per year who file tax 
returns would need to file a return even absent the EITC. 
The federal EITC is a wage subsidy provided to families who earn 
under about $35,000. In tax year 2001, the credit provided over $30 billion 
to over eighteen million families through refundable credits against federal 
income tax. The average family with children that year earned a credit of 
nearly $1,800. Unfortunately, the credit and its rules can be difficult to 
understand for families who have complicated living arrangements, such 
as children who spend time living with a parent and another relative, who 
have low levels of education, or who do not speak English as their first 
language.216 Conflicting and complex rules governing different tax 
provision rules for determining household status, dependents, and the like 
make tax preparation services attractive. Additionally, low-income 
families may not understand the refund process or timing, or may worry 
about increasing IRS audits of EITC claimants.  
For the low-income population, tax preparers provide two major 
products and services. The first is return preparation and filing of what has 
become for some a complicated task of filing a tax return, including an 
EITC claim. Typically, preparers will fill out a client’s federal return, the 
accompanying Earned Income Credit (EIC) schedule, and a state return, if 
the client is required to file or is eligible for a refund from the state. In 
most cases, preparers file low-income clients’ returns electronically, so as 
to expedite the processing of the refund by the IRS. As many as 67 to 68% 
of EITC recipients hired a commercial tax preparer to prepare their returns, 
and more than half of all EITC recipients filed their returns 
electronically.217  
 
 216 See HOTZ & SCHOLZ, supra note 9, at 13-14, 32 (stating that most EITC errors result 
from family status issues). The problem of tax complexity is, of course, not confined to low-income 
taxpayers, nor are the complexities facing low-income taxpayers confined to the EITC. See generally 
Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Complicated Lives: Tax Administrative Issues Affecting Low-
Income Filers, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION (forthcoming 2004). 
 217 See BERUBE ET AL., supra note 38, at 2, 10; see also HOTZ & SCHOLZ, supra note 9, at 31 
(finding that 56.5% of claimants used paid tax preparers in 1996); Michael A. O’Connor, Tax 
Preparation Services for Lower-Income Filers, 90 TAX NOTES 231, 232 (2001) (finding that 60% of 
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Second, many EITC recipients also use refund anticipation loans 
(RALs) and similar products marketed by many tax preparation services, 
including the two large national chains, H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt. 
RALs are quite similar to payday loans in that they provide advances on a 
borrower’s anticipated income—in this case, a tax refund. In the case of 
the RAL, the loan is repaid when the IRS issues the borrower’s expected 
refund. RALs serve three main purposes: First, customers are usually able 
to receive cash proceeds from their loans within two days or less of 
electronically filing their tax returns,218 which is eight to ten days sooner 
than if they had requested direct deposit of their refund to their bank 
account, if they had one. They may need the funds for daily needs, to catch 
up on recurring payments on which they have fallen behind, or to repay 
other short-term loans. Families who receive the EITC may live from 
paycheck to paycheck and may be unable to save for large purchases such 
as a car, and thus many seek assistance in getting quick access to the 
relatively large refund dollars.219 Second, RALs also permit taxpayers 
without bank accounts—and, consequently, without direct deposit 
capabilities—to obtain their refunds without waiting approximately four to 
six weeks for a paper check from the IRS.220 Third, taxpayers who do not 
 
EITC recipients used paid preparers in 1999). Holtzblatt & McCubbin report that in 2000, 64% of 
EITC claimants reported using a paid preparer (compared to 53% of all filers), and 55% of EITC 
claimants filed electronically (compared to less than one-third for all filers). Holtzblatt & McCubbin, 
supra note 216, at 11-12.  
 218 Some preparers are advertising instant refund loans. See, e.g., 2001 Tax Filing Season: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Comm., 107th Cong. 77, 79 
(2001) (testimony of Mark A. Ernst, President and CEO, H&R Block) [hereinafter Ernst 2001 
Testimony] , available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy.asp?file=legacy/oversite/107cong/4-
3-01/43erns.htm.  
 219 Eligible EITC recipients may use an “advance payment option” under which they receive 
up to 60% of their EITC refund spread throughout the year through reduced withholding in their 
regular paycheck; but, perhaps because of the fact that 75% of EITC filers have more than one source 
of income and setting advance EITC up with multiple employers would be complicated and might 
result in incorrect overpayments that would later be subject to recapture, or perhaps because of a desire 
to have a form of enforced savings for larger purchases using the lump sum refund, only 1.1% of 
eligible EITC recipients used this option in 1998. See HOTZ & SCHOLZ, supra note 9, at 27-28, 54, 61; 
see also Holtzblatt & McCubbin, supra note 216, at 10 (describing household status and multiple 
income sources as barriers to using advance EITC payments easily). If the need to speed up the refund 
to pay for daily needs were the prime motivation for RALs, it is somewhat unclear why more EITC 
filers do not opt for advance payments, even given the administrative difficulties.  
 220 The estimate of four-to-six weeks for refunds is from the testimony of Nina Olson, IRS 
Taxpayer Advocate, before the House Ways & Means Committee in 2001. See 2001 Tax Filing 
Season: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Comm., 107th 
Cong. 42, 47 (2001) (testimony of Nina Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate, Taxpayer Advocate 
Service, Internal Revenue Service) [hereinafter Olson 2001 Testimony], available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy.asp?file=legacy/oversite/107cong/4-3-01/4-3olso.htm (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2003). Tax preparation services also offer a product variously known as “refund 
transfer,” “accelerated check request,” or “refund anticipation checks,” by which unbanked EITC 
recipients can have their refunds direct deposited to the bank partnering with the tax preparation 
service, which then cuts a check to the recipient, after deducting tax preparation, administrative, and 
bank fees. The service permits the recipient to receive his check much earlier than if the IRS were to 
mail the recipient a check. See BERUBE ET AL., supra note 38, at 2. 
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have the funds to pay for tax preparation services up-front, but believe that 
they need help filing for the EITC, find RALs and similar products 
necessary simply to pay preparers to file for their refund. Tax preparation 
fees are deducted from the proceeds of the RAL, encouraging tax preparers 
to work with low-income customers, who in turn can more easily pay for 
the services provided.221 Thus, the complexity of the EITC and the desire 
to have forms professionally prepared may itself drive some decisions to 
take out RALs independent of a desire to obtain a quicker refund. The 
need for commercial preparation could be reduced for some EITC 
recipients, who could request that the IRS calculate the credit based on 
their EIC schedule.222 This is an option that few currently pursue, however, 
and EIC schedules are quite complicated.223
Tax preparation services and refund loans can consume a nontrivial 
portion of an EITC recipient’s refund. A survey of providers in 
Washington, D.C. in 2002 found that the preparation and electronic filing 
of federal and state returns, and associated schedules, cost low-income 
taxpayers about $100 on average.224 The purchase of a RAL for an 
anticipated $1,500 refund added roughly $90 to this amount. Thus, for 
EITC recipients filing electronically and choosing to take out a RAL, total 
fees would consume an average of 13% of the EITC or nearly 8% of the 
total refund from the EITC and other credits.225 Annual percentage rates on 
RALs are generally in the 150% to 300% range, depending on how 
quickly the IRS processes the refund, and thus how quickly the loan is 
repaid.226 In addition, for the estimated 22% of EITC recipients who lack a 
bank account, or four million households, the additional fee to cash a 
$1,500 RAL check issued by the bank partner of the tax preparer would be 
 
 221 See Michael A. O’Connor, Tax Preparation Services for Low Income Filers, 90 TAX 
NOTES 231 (2001); Roger Russell, Products That E-Preparers Can Take to the Bank, ACCT. TODAY, 
June 4, 2001, at 10. 
 222 See Holtzblatt & McCubbin, supra note 216, at 25. 
 223 See HOTZ & SCHOLZ, supra note 9, at 59. Calculations became more complicated in 
2002, when many low-income families became eligible for a federal child credit with definitions of 
eligible children that are different from the EITC. 
 224 BERUBE ET AL., supra note 38, at 5. These fees cover preparation of the whole tax return, 
of which the EITC schedule is only a small part. 
 225 Id. This is consistent with other estimates. See CHI CHI WU, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. & 
CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., REFUND ANTICIPATION LOAN REPORTS (2002) (reporting range of total 
fees from $129 to $429). 
 226 A recent study reports that APRs are often calculated and posted by some tax preparation 
services as if the RALs were demand notes, on the basis of repayment in one year, thus significantly 
understating APRs. WU ET AL., supra note 225, at 6; see also Regulation Z Official Staff 
Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 supp. I, at 226.17(c)(1)-17 (describing special rules for tax refund 
anticipation loans and providing that disclosures of APRs be based on the “creditor’s estimate of the 
time the refund will be delivered”). Banks offering RALs in partnership with tax preparation firms may 
charge interest at rates permitted by the bank’s home state, which permits the banks to make RALs at 
rates that would exceed state usury caps in the customer’s state. See supra Section II.B. (discussing 
payday loans).  
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at least $30 on average at a check casher, despite the low-risk nature of the 
checks.227 Another study found EITC recipient use of check cashers to be 
double that rate, at 44.5%,228 and CFA reported double that cost for 
cashing refund checks, at $67 on average.229
The refund anticipation and electronic tax preparation and filing 
industry is growing.230 The commercial tax preparation firms earned $357 
million in fiscal year 2001 from refund anticipation loans, more than 
double the amount they earned in fiscal year 1998.231 Given the high 
demand for tax preparation services by EITC claimants, electronic tax 
filing and preparation services are disproportionately represented in 
neighborhoods with concentrations of EITC recipients.232 Tax preparers 
that emphasize refund loans are concentrated in low-income 
neighborhoods. In zip codes with relatively high concentrations of EITC 
recipients, there are 50% more electronic tax preparation services per filer 
than in low-EITC zip codes.233  
RALs are used by a significant portion of EITC recipients. In 1999, 
38% of EITC recipients received a refund loan, compared to only 4% of 
other taxpayers. Seven and one-half million EITC recipients took out 
RALs. Nearly half (47%) of all EITC dollars were received through a 
 
 227 This assumes a check cashing fee of 2% of the face value, lower than the average charged 
by the two national chains, and the $1500 figure is higher than the net amount that would remain after 
deducting tax preparation, RAL and administrative fees. In 2002, H&R Block stores began installing 
Ace Cash Express self-service check cashing machines. See David Cay Johnston, A Tax-Refund Check 
That Just Keeps Shrinking, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2002, at L2. Tax preparation firms are reportedly 
making cross-marketing deals with check-cashing organizations. See Press Release, Ace Cash Express, 
Inc., Ace Cash Express Partners with H&R Block (Jan. 17, 2002), available at 
http://www.acecashexpress.com/investor/press/2002/H&RBlock02.html. Tax preparation firms could 
instead use technology that is cheaper for check conversion for this purpose. H&R Block has recently 
installed check truncation machines in most of its 9,300 offices. See David Breitkopf, Rollout Points to 
H&R Block’s Diversification, AM. BANKER, Apr. 5, 2002, at 1. These machines could be used to 
cheaply convert checks to payments. But see I.R.S., PUBLICATION 1345, E-FILE HANDBOOK 33 (2001), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1345.pdf (restricting cashing of refund checks by tax 
preparers). Some tax preparation firms are offering debit or stored value cards for unbanked customers, 
but with high fees and no bank accounts. See Tax Preparers Add a Stored-Value Option for Refunds, 
ATM & DEBIT NEWS, Feb. 1, 2001, at 1. 
 228 Smeeding et al., supra note 37, at 1202 tbl.5. Smeeding et al. also find checking account 
ownership among EITC recipients to be around 40%. Id. 
 229 WU ET AL., supra note 225, at 9. 
 230 The industry is dominated by two firms: H&R Block, the leading tax preparation firm in 
the nation, which partners with Household International on RALs, and Jackson Hewitt, which partners 
with Pacific Capital Bancorp on RALs. BERUBE ET AL., supra note 38, at 3; see also H&R BLOCK, 
INC., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT (2002) (revealing that H&R Block made 4.5 million RALs in 2001, 
generating $133.7 million in gross revenue and $68 million in net profits); HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
CORP., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT (2002); David Cay Johnston, New Questions About Block’s Lucrative 
Tax Loans, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2000, at C1; Katie Kuehner-Hebert, California Bank Finds Gold in E-
Returns, AM. BANKER, Aug. 12, 2001, at 1 (adding that Bank One is also a significant maker of 
RALs). Check cashers are also beginning to become directly involved in electronic tax filing. See ACE 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 53; DOLLAR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 6. 
 231 BERUBE ET AL., supra note 38, at 7. 
 232 Id. at 8-9. 
 233 Id. at 10-11. 
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RAL.234 All told, an estimated $1.75 billion in EITC refunds in 1999 was 
spent for tax preparation, electronic filing and tax refund loans, by those 
EITC recipients who use these services.235 Check cashing fees would add a 
further $120 million to the total reduction in EITC benefits reaching low-
income families without bank accounts. 
Commercial tax preparers do provide an essential service to EITC 
recipients who do not understand how to file for the credit, or who want to 
have a professional fill out their forms.236 As well, many EITC recipients 
who would otherwise be unaware of the credit may learn of it through 
marketing of tax preparation services in their neighborhoods. Thus, tax 
preparers may contribute to the high take-up rate for the EITC among 
eligible persons. Nonetheless, a significant part of the federal 
government’s EITC expenditure is used by low-income families to pay 
commercial tax intermediaries for filing and refund loans. Viewed as a 
cost of compliance with the EITC program, EITC claimant expenses for 
tax preparation and RALs would swamp governmental costs of 
administering the EITC, although the total operating costs of the EITC 
program—including both taxpayer compliance and governmental 
administration—would still be only about half the costs for governmental 
administration alone of other major low-income programs, such as food 
stamps and welfare.237 EITC compliance costs could be reduced. 
 
 234 Id. at 11-14 (listing figures by metropolitan statistical area). The percentages of EITC 
recipients using RALs vary significantly by region. 
 235 Id. at 13. The total consists of RALs ($100 average x 39% of 19 million EITC recipients 
= $750 million), tax preparation and filing ($100 average x 52% of 19 million = $1 billion). Check-
cashing fees would add at least $120 million ($30 x 22% of 19 million). Most EITC claimants would 
need to file a tax return even if the EITC did not exist, so one cannot attribute all of these taxpayer 
costs to the need to file to claim the EITC. Nonetheless, it is the case that the refund from the EITC 
and other credits is effectively reduced by the amount spent on tax preparation fees and RALs. 
 236 Error rates for commercially prepared EITC returns are not on average significantly 
better than for other EITC returns. O’Connor, supra note 221, at 232. But there is wide variation 
among commercial preparers with respect to error rates, with large national organizations performing 
much better than small store-front ones. See Holtzblatt & McCubbin, supra note 216, at 20-21 (noting 
an eleven percentage point difference in error rates); Janet McCubbin, EITC Noncompliance: The 
Determinants of the Misreporting of Children, 53 NAT. TAX J. 1135, at 1143 (2000); see also Olson 
2001 Testimony, supra note 220 (44% of returns showing computational error and 55% of returns with 
math error adjustments are commercially prepared). 
 237 See HOTZ & SCHOLZ, supra note 9, at 12 (arguing that the EITC is “inexpensive to 
administer,” particularly when compared to food stamps, which incurred administrative costs of $3.7 
billion in fiscal year 1995, and AFDC, which incurred $3.5 billion in administrative costs). The IRS’s 
costs of administering the EITC, including customer service, public outreach, enforcement, and 
research are projected to be $154 million in fiscal year 2003. 2002 Tax Return Filing Season and the 
IRS Budget for Fiscal Year 2003: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Ways and 
Means Comm., 107th Cong. 6, 20 (2002) (testimony of Charles O. Rossotti, Commissioner, Internal 
Revenue Service). Holtzblatt estimates administrative costs of the EITC to be about 1% of EITC 
claims, see Holtzblatt & McCubbin, supra note 216, at 14; see also id. at 27 (noting that EITC 
administrative costs of $145 million equal less than 4% of food stamp administrative costs of $4 
billion). Good data do not yet exist on individual compliance costs, as opposed to governmental 
administrative costs, for either the EITC or other government programs, including data on, for 
example, time costs for applying to such programs, which are likely to be significant. 
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Simplification of the EITC could reduce the need for tax preparation 
services and should remain on the congressional agenda.238
With respect to refund loans, some portion of EITC recipients may 
need their refund cash immediately to meet an emergency expenditure. 
Many recipients, however, are likely unaware that they could receive their 
refund within ten to 14 days if they were banked and filed electronically 
through IRS Direct Deposit. The IRS could diminish demand for RALs by 
speeding up refunds and advertising refund times. In addition, many EITC 
recipients are probably unaware that they are receiving a loan against their 
refund as opposed to an expedited refund itself.239 For example, H&R 
Block was found to have used misleading advertising and to have trained 
its tax preparers to focus on “rapid refunds” rather than explaining that the 
products were loans.240 While H&R Block changed its practices to clarify 
the nature of the refund loan transaction, some observers believe that its 
advertising remained somewhat unclear,241 and most independent agents 
and smaller firms may be able to escape scrutiny altogether. Enhanced 
disclosure may help avoid some consumer mistakes. 
In considering the role of refund loans in the marketplace, it is useful 
to contrast them with payday loans. Both are an expensive short-term 
source of credit, used primarily by low- and moderate-income families 
with no savings. Payday loans arguably represent a product that is absent 
elsewhere in the marketplace—small unsecured loans for people with 
blemished credit histories. The main problem is in their structure—a short-
term balloon with high fees that often leaves consumers in a cycle of 
perpetual debt. Refund loans, on the other hand, rarely turn into long-term 
problems for taxpayers or credit problems for the lender; the loan is fully 
collateralized by the payment due from the IRS, a reliable payor.242 By 
aggressively marketing RALs, however, and—at least in some well 
documented instances—disguising their nature,243 some tax preparers seem 
to have capitalized on a lack of information among low-income families. 
As with payday lending, RALs are offered by tax preparation firms in 
partnerships with banks. IRS rules bar tax preparers from directly 
 
 238 See, e.g., Robert Greenstein, Welfare Reform’s Hidden Ally, AM. PROSPECT, Special 
Supp. Summer 2002, at A35. 
 239 See Joan Koonce Lewis et al., Refund Anticipation Loan and the Consumer Interest: A 
Preliminary Investigation, 42 CONSUMER INT. ANN. 167 (1996). 
 240 See JTH Tax v. H&R Block E. Tax Serv., 128 F. Supp. 2d 926, 938 (E.D. Va. 2001), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 28 Fed. Appx. 207 (4th Cir. 2002); Basile v. H&R Block, 777 A.2d 95, 
105-06 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001); WU ET AL., supra note 225, at 25-26 (listing cases); David Cay Johnston, 
New Questions About Block’s Lucrative Tax Loans, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2000, at C1. 
 241 WU ET AL., supra note 225, at 22-23. 
 242 Refund loans, however, can cause long-term problems for borrowers when it turns out 
that refunds do not come, or are smaller than anticipated because of errors or offsets. See id. 
 243 See, e.g., id. at 25-26 (citing a number of recent suits illustrating efforts to disguise 
RALs).  
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providing RALs,244 and using the bank charter, among other things, 
permits tax preparers to offer RALS without needing to comply with local 
usury laws.245
2. Regulation 
The IRS role in this area could be critical. The IRS ended its practice 
of providing notice of anticipated refunds, and an indicator of any offsets 
for child support or other federal debts, to tax preparers in 1995 in order to 
reduce fraud and other problems associated with RALs.246 But the IRS 
responded in 1999 to congressional electronic filing mandates by again 
providing tax refund and offset information to preparers as an inducement 
to expand electronic filing, and to provide the IRS with information on 
their detection systems.247 The IRS also delayed EITC refunds in order to 
conduct basic anti-fraud and error detection.248 These changes may have 
increased the supply of tax preparers willing to prepare low-income returns 
because they could be paid up front from the proceeds of a RAL. The 
changes also may have increased the demand for RALs as well because 
delaying refunds exacerbated low-income persons’ need for cash.249
The IRS regulates aspects of RAL transactions through its oversight 
of electronic return originators (EROs). EROs are authorized by the IRS to 
file returns electronically on behalf of taxpayers, and receive a number of 
benefits from the IRS, including promotional material, permission to use 
the IRS e-file brand name, and indirect benefit from public service 
 
 244 See infra note 253.  
 245 See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 123 S. Ct. 2058 (2003) (noting that the National 
Bank Act pre-empts state law usury claims against national bank that had partnered with a tax 
preparation firm to provide refund anticipation loans); Cades v. H&R Block, 43 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 
1994) (upholding such partnerships). 
 246 See Ryan Donmoyer, IRS Takes Aim at RAL Fraud, Hits Preparer Profits, 66 TAX 
NOTES 1750 (1995). 
 247 See George Guttman, IRS Reinstates Debt Indicator To Increase Electronic Filings, 85 
TAX NOTES 1125 (1999); Amy Hamilton, Tax Writers Zeroing in on “Rapid Refund Loans,” 91 TAX 
NOTES 189 (2001). Despite the lower risk associated with the RALs when debt indicators are provided, 
evidence suggests that the re-instatement of the debt indicator only temporarily lowered rates, which 
have returned to levels close to their earlier, pre-debt-indicator level. See WU ET AL., supra note 225, at 
20 (describing pre-indicator RAL fees in the range of $40-$90, 2000 fees ranging $20-$60, and 2001 
fees of $30-$90). But see Ernst 2001 Testimony, supra note 218, at 2 (suggesting that IRS mistakes in 
implementing the debt indicator were responsible for losses to taxpayers and preparation firms in the 
first year of the program). 
 248 The congressional mandate that 80% of all taxpayers file their income tax returns 
electronically by 2007 was a major reason behind the reinstatement of the IRS “debt indicator” tool, 
which facilitates not only electronic filing but also the underwriting of RALs. See BERUBE ET AL., 
supra note 38, at 17. 
 249 The IRS decision in 2003 to require certain EITC filers to undergo time-consuming “pre-
certification” is likely to drive more claimants to use tax preparation services and RALs. See News 
Release, I.R.S., EITC Reform Initiative (June 2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
newsroom/article/omd=110296,00.html. Similarly, the high rate of audits for EITC claimants may 
increase taxpayers’ interest in using paid preparers. 
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announcements advertising electronic filing.250 The IRS requires preparers 
to disclose that “RALs are interest bearing loans and not substitutes for or 
a faster way of receiving a refund.”251 The IRS permits RALs to be repaid 
by direct deposit into special RAL accounts held by the bank partnering 
with the tax preparer, rather than the taxpayer.252 The tax preparer (or 
related parties) cannot make the RAL directly, nor can the tax preparer 
directly cash a refund check issued to a taxpayer whose return the filer 
prepared. (A preparer that is also a financial institution may cash a refund 
check, but not if the preparer has made a RAL.)253 The IRS also regulates 
RAL fees. Under IRS rules, authorized providers: 
may not base their fees on a percentage of the refund. . . . Separate fees 
may not be charged for Direct Deposits. An Authorized IRS e-file 
Provider may assist a taxpayer in applying for a RAL and may charge a 
flat fee for that assistance. However, the fee must not be related to the 
amount of the refund or a RAL. The Provider must not accept a fee from 
a financial institution for any service connected with a RAL that is 
contingent upon the amount of the refund or a RAL.254
The IRS also regulates the advertising of RALs. The IRS “prohibits 
the use or participation in the use of any form of public communication 
containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, unduly influencing, 
coercive, or unfair statement of claim.” In addition, “a Provider must 
adhere to all relevant federal, state and local consumer protection laws that 
relate to advertising and soliciting.” Moreover, with respect to RALs, the 
Provider and financial institution must clearly refer to or describe the 
funds being advanced as a loan, not a refund. The advertisement on a RAL 
must be easy to identify and in readable print. That is, it must be made 
clear in the advertising that the taxpayer is borrowing against the 
anticipated refund and not obtaining the refund itself from the financial 
institution.255
3. Reforms 
The IRS, in responding to congressional pressure to increase e-filing 
and decrease EITC errors, has helped to create the market for RALs. It 
 
 250 See generally IRS, E-FILE HANDBOOK, supra note 227.  
 251 Id. at 51. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. This aspect of the regulation, apparently designed to reduce the likelihood of EROs 
taking advantage of its tax preparation clientele or seeking to inflate the refund amount, may simply 
have driven the particular form of bank-ERO-check casher partnerships currently in use by major 
preparers, arrangements not necessarily more beneficial to consumers than permitting tax preparers to 
provide loans directly. 
 254 Id. at 52. 
 255 Id. at 74-75. 
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now bears a special responsibility to help end it. 
There are several steps that the Treasury Department and the IRS 
could take to improve the manner in which EITC recipients receive 
financial services. First, and most importantly, Treasury and the Congress 
need to continue efforts to simplify the EITC, for example, by altering the 
definition of qualifying children. Simplification should help to drive down 
error rates, which are costly in their own right and more expensive to EITC 
recipients who take out RALs incorrectly anticipating a refund, and 
diminish the need for expensive tax preparation services.256
Second, the IRS should expand free tax preparation and electronic 
filing availability;257 greater availability of these services would, of course, 
diminish the need to take out RALs in order to pay for preparation 
services. The biggest barriers to an expansion of free tax preparation 
services are lack of funds, lack of sites that provide for electronic filing, 
and, more critically, lack of effective ways to assure the quality of these 
tax preparation services. Moreover, if Congress wants the IRS to expand e-
filing availability, it should pay for expanding the private sector 
infrastructure necessary to implement it, rather than relying on RAL fees 
paid by low- and moderate-income tax payers to cover the tax preparers’ 
costs of implementing e-filing. Congress could appropriate funds for the 
purpose, or use an e-filing tax credit to offset the costs. 
Third, since the IRS now has the technical capacity to split refunds, 
the IRS should permit refunds to be direct deposited into more than one 
bank account. If refunds are permitted to be split into more than one 
account, tax preparers could compete by offering tax preparation services 
that are paid not out of the proceeds of RALs, but paid directly to them 
electronically out of tax refunds through direct deposit to them of a portion 
of the refund, diminishing the risk to the preparer and eliminating one 
reason to take out a RAL. If this reform is combined with public and 
private sector efforts to bring EITC recipients into the banking system, the 
remaining portion of the refund could be direct deposited into the client’s 
own bank account. Given the large average refund size, the portion 
deposited into the client’s account might serve not only for short-term 
needs, but also, for some clients, as a base for savings. 
 
 256 See, e.g., IRS National Taxpayer Advocate Annual Report and IRS Oversight Board 
Annual Report: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Comm., 
107th Cong. 6 (2002) (testimony of Nina Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate, Taxpayer Advocate 
Service, Internal Revenue Service), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/ 
legacy.asp?file=legacy/oversite/107cong/2-28-02/2-28olso.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003) (suggesting 
further reforms to the definition of “qualifying child” in the Internal Revenue Code); Holtzblatt & 
McCubbin, supra note 216, at 28. An analysis of the full costs and benefits of such legislation is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 257 The IRS has a small program to provide matching grants to low-income tax clinics 
although the clinics are not primarily focused on preparing returns. In fiscal year 2002, the IRS 
provided $7 million to 127 organizations. Holtzblatt & McCubbin, supra note 216, at 15. 
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Fourth, coupled with better error and fraud detection and prevention 
efforts,258 the IRS can speed up EITC refunds,259 and do more to encourage 
direct deposit of refunds into bank accounts, both directly260 and through 
employers, commercial preparers, and Volunteer Income Tax Assistance 
(VITA) sites. Again, if Congress believes that more efficient tax 
processing, in the form of e-filing and direct deposit of refunds, is in the 
government’s interest, Congress should appropriate funds or provide a 
credit to pay for these improvements rather than letting them be cross-
subsidized by fees from RALs and tax preparation. 
Fifth, as explained in more detail below,261 EITC recipients can 
become a central focus of efforts to bank the unbanked. The following 
steps should be taken to accomplish this goal: Treasury should expand its 
Electronic Transfer Account (ETA) program to permit use of ETAs for 
EITC receipt. Congress should appropriate more funds for Treasury’s First 
Accounts program to support innovative efforts to reach EITC recipients 
without bank accounts. The IRS should establish partnerships with large 
employers to encourage employees to open bank accounts and establish 
direct deposit of paychecks and tax refunds. Moreover, the tax preparation 
firms themselves should partner with banks to develop and offer 
individual, low-cost, electronically based bank accounts for their clients. 
Their clients could use the accounts to receive direct deposit of their 
income tax refunds, to withdraw funds at ATMs and POS using debit 
cards, to save, and for their other financial services needs throughout the 
year. The tax preparers would gain a new marketing tool and might see 
higher rates of client retention.  
Sixth, the IRS can use its oversight of e-file preparers to improve the 
market for EITC recipients. Towards this end, the IRS should make 
enforcement of existing rules, especially regarding advertising, a priority; 
provide more detailed rules regarding non-deceptive advertising, including 
disclosures of how the offered product compares with the IRS’s current 
anticipated refund times; and force greater transparency in pricing, 
including by requiring that RAL funds be provided to EITC recipients in a 
 
 258 The Dependent Database is one such tool, launched in 2001. The database permits the 
IRS to match returns with state child custody databases, potentially reducing error or fraud from 
noncustodial parents. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, IRS Announces Task Force on 
Improving the Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit (Feb. 28, 2002), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/release/po1059.htm. 
 259 The IRS Taxpayer Advocate, a congressionally created position heading an independent 
organization within the IRS, notes that the IRS expects to be able to speed up refunds on electronically 
filed tax returns to within two to three days of filing. See Olson 2001 Testimony, supra note 220, at 3. 
The IRS has had a notoriously difficult time, however, with efforts to modernize administration, 
including refund processing. 
 260 The Taxpayer Advocate notes that the IRS and the FMS can establish bank accounts for 
taxpayers who do not have one. Id. 
 261 See infra Subsection III.B.1. 
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form that does not require an additional cost to convert to cash. For 
example, funds could be transferred to debit or stored value cards that can 
be used at ATMs or POS without cost. 
III. The Banking Sector 
A. Barriers to Banking the Poor 
While changes in the AFS sector could improve the delivery of 
financial services for the poor, fundamental change would be accelerated 
by enhanced competition from banks, thrifts, and credit unions using 
electronically based accounts to serve low- and moderate-income 
customers. Mainstream providers can offer a range of services to meet the 
needs of low-income communities. Today, however, while the banking 
system works extraordinarily well for most Americans, many low- and 
moderate-income individuals face a number of barriers to account 
ownership. There are five key barriers: the structure and price of existing 
accounts, prior credit problems of the unbanked, low perceived 
profitability of serving the poor, lack of bank distribution systems in low-
income areas, and the need for financial education. 
First, regular checking accounts may not make economic sense for 
many lower-income families.262 Three main problems are high minimum 
balances, monthly fees, and the risk and cost of bouncing checks. 
Consumers who cannot meet account balance minimums for a checking 
account at a bank often pay high monthly fees. Thirty percent of banks 
offered an account requiring minimum balances for checking, with an 
average minimum monthly balance of $527, and a monthly fee of $7.12 
for falling below the minimum.263 Another 38% of banks offered fee-only 
accounts, charging an average of $4.74 per month for checking accounts 
without monthly minimum balances.264 The number of banks offering free 
checking accounts appears to have jumped to 32% of banks by 2001;265 
yet, most of these banks have high minimum balances that low-income 
 
 262 The Federal Reserve Board’s 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances asked unbanked 
individuals why they did not own a checking account. The most cited reasons were not writing enough 
checks to make an account worthwhile, finding minimum balances and services charges to be too high, 
not having enough money, and not wanting to deal with banks. See Kennickell et al., supra note 1. It is 
not possible to determine from the survey whether respondents who indicated that they did not want to 
deal with banks were motivated by economic reasons, such as high costs and accounts not structured to 
their needs, or noneconomic motivations, such as cultural dislike of banks. 
 263 RETAIL FEES STUDY, supra note 150, at 3. The Retail Fees Study excludes “tiered” 
accounts with complicated balance and fee structure. 
 264 Id.  
 265 Id. But see Laura Bruce, Low Fees, More Free Accounts in 2002, BANKRATE.COM (Mar. 
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persons cannot meet. Free accounts may also be available only to 
particular segments of the population, such as full-time students and the 
elderly. 
Nearly all banks, including those offering otherwise free accounts, 
levy high charges for bounced checks or overdrafts that low-income 
families with little or no savings face a high risk of paying and can ill-
afford. Avoidance of these bounced check fees may be an important 
determinant of the decision to become or remain unbanked. The average 
fee for checks that “bounce” and are rejected for not-sufficient-funds 
(NSF) was $20.75 in 2001, and the average fee for overdrafts was 
$20.50.266 In fact, depository institutions target the fee for NSF as a “core 
fee driver” in generating revenues from checking accounts.267 Consumer 
organizations have become increasingly concerned about “bounce 
protection” plans offered by some banks without adequate disclosure of 
fees.268 In addition, a customer depositing someone else’s check endorsed 
to her faces risks if the check turns out to be bad. Customers are charged 
an average fee of $7.11 by 74.1% of banks for checks that the bank 
customer deposits that are, in turn, returned for insufficient funds in the 
check writer’s account.269 Unbanked customers may fear that a large 
fraction of their income comes from parties whom they have little reason 
to trust will make payment on their checks.270  
Checking accounts are costly for depository institutions to offer271 and 
 
 266 RETAIL FEES STUDY, supra note 150, at 6. 
 267 Ralph Haberfeld, Breaking the $200 Barrier, BANKSTOCKS.COM (Sept. 25, 2001) 
(suggesting a target of $140 in NSF fees per account annually), at 
http://www.bankstocks.com/print.html?id=425; see also Joanna Stavins, Checking Accounts: What Do 
Banks Offer and What Do Consumers Value?, NEW ENG. ECON. R., Mar.-Apr. 1999 (noting that NSF 
fees raised bank checking account revenues while other fees studied tended to lower overall revenue), 
available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/neer/neer1999/neer299a.pdf; John Reosti, Superior of 
Arkansas Growth Story: Free Checking, Overdraft Charges, AM. BANKER, Sept. 25, 2002, at 1 (noting 
that Superior earned $28.4 million, mostly in NSF fees, on its 190,000 “Totally Free” checking 
accounts, marketed to moderate income persons, in 2001). 
 268 See, e.g., National Consumer Law Center and the Consumer Federation of America, 
Comments to the Federal Reserve Board’s Proposed Revisions to Official Staff Commentary to 
Regulation Z, No. R-1136, Jan. 27, 2003 (arguing that fees for “bounce protection” plans are finance 
charges subject to disclosure under the Truth in Lending Act), at 
http:/www.consumerfed.org/frbcomments.pdf. 
 269 RETAIL FEES STUDY, supra note 150. 
 270 In fact, Banco Popular’s check cashing outfit finds that a larger portion of their fraud risk 
comes not from customers cashing someone else’s check, but from instances in which businesses 
knowingly provide checks to their workers that are not supported by adequate funds in the business’s 
account or purport to draw on nonexistent accounts. See Banco Popular, supra note 88. As described in 
the text accompanying note 75, overall losses from such risk are low. 
 271 The Federal Reserve Board’s 1997 Functional Cost & Profit Analysis estimates the fully 
loaded cost of the average checking account to be $145. FED. RESERVE BD., FUNCTIONAL COST & 
PROFIT ANALYSIS 129 (1997). Others argue that variable costs (including front and back-office step 
functions) are a better measure of the costs of checking accounts; estimates of variable costs are in the 
range of $48. See Ralph Haberfeld, Cognitive Dissonance, Microeconomics, and Checking Accounts, 
BANKSTOCKS.COM (Mar. 4, 2002), at http://www.bankstocks.com/article.asp?id=517.  
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need to be offset with sufficient revenue (from float and fees) that may not 
be present in accounts that low-income customers could afford to use. In 
addition to direct fees for servicing the checking account, financial 
institutions may also charge high fees for money orders or other products 
that their typical customers do not often use, but that lower-income 
consumers use frequently. Moreover, banks hold checks that are not “on 
us” for a matter of days before depositing funds, unlike check cashing 
outlets; for low-income customers, the few days wait may not be practical.  
In addition to fees from checking accounts, banks also usually charge 
fees for savings accounts. No-fee passbook accounts are available at only 
15% of institutions; no-fee statement accounts are available at 17% of 
banks and savings associations. For other accounts, minimum balances to 
avoid fees ranged from $157.86 for passbook accounts to $184.42 for 
statement accounts. Monthly fees of $2.15 for passbook accounts and 
$2.50 for statement accounts were charged for accounts falling below the 
minimum required balances.272
There is wide variation in the structure and pricing of accounts and 
fees across metropolitan areas and states.273 Fees for checking accounts 
also vary by the nature and size of the institution. Multistate banks tend to 
charge higher fees than single-state banks, including about $3 more for 
NSF and overdrafts.274 Multistate banks are more than fifteen percentage 
points more likely to offer free checking accounts275 but at least ten 
percentage points less likely to offer free savings passbook or statement 
accounts.276 Large institutions are now more likely to offer free checking 
accounts, and more likely to impose higher fees than do medium and 
smaller institutions, but less likely to offer free savings accounts.277 The 
number of large banks reporting that they offer “free” checking jumped 
twenty-two percentage points from 2000 to 2001, following significant 
increases in the percentage of small and medium-sized banks offering such 
accounts in the previous year.278 These free checking accounts, however, 
may still be ill-suited to low-income consumers, given minimum balances 
and high fees for NSF, overdraft, and deposit returns. 
 
 272 RETAIL FEES STUDY, supra note 150, at 5 tbl.3.  
 273 Id. at 18-62. Empirical research testing this variation against the numbers of unbanked 
households, and against the presence of alternative financial service providers, could shed light on 
these relationships.  
 274 Id. at 8.  
 275 Id. at 6.  
 276 Id. at 7.  
 277 Id. at 10-15. 
 278 Id.  
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Table 2. Fee Structure by Size of Institution 
 
 Large* Medium Small 
Free Checking 46 % 37.6 % 26.3 % 
Free Savings** 0.9-2.1 % 7.8-14.3 % 20.7-20.5 % 
Stop-payment 
order 
$21.53 $19.46 $16.69 
NSF checks $24.70 $22.05 $19.33 
Overdrafts $25.10 $22.22 $18.56 
Deposit returns***  $5.90  $7.60  $6.82 
Source: BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., ANNUAL REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS ON RETAIL FEES AND SERVICES OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 10-20 
(2002) 
* Large = > $1 billion. Medium = $100 million to $1 billion. Small < $100 
million. 
** The first figure in each column of this row represents passbook accounts; the 
second figure represents statement accounts. 
*** While nearly all banks of any size charge for stop-payment orders, NSF, and 
overdrafts, only 83% of medium-sized banks and 65% of small banks charge 
customers for deposit items returned. 
The structure of these accounts is a key driver in keeping the 
unbanked out of the banking system. As discussed above, surveys 
consistently show that the price of account products and minimum account 
balance requirements are important determinants of being unbanked.279 
Studies have confirmed that many of the unbanked would become 
“banked” if they had access to a relatively low-cost electronic account of 
the type that this Article proposes. These accounts could plausibly be 
offered by financial institutions with modest governmental incentives to 
cover start-up costs.280 In fact, the unbanked have responded to account 
products tailored to their needs. For example, in Puerto Rico, Banco 
Popular introduced Acceso 24, an electronic account, with no minimum 
monthly balance, free direct deposit, unlimited ATM access, and a low 
monthly fee. The bank has enrolled tens of thousands of low-income 
customers in the product since 1995.281  
Cultural issues and reluctance to use banks may matter,282 but many 
of the unbanked already use, or have used, the banking system. Nearly half 
the unbanked, according to one study, use banks, thrifts, or credit unions to 
                                                                                                                         
 279 See supra note 21 (discussing surveys of reasons for being unbanked). 
 280 See generally ETA CONJOINT RESEARCH, supra note 51. 
 281 See infra notes 330-44 (discussing product experimentation and providing limitations on 
lessons from Puerto Rican market). 
 282 About 18% of unbanked respondents to surveys reported that they were not 
“comfortable” dealing with banks. See CASKEY, FILENE INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 86 (17.6%); 
Kennickell et al., supra note 1 (18.5%); see also supra note 22. 
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cash checks at least some of the time,283 although far fewer unbanked 
households in inner city communities use such institutions.284 Between 
48% and 70% of the unbanked have had an account at a financial 
institution at some time in the past.285 Existing products, however, are too 
costly, too risky, or not well-suited to their needs. Moreover, because bank 
hours and locations may be less convenient for low-income workers than 
those offered by AFS providers, and branch expansion or longer hours are 
costly, I focus my proposals on expanding access to financial services 
through ATMs and other electronic delivery mechanisms that can be 
expanded to more locations and with longer hours less expensively than 
bank branches. As discussed below,286 I propose ways in which such 
electronically based accounts should be tailored to the needs of low- and 
moderate-income households if they are to be brought back into the 
financial services mainstream, or enter for the first time. 
While high fees pose one barrier to access for the unbanked, a second 
barrier comes from difficulties that many unbanked persons may have in 
qualifying for conventional bank accounts because of past problems with 
the banking system. The ChexSystem, a private clearinghouse used by 
most banks to decide whether to open bank accounts for potential 
customers, records that nearly seven million individuals have had their 
accounts closed for prior problems, such as writing checks with 
insufficient funds or failing to pay overdraft charges.287 Records of prior 
problems are kept in the system for five years, during which time these 
individuals will likely be unable to open a conventional bank account at 
most banks, thrifts, and credit unions. While some individuals undoubtedly 
pose undue risk for account ownership, many potential customers could 
responsibly use bank accounts. Banks could obviate this concern by 
working with the private clearinghouses to better distinguish among types 
of past problems, by offering accounts contingent on completion of 
financial counseling,288 and by offering electronically based accounts with 
 
 283 CASKEY, FILENE INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 86. 
 284 Rhine et al., supra note 20, at 76 tbl.5 (noting that only 15% of surveyed unbanked 
households used financial institutions to cash checks in Chicago).  
 285 Compare Kennickell et al., supra note 1, at 8 (48%), with CASKEY, FILENE INSTITUTE 
REPORT, supra note 86, at 20 tbl.3 (70%).  
 286 See infra Section V.A. 
 287 Paul Beckett, Banks Are Using a National Database To Blacklist Customers for Slip-Ups, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2000, at 1. Surprisingly, in Caskey’s survey, only 9.5% of respondents cited 
“banks won’t let us open an account” as a reason for being unbanked. See FILENE INSTITUTE REPORT, 
supra note 86, at 20 tbl.3. This finding echoes that of the Rhine study, in which only 7.4% of 
respondents cited account management or being turned down for a bank account as a reason for being 
unbanked. Rhine et al., supra note 20, at 75 tbl.4. The Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer 
Finance reports that only 2.7% of the unbanked reported the reason for being unbanked as prior credit 
or financial problems; only 7.2% cited inability to manage or balance checking accounts. Kennickell et 
al., supra note 1, at 8. 
 288 EFunds launched Get Checking in response to criticism of the ChexSystem, which it 
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online bill payment or automatic money orders, and without check-writing 
privileges, that pose little risk of overdraft.289 To date, banks have been 
reluctant to take these steps because the expected returns from such 
accounts are low. 
Third, while many urban communities contain adequate numbers of 
both banking institutions and AFS providers, in some low-income urban 
and rural communities, banks, thrifts, and credit unions are not as readily 
accessible to potential customers as such institutions are in higher-income 
areas. A 1997 Federal Reserve Board study found that low-income central 
city neighborhoods have far fewer bank offices per capita than higher-
income areas and those outside the central city.290 In Chicago, 40% of low- 
to moderate-income neighborhoods had only check cashers, 32% of low- 
to moderate-income areas had both check cashers and banks in about equal 
proportions, and 28% of low- to moderate-income areas had only banks. 
Areas in Chicago with only check cashers have a greater percentage of 
minority households than other low- to moderate-income areas in 
Chicago.291  
Similar patterns may persist in the distribution of ATMs. In New 
York and Los Angeles, there are nearly twice as many ATMs per resident 
in middle-income zip codes as there are in low-income zip codes, 
according to 2000 Treasury Department research.292  
Location is simply one aspect of convenience, of course, and bank 
branches (though not ATMs) lack the convenient hours of most AFS 
providers.293 However, location may be a less important determinant of 
financial service usage than is commonly thought. One study found that 
 
operates. In its initial pilot, 90% of participants completed the education program and more than one-
third opened accounts. See EFUNDS, THE UNBANKED: A HIDDEN MARKET 5 (2001), available at 
http://www.efunds.com/us/en/about_efunds/whitepapers/000949.pdf (last visited Dec. 11, 2003). 
Union Bank has a “nest egg” account in which those who are in the ChexSystem can build their way 
toward a regular checking account by making regular monthly deposits into a savings account. See 
Beckett, supra note 287, at 1. 
 289 Over the long term, the risk of overdraft from checks may be reduced by widespread 
adoption of check truncation technology, allowing information to be processed and settled 
electronically rather than by paper, combined with online verification of demand deposit account 
balances. See, e.g., Priya Malhotra, Visa: Check Verify-Convert Service Catching On, AM. BANKER, 
Sept. 20, 2002, at 7 (describing online verification system). This technology is nascent, and widespread 
adoption of check truncation by merchants and of account-verification by banks would be required 
before checking accounts become sufficiently risk-free as to be reasonable substitutes for online debit 
card access. 
 290 See R. Avery et al., Changes in the Distribution of Banking Offices, 83 FED. RES. BULL. 
707, 723 (1997). 
 291 See Rhine et al., supra note 60, at 15 (noting that areas with only check cashers have an 
85% minority population, compared to a 77% minority population overall in low- to moderate-income 
areas).  
 292 The research used MasterCard/Cirrus ATM data. Solid data on the geographic 
distribution of ATMs nationwide are lacking. POS at retail locations, with cash-back, may make up for 
some of this lack of ATM access, but data are not available on POS distribution.  
 293 See DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 29. 
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“proximity to the nearest branch was not a significant determinant of 
whether an individual owned a checking account.”294 Another study found 
that non-bank financial institutions are located closer to bank branches or 
ATMs than to other non-bank providers.295
Fourth, banks doubt that accounts tailored to low-income individuals 
will be profitable. As discussed more fully below,296 while a financial 
institution’s recurring monthly costs for administering the account can 
likely be covered by low monthly fees charged to consumers, at this early 
stage in the evolution of research and development for low-income 
products, banks’ up-front costs are likely to exceed what most unbanked 
households are willing to pay. Financial institutions may be reluctant to 
expend the resources for research, product development, training, 
marketing, and education, which are necessary to expand financial services 
to lower-income clientele. Financial institutions may need incentives to 
pursue research and product development, to be shared widely in the 
industry, with respect to accounts for low-income customers, particularly 
for accounts based on electronic payments technology.297 Further market 
research would help to define the product needs of low-income families 
and existing products will likely need to be modified to serve this clientele. 
Marketing of new products to low-income persons and training of bank 
staff are both critical to the success of any new product; yet, given the 
expense and the expected low returns, they are often not fully pursued 
even when financial institutions decide to become involved with offering 
financial services to low-income customers. If the unbanked do not know 
about the availability of new products and services, they are not likely to 
seek out financial services at banking institutions. If local banking 
personnel are not informed about new offerings, the unbanked will find it 
difficult to open accounts even where local branches are convenient and 
accessible. Yet the costs of marketing, training, and education associated 
with these services—at least until electronic banking services for the poor 
become widespread—are likely to exceed a price that low-income 
households could afford. 
Fifth, at least for a segment of the low-income population, lack of 
 
 294 VERMILYEA & WILCOX, supra note 18, at 14. 
 295 See DOVE REPORT, supra note 2. 
 296 See infra notes 310-312. 
 297 See Sujit Chakravorti & Timothy McHugh, Why Do We Use So Many Checks?, ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES, Third Quarter, 2002, at 45 (“Consumers, merchants, and financial institutions may be 
unwilling to invest in emerging payment technologies due to uncertainty about whether they will be 
widely accepted in the marketplace.”), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/ 
publications/economicperspectives/2002/3qepart3.pdf. It may be argued that incentives for research 
and development would provide indiscriminate subsidies for the banking industry, but I believe an 
incentive can be structured that benefits low- and moderate-income households even if the results have 
broader applicability. In fact, broader applicability provides an incentive for participation. I discuss the 
proposal infra Part V. 
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financial education with respect to account ownership, budgeting, saving, 
and credit management is a significant barrier to personal financial 
stability. The need for financial education may be particularly acute among 
immigrants and other groups unfamiliar with American banking practices. 
The benefits of financial education are not likely to be fully captured by 
any one financial institution or other entity offering education because an 
educated consumer will shop for financial services among competing 
providers. Financial education also benefits the financial system as a 
whole. Thus, education at any scale will likely be under-funded without 
public or philanthropic subsidy.  
Lastly, immigrant communities may face difficulties regarding proper 
documentation for opening an account, either because they lack such 
documentation, or they fear that depositories will police immigration laws. 
Nearly 40% of Hispanic immigrants without bank accounts in one survey 
cited their immigration status as a major barrier to becoming banked.298 
Treasury has made clear that it is up to banks and thrifts to ensure that 
their identification verification is consistent with regulators’ “know your 
customer” rules, which have gained heightened significance in the wake of 
the USA PATRIOT Act.299 Despite congressional opposition, Treasury 
indicated that such identification could include consular-issued identity 
cards commonly used by Mexican residents and other immigrants in the 
United States.300 Some banks have begun to accept this form of 
identification for opening accounts at their institutions. Matricular cards 
alone, however, will not help immigrants who are not lawfully in the U.S. 
An IRS-issued individual taxpayer identification number or a social 
security card is needed for interest-bearing accounts. Moreover, the IRS 
will no longer guarantee that taxpayer information will not be shared with 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service.301
 
 298 ROBERT SURO ET AL., PEW HISPANIC CENTER & MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT FUND, 
INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, BILLIONS IN MOTION: LATINO IMMIGRANTS, REMITTANCES 
AND BANKING 14 (2002), available at http://www.iadb.org/mif/v2/files/nov22b.pdf [hereinafter IADB 
SURVEY] 
 299 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 326 prescribes new requirements for 
verification of identity on account opening. Two bills also address this issue. See H.R. 773, 108th 
Cong. (2003) (seeking to authorize financial institutions to accept consular identification). But see H.R. 
502, 108th Cong. (2003) (seeking to prohibit federal agencies from accepting anything other than U.S.-
issued identification, with the goal of controlling immigration). 
 300 After some members of Congress raised concerns over the proposal, Treasury issued a 
notice of inquiry seeking comment on its earlier rule, and then reaffirmed. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Results of the Notice of Inquiry on Final Regulations Implementing 
Customer Identity Verification Requirements Under Section 326 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Sept. 18, 
2003), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/js7432.doc.  
 301 For a discussion of the problem of immigrant identification needed to open an account, 
see SHEILA C. BAIR, MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT FUND, IMPROVING ACCESS TO THE U.S. BANKING 
SYSTEM AMONG RECENT LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS 7 (2003), available at 
http://www.cbanet.org/Issues/documents/Unbanked.pdf (last accessed Dec. 10, 2003). 
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B. Governmental Policy and Private Sector Innovation 
Despite these barriers, the 1990s witnessed a period of strong 
economic growth and technological innovation that improved the 
prospects for banking the poor. During the latter part of the 1990s, 
governmental policy began to focus on expanding access to financial 
services for low-income persons, focused initially on recipients of federal 
benefits and later on low-income persons more generally. In addition, 
financial institutions began to experiment, in the last two years, with 
products designed to reach Hispanic consumers, primarily with new 
techniques to send remittances to family members in other countries in 
competition with Western Union and other wire transfer services. 
Innovations in this area hold the potential to assist the unbanked more 
broadly. Community development financial institutions have also 
experimented with new products to reach the unbanked. Lastly, financial 
institutions in other countries have made strides in serving low-income 
persons. These experiments, although quite small in scope and scale—
even cumulatively—are instructive with respect to the potential for 
financial innovation to help meet the needs of low-income persons. 
1. Electronic Funds Transfer ‘99 and Electronic Transfer Accounts 
The Treasury Department’s efforts to increase electronic payment of 
federal benefits, pursuant to the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 
1996,302 while aimed at a narrower goal—reducing the cost of making 
federal benefit payments—may also have helped to spur innovation in 
serving low income households. Under Treasury’s electronic funds 
transfer (EFT ‘99) program, direct deposit into bank accounts has 
increased as a portion of all federal benefit payments from 58% in 1996 to 
77% in 2002. This increase in benefit payments reflects an increase in both 
direct deposit to existing accounts and the percentage of benefit recipients 
who have obtained bank accounts.  
Under EFT ‘99, Treasury launched the Electronic Transfer Account 
(ETA), a low-cost electronically based bank account for federal benefit 
recipients.303 The ETA provides for a maximum fee of $3.00 per month 
and no minimum balance, except where required by law. The ETA offers a 
minimum of four cash withdrawals and four balance inquiries per month, 
through any combination of ATM and/or teller access (at the discretion of 
 
 302 Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321. 
 303 ETAs are individually-owned bank accounts that accept electronic federal benefit, wage, 
salary, and retirement payments, and other deposits as permitted by the offering financial institution. 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, ETA: Background, at http://www.fms.treas.gov/eta/background.html (last 
accessed Dec. 17, 2003). 
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the financial institution), and allows access to the institution’s point-of-sale 
(POS) network, if available. It provides for direct deposit of federal 
benefits and, at the option of the financial institution, the ETA may cover 
direct deposit and may be an interest-bearing account. Additionally, the 
ETA provides the same consumer protections, including those guaranteed 
under Regulation E,304 that are available to other account holders at the 
financial institution. Under the program, Treasury provides financial 
institutions offering ETAs with a one-time payment of $12.60 per account 
to offset the costs of opening the accounts.305 Despite the relatively low 
reimbursement amount, as of Spring 2002, nearly 600 banks, thrifts, and 
credit unions were offering ETAs at over 18,000 locations nationwide.306 
Banks may be motivated to participate for a variety of reasons: good 
public relations from community service, positive consideration under the 
Community Reinvestment Act, a belief that with reimbursement the 
product is reasonably profitable, or a desire to reach a new customer 
segment that may one day need other bank products. Nearly 64,000 benefit 
recipients have opened these ETAs thus far.307  
The ETA could presumably make faster progress were additional 
funds made available for marketing, education, and training.308 The ETA 
initiative could also be linked with state EBT programs, discussed below, 
and the First Accounts pilot309 to permit a greater range of products to be 
offered to low-income households, whether federal benefit recipients, state 
beneficiaries, EITC-eligible taxpayers, or low- and moderate-income 
families more generally. 
For our purposes, the ETA project also revealed important 
information about the costs of offering electronically based accounts. 
Based on evidence to date, banks are likely to need subsidies to cover the 
 
 304 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (2002) (limiting consumer’s liability for fraudulent transfers to $50 if 
timely notice is given to the bank, and to $500 if timely notice is not given). 
 305 Research conducted for the Treasury Department by Dove Associates concluded that the 
average cost of opening an ETA account is $12.60. Actual costs vary significantly by institution. The 
$12.60 does not include costs for marketing, training, education, technology platform changes, or 
research. Treasury estimates from other account products suggest that marketing ETAs would cost an 
additional $9 to $11 per account. See DOVE ASSOCS. & U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ETA 
INITIATIVE, FINAL REPORT 67 (1998) [hereinafter DOVE ETA REPORT]. 
 306 The largest banks offering ETAs include Bank One, Bank of America, Fleet Bank, J.P. 
Morgan Chase Bank, U.S. Bank, and Wells Fargo. The top five ETA providers are Banco Popular de 
Puerto Rico, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Union Bank, and U.S. Bank. Big Banks Line Up To Offer 
the Popular ETA, EFT EXCHANGE NEWSLETTER, Spring 2002, available at 
http://www.fms.treas.gov/eft/promotional/EFTSPR2002.pdf. 
 307 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, ETA Reports & Statistics, at 
http://www.fms.treas.gov/eta/reports.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2003). I was involved in a small 
experiment that Treasury conducted with the U.S. Postal Service to place ATMs in post offices in 
several low-income urban and rural areas. 
 308 Funding for the Treasury Department’s EFT 1999 public education campaign ended in 
September 2001.  
 309 See infra Subsections IV.B.2. and V.A.1. 
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cost of initiating a program but could profitably offer accounts on a 
monthly recurring basis. Analysis conducted by Dove Consulting for the 
Treasury Department examined cost structures for a range of accounts and 
types of financial institutions.310 Although cost structures are highly 
sensitive to precise features of the account and type and size of the 
institution, anticipated costs for an average financial institution offering an 
all-electronic account with no teller visits may be instructive. Dove 
estimated that such an ETA account with a $3.00 monthly fee would 
produce pre-tax profit of $0.93 per month, excluding costs of research and 
product development, marketing and education, program start up, account 
set up and closure, and reclamation costs.311 Average account set up costs 
of $12.61 would take thirteen and a half months to recover. A more critical 
expense, however, is the expense of product development for each 
financial institution. Dove estimated that ETA products could cost between 
$64,000 and $148,000 for each financial institution. Even if a financial 
institution were to open 10,000 ETAs, product development would still 
cost between $6 and $15 per account. Marketing and education expenses 
are likely also to be high, as are the costs of training bank personnel about 
the product.312  
Anecdotally, banks are reporting to Financial Management Service 
(FMS) that they are signing up customers who inquire about ETAs for 
direct deposit into regular banking accounts. This may indicate that a 
portion of the unbanked federal benefit recipient population can be 
persuaded to open accounts once they receive minimal education about the 
benefits of direct deposit. Moreover, banks are attracting these customers 
without making any changes to existing account structures to induce them 
to sign up. This group also apparently does not have a prior poor credit 
history that would militate against a different account structure. (It is not 
clear, however, that these persons signing up for direct deposit are actually 
unbanked federal benefit recipients who would have been eligible to open 
ETAs.) 
Although EFT ‘99 seems to have spurred positive developments for 
low-income financial services, some consumer advocates have argued that 
the program has also spurred developments adverse to consumers. In 
particular, they argue that expensive bank-AFS provider relationships have 
sprung up to provide federal benefits electronically through check cashers, 
effectively re-converting the electronic payment from the government to a 
 
 310 See DOVE ETA REPORT, supra note 305; DOVE ASSOCS. & U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, ETA INITIATIVE: OPTIONAL ACCOUNT FEATURES, ECONOMIC WATERFALL ANALYSES 
(1998) [hereinafter ETA WATERFALL ANALYSES]. 
 311 DOVE ETA REPORT, supra note 305, at 61. ETA monthly revenues were estimated at 
$3.47, customer service at $1.75, transaction processing at $0.40, and ATM expenses at $0.38. 
 312 See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 32-33 (discussing financial institutions’ 
reluctance to market accounts with low profitability). 
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check, and then requiring holders to cash them for a fee.313 Despite the 
availability of these options, and likely because of their high cost and low 
benefit, there appears to be little appetite for them among consumers.314
2. Electronic Benefits Transfer 
The 1996 Welfare Reform law mandated that states convert from 
paying federal welfare benefits in the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) program by check to making such payments 
electronically. State electronic benefit transfer programs cover not just 
welfare payments, but a host of other state programs as well. A 2001 
National Automated Clearinghouse Association (NACHA) survey found 
over forty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico now use 
Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) to make food stamp payments, and 
most remaining states have plans to set up EBT programs shortly.315 
Nearly 80% of food stamp benefits are now issued using EBT.316 One half 
of NACHA-surveyed states also permit cash benefits to be placed on EBT 
cards; one third also deliver child care benefits; 20% place SSI benefits on 
EBT cards; 15% use the cards for Medicaid eligibility; and more than one 
half of the surveyed states also use EBT cards for other programs.317 As 
child-care subsidies have increased significantly as a percentage of TANF 
spending in recent years,318 the EFT trade group has recently launched a 
campaign to encourage states to deliver federal and state child-care 
subsidies through EBT.319
 
 313 See EFT Requirements of the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 and the Use of 
ETAs: Hearing on Implementation of EFT Requirements Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight 
and Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 52 (2001) (statement of Margot Saunders, 
National Consumer Law Center) (detailing a number of costly bank-check casher relationships set up 
for federal benefit recipients). 
 314 See DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 27. Although 87% of surveyed non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFIs) are aware of direct deposit products that would allow customers to access 
payments deposited in a bank through the NBFI, only 27% offer such products. The typical NBFI that 
offers a direct deposit product has only twenty-two direct deposit customers, whereas these NBFIs 
cash an average of 700 to 3,400 checks monthly. NBFI managers told researchers that compared to 
check cashing, these products are less profitable to NBFIs and are more expensive for customers. Id. at 
9, 27.  
 315 BARBARA LEYSER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF 
STATE EBT SYSTEMS (2001), at http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/electronic_benefits/ 
content/ebt_summary_table.pdf [hereinafter LEYSER, SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS]; see also 
NACHA, EBT IN THE STATES: SURVEY RESULTS, 2002 ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS REVIEW AND 
BUYER’S GUIDE 43-44 (2002) [hereinafter NACHA EBT SURVEY]. 
 316 RETAIL PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 67. 
 317 See NACHA EBT SURVEY, supra note 315. 
 318 Childcare is now the largest category of TANF expenditures after cash assistance. See 
ZOE NEUBERGER, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, TANF SPENDING IN FEDERAL FISCAL YEAR 
2001 (2002), available at http://www.cbpp.org/3-21-02tanf.pdf; GINA ADAMS & MONICA ROHACEK, 
CHILD CARE AND WELFARE REFORM 2 (Brookings Inst., Policy Brief No. 96, 2002). 
 319 See David Breitkopf, Trade Group To Push EBT for Subsidized Child Care, AM. 
BANKER, Nov. 21, 2001, at 10. 
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Unfortunately, the way EBT has been set up in most states has 
minimized the extent to which electronic transfer could be utilized as an 
entry point to banking. Most states do not seek to establish bank accounts 
for benefit recipients, but instead use a contractor to provide debit-based 
access to funds held by the state government in a pooled account. Doing 
this allows states to have the benefit of the “float” on benefit funds before 
recipients withdraw the funds. Switching to direct deposit of benefit funds 
into recipients’ accounts would require states to forego the benefit of this 
float, something that they are unlikely to do at this time given the current 
fiscal crises in many states. In addition, states hope to minimize 
administrative costs by having a single prime contractor deliver EBT 
services rather than seeking out all depositories in the state to offer EBT. 
The prime contractor approach also may reduce overall costs of educating 
recipients about accounts by making accounts uniform. If a variety of bank 
accounts are offered by a range of financial institutions, by contrast, 
education and marketing costs would presumably increase.  
Although nearly all states have focused on a prime contractor model 
using debit card access for delivering benefits, nineteen states now also 
permit recipients to have cash benefits directly deposited into a bank 
account established by the beneficiary.320 In a recent survey, only 24% of 
cash benefit recipients in EBT programs had bank accounts, and only 42% 
of those with bank accounts had benefits directly deposited to those 
accounts.321 Perhaps because the prime contractor benefit card model 
limits access to benefits to the geographic coverage of the prime 
contractor’s ATMs, about a third of EBT recipients in the survey have had 
some problem accessing cash, with the most common reasons being that 
they could not find an ATM or POS that accepted their EBT card for cash 
withdrawals.322 Most EBT recipients responding to the survey could not 
withdraw all of their benefit funds without paying fees or surcharges; of 
those paying for withdrawals, the most common monthly total for 
accessing funds was between $2.51 and $5.00.323 Although the most 
common choices for usual use of EBT cards were ATMs and POS at 
grocery stores, survey respondents also frequented check cashers to access 
their benefits electronically.324  
States have made a variety of arrangements with respect to charges 
 
 320 LEYSER, SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 315. A handful of additional states are 
considering the option. Id. 
 321 BARBARA LEYSER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FINDINGS FROM THE FIRST MULTI-
STATE SURVEY OF EBT RECIPIENTS (2001), available at http://www.nclc.org/initiatives/ 
electronic_benefits/multi_state.shtml. Given the small response size and limited geographic coverage, 
the survey may not be representative of EBT recipients as a whole. 
 322 Id. 
 323 Id.  
 324 Id.  
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for ATM and POS usage: Fifteen states permit at least four free ATM 
withdrawals per month; twelve states permit two to three free ATM 
withdrawals per month using EBT cards; the rest permit banks to charge 
fees for any ATM usage. The most common fee for ATM withdrawals, 
when such a fee is permitted to be charged, was $0.85. Most states permit 
free POS withdrawals, although some states include these withdrawals in 
the ATM fee-free limitations or require purchases for cash-back to be fee-
free.325 Most states permit banks to surcharge for ATM use but discourage 
merchant POS surcharging; some states have negotiated agreements with 
banks or networks to refrain from surcharging EBT recipients.326
There is a narrow window within which states could choose to 
restructure contracts to use EBT to develop banking relationships. 
Contracts, usually lasting five to seven years, will be up for renewal in 
most states within the next three years.327 States could move towards 
providing EBT through individually owned bank accounts and negotiate 
with networks for surcharge-free alliances for EBT-card holders. In so 
doing, states would be increasing the effectiveness of their welfare-to-
work strategies by bringing low-income families into the banking system 
in preparation for their entry into the workforce. States should permit these 
families to retain their EBT-issued bank accounts once they make the 
transition to the working world. This step may decrease the likelihood that 
new labor force entrants will turn to check cashing services once employed 
and increase the likelihood that they will arrange for direct deposit of their 
income. Given the high turnover rates of households on and off welfare,328 
permitting families to retain EBT-issued bank accounts may be important 
to those families’ financial stability. These initiatives could be combined 
with use of TANF funds for financial education, although TANF funding 
is tight in the current economic climate. Some states may wish to 
experiment with using TANF funds to make lump sum deposits into new 
bank accounts of those moving off welfare as an incentive to open a new 
account and to begin saving.329  
3. Private Sector Innovation in Banking Products 
Partly in response to increased information about the unbanked and 
incentives created by EFT ‘99 and EBT, a number of banks, thrifts, and 
 
 325 LEYSER, SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 315. 
 326 Id. 
 327 See id. (listing states, 85% of which will be up for renewal); NACHA EBT SURVEY, 
supra note 315, at 44 (showing that 60% of surveyed states will be up for renewal). 
 328 See generally REBECCA BLANK & RON HASKINS, BROOKINGS INST., THE NEW WORLD 
OF WELFARE (2001). 
 329 I take up savings policy and discuss Individual Development Accounts and other savings 
strategies more fully in SHERRADEN & BARR, supra note 1. 
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credit unions have begun to experiment with a variety of products 
designed to serve the needs of low-income individuals.330 These efforts, 
though small in scale, suggest that the type of policies that I advocate here 
could plausibly be undertaken in the real world.  
For example, Banco Popular has made great strides in reaching the 
50% of Puerto Rican residents who are unbanked.331 Banco Popular’s 
Acceso Popular account has a $1 monthly fee, no minimum balance, free 
ATM transactions, and free electronic and telephone bill payment.332 To 
encourage savings, Acceso Popular has a savings “pocket” into which 
small sums (initially, $5 per month) are automatically transferred from the 
Acceso Popular transaction account. The savings “pocket” pays modest 
interest. Funds may only be withdrawn by seeing a teller and account 
holders must pay a fee to see a teller more than once a month to discourage 
withdrawals.333 Banco Popular opened nearly 60,000 such accounts in 
2001, with half of those activating the savings “pocket” in their accounts. 
Many of the account holders open an account to save for a specific 
purchase, and then close the account once the purchase has been made. 
Banco Popular has a relatively low cost structure and higher returns from 
merchant POS fees from these accounts than would a similar institution in 
the states because the bank owns about half of the ATM/POS 
infrastructure in Puerto Rico. In addition, the potential market for these 
products represents a larger share of Puerto Rico’s market than would 
similar products in the states because such a high percentage of Puerto 
Rico’s population is unbanked. Nonetheless, Banco Popular’s experience 
suggests types of accounts that would prove attractive to low-income 
clientele. 
In the states, Banco Popular has focused not on retail banking 
services but on its over 150 check-cashing outlets and over fifty mobile 
check cashing vans that visit workplaces, making Banco Popular the third 
largest check casher in the United States. More recently, it has pursued two 
additional strategies. Banco Popular has opened a co-branded check-
cashing outlet/bank branch in California to give its customers access to 
other types of services, in the hope that unbanked check cashing customers 
will be drawn into using banking services. Banco Popular has also offered 
its Acceso Popular product in the states, as well as a debit-card based 
account in which customers are given two cards, one for themselves and 
 
 330 See generally NAT’L CMTY. INV. FUND, RETAIL FINANCIAL SERVICES INITIATIVE: A 
REPORT ON INNOVATIVE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES FOR LOW INCOME AND UNBANKED CUSTOMERS 
(2002), available at http://www.ncif.org/new/RFSIhighlights0405.pdf [hereinafter NCIF REPORT]. 
 331 Banco Popular, supra note 88 (citing FREYRE ECONOMIC FORECASTS & GAITHER INT’L, 
A SURVEY OF THE UNBANKED HOUSEHOLDS IN PUERTO RICO (1996)).  
 332 Press Release, Banco Popular, Banco Popular Launches “Programa Accesso Popular” 
and Brings it Directly to the Community and the Workplace (May 13, 2002) (on file with author). 
 333 Banco Popular, supra note 88.  
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one to send home to relatives who can then withdraw funds without high-
priced wire transfer fees. Thus far, the account is linked to remittances to 
Puerto Rico and to Mexico, where Banco Popular was able to purchase 
ATM access rights. In Chicago, where Acceso Popular was piloted, 500 
accounts were opened, some 80% of which had savings activated, with 
high average balances of $1,900.334  
Bank One is experimenting with using a broader range of credit 
criteria and low account minimums for opening checking accounts. Low-
income participants have managed to maintain average checking balances 
of $1,100 and average savings balances of $1,600.335  
ShoreBank, based in Chicago, has focused on bringing EITC 
recipients into the banking system.336 In its program, ShoreBank worked 
with a local voluntary income tax assistance (VITA) organization337 to 
provide tax preparation advice to EITC filers in ShoreBank’s branches. By 
focusing on EITC recipients, the program potentially reduces transaction 
costs and increases the likelihood of encouraging account-opening and 
saving. EITC recipients filing through VITA offices do not face high tax 
preparation and filing fees, nor do they have an incentive to take out 
expensive refund anticipation loans to pay for tax preparation services.338 
EITC refunds also present an opportunity for low-income people to open 
an account in order to save and earn interest, as well as for banks to open 
accounts given the potential for some interest income.  
In the pilot, take-up rates were low but account-holders found 
participation useful for transactions, savings, or access to credit. Twenty 
percent of low-income individuals who had their taxes prepared agreed to 
direct deposit their refund into a savings account with debit card access; of 
these, 60% of new account openers were previously unbanked.339 About 
 
 334 Ben Jackson, Popular Aims To Double in U.S., AM. BANKER, July 15, 2002, at 1. 
 335 Bringing More Unbanked Americans into the Financial Mainstream: Hearing Before the 
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 23, 24 (2002) (statement of Jaye 
Morgan Williams, Senior Vice President, Managing Director of Community Investment, Bank One 
Corporation).  
 336 See Ben Jackson, ShoreBank Courts Unbanked via Tax Service, AM. BANKER, Dec. 12, 
2001, at 6. Shorebank is a Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI), a specialized 
financial intermediary serving low-income communities. Of the 553 CDFIs certified to date by the 
Treasury Department’s CDFI Fund, 159 are banks, thrifts, or credit unions offering depository 
services. In a 2000 survey, 21 CDFIs provided 141,440 checking and saving accounts to low-income 
customers. These accounts had balances averaging $1,815. These depository CDFIs also offered 985 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) with an average balance of $395 per account. Fiscal Year 
2003 Appropriations: Hearing Before the Senate Appropriations Subcomm. on VA, HUD, and 
Independent Agencies, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Tony T. Brown, Director, CDFI Fund).  
 337 Nationwide, there are only enough volunteer resources at VITA sites to prepare about 
one-tenth of the seventeen million returns by filers with income at or below the poverty threshold. 
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, FY 2001 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 50-51 (2001). 
 338 See supra Section II.D. 
 339 See Bringing More Unbanked Americans into the Financial Mainstream: Hearing Before 
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 52, 54 (May 2, 2002) 
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half of participants used their accounts for savings or transactional 
purposes beyond simply depositing their refunds. A follow-up study found 
that 14% of account holders were “savers,” maintaining significant 
balances for at least six months, while 22% were “transactors,” using the 
account regularly for direct deposit of paychecks or government benefits, 
and making regular withdrawals. Twenty-two percent spent funds slowly, 
while 41% withdrew most of their funds in the first month.340 Customers 
believed that the accounts helped them to save; they paid less for 
preparation of taxes; financial transactions, including ATM use, were 
“more convenient and less expensive”; and credit card companies began to 
offer them credit “that might have been denied in the past.”341 Larger 
refunds resulted in a greater desire to open an account; account opening at 
the time of the refund was critical to interesting new customers; quick 
refunds through electronic filing were important to customers signing up 
for accounts; and a number of account holders signed up for direct deposit 
of paychecks or government benefit checks.342 ShoreBank has experienced 
low monthly costs,343 but the ShoreBank initiative is currently operating at 
quite a small scale.344
 Fleet is working with a nonprofit organization, Doorways to Dreams, 
to create an Internet platform that non-profit providers of individual 
development accounts can use to reduce the costs of providing accounts 
for low-income savers. Fleet has also launched a new debit product for the 
unbanked, Access Advantage, to move an estimated 8,000 employees from 
payroll checks to bank accounts this year. The accounts carry no minimum 
balances, no monthly fees, permit no check writing and allow free ATM 
withdrawal from Fleet’s ATMs, as well as free POS withdrawal. Fleet 
expects to cut the number of non-customer payroll checks processed by its 
branches by 216,000 from 1.1 million this year, both to reduce lines at 
branches, as well as to provide a service to its corporate clients.345
 
(testimony of Fran Grossman, Executive Vice President, Shorebank Advisory Services) (noting that 
participants in the pilot found reduced refund times from direct deposit, with some receiving their 
refund in as few as 8 days). Cf. BERUBE ET AL., supra note 38, at 7 (noting regular refund time of 14 
days for direct deposit). 
 340 SHOREBANK & CTR. FOR LAW & HUMAN SERVS., MONEY IN THE BANK: THE EXTRA 
CREDIT SAVINGS PROGRAM 7 (2002).  
 341 Id. at 8. 
 342 Id. at 9. 
 343 Shorebank spreadsheet on file with author; see also DOVE REPORT, supra note 2 (finding 
monthly costs under $3.00). 
 344 Only thirty-five accounts had been opened in the Detroit pilot as of March 2003. Susan 
Tompor, Small Incomes, Complex Issues: Poorer Taxpayers Need Help Maximizing Breaks, 
Minimizing Frustration, DET. FREE PRESS, Mar 24, 2003, available at 
http://www.freep.com/money/business/tompor24_20030324.htm. 
 345 See David Wessel, Banking on Technology for the Poor, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2002, at 
A2; Veronica Agosta, Fleet Hopes Product Turns Unbanked into Customers, AM. BANKER, Apr. 2, 
2002, at 2; see also Kevin Harlin, Banks Court Unbanked, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Apr. 28, 
2002, at E1. In contrast, KeyBank started imposing a $5 fee for noncustomer payroll checks cashed at 
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Other depository institutions have entered the low-income market by 
partnering with check cashers or payday lenders or closely following their 
business model. Union Bank of California, for example, has a check 
cashing unit, Cash & Save, which charges up to 2% of the check’s face 
amount for cashing checks.346 Union Bank attempts to transition some of 
its check cashing customers to banking products through “transitional” 
products, such as low-minimum savings accounts, and reports that 40% of 
its repeat check cashing customers have become banking customers.347 
Union Bank has also partnered with the non-profit Operation Hope to 
provide financial education and has a partnership with Nix Check Cashing 
to provide banking services through check cashing outlets. Bethex Federal 
Credit Union, a CDFI in the Bronx, New York, has partnered with 
RiteCheck Cashing Inc., a check cashing chain, to expand its presence in 
low-income neighborhoods through RiteCheck stores.348 Other credit 
union-check casher partnerships have followed suit. Harris Bank opened a 
check cashing outlet in Chicago, seeking to encourage its clientele to open 
accounts at the bank. A pilot moved 8-10% of customers into accounts 
through financial education and partnerships with community groups.349 In 
Atlanta, El Banco de Nuestra Comunidad, a bank-check-cashing 
partnership provides services beyond those of a typical bank or check 
cashing outlet—with a children’s playroom, Internet access, free local 
phone service, an on-site IRS certifying agent, and classes on credit; the 
institution seeks to function as more of a community center for its 
immigrant clientele than a financial institution.350  
Based on the experience to date, efforts to expand access to electronic 
accounts have had positive but modest effects on account ownership and 
savings. Partnerships between check cashers and banks appear to be high 
cost and do not take advantage of electronic payment system or delivery 
network efficiencies, but may expand the range of financial services 
offerings available to low-income check cashing customers. Such 
partnerships may be particularly useful for those who do not have access to 
direct deposit at work. Strategies involving co-locating check cashing 
operations and bank branches may be more promising in terms of 
 
branches, in part to discourage teller use and in part to encourage new Key account holders. Id. 
 346 Union Bank’s Cash & Save charges 1.5% for payroll checks and 1.0% for government 
checks. Caskey, Reaching Out, supra note 20, at 90.  
 347 Yolanda Brown, Big Opportunities Among Low-Income Customers, BANKSTOCKS.COM 
(June 14, 2002), at http://www.bankstocks.com/article.asp?id=582. 
 348 David Breitkopf, Credit Union, Check Casher Try Working Together, AM. BANKER, Oct. 
30, 2001, at 13. 
 349 Ben Jackson, Brushing Up on Its Spanish, Harris Opens Up a Store, AM. BANKER, Sept. 
3, 2002, at 4. 
 350 Meredith Jordan, El Banco Serves the Unbanked as a “Non-Bank,” ATLANTA BUS. 
CHRON., Feb. 3, 2003, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2003/ 
02/03/newscolumn4.html. 
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transitioning customers to banking relationships, but they are also 
undertaken at relatively high cost. Automated check cashing through 
ATMs may be a promising strategy to lower costs if anti-fraud measures 
can be made effective. 
4. Remittances and the Hispanic Market 
President Bush and Mexican President Vicente Fox have focused on 
reducing the costs of the nearly $10 billion in annual U.S.-initiated 
remittances to Mexico.351 Remittances serve to bolster the Mexican 
economy,352 increase the purchasing power of recipients, and finance the 
growth of micro-enterprises.353 Remittances from the U.S. to all of Latin 
America and the Caribbean totaled $32 billion in 2002.354 While the 
degree to which Hispanics in the U.S. are unbanked varies significantly by 
country of origin, on average more than 40% of Hispanic immigrants lack 
a bank account.355 Most Latino immigrants send remittances back to their 
country of origin using wire transfer services, rather than banks.356  
A growing number of banks have focused on the Hispanic market as a 
new revenue source.357 For example, Bank of America has stated that it 
anticipates growth near its branches from the Hispanic population.358 In 
particular, banks have begun to view the market for remittances as a 
potential growth area. New initiatives may have the potential to expand 
access to banking services for low-income Hispanics,359 and these efforts 
 
351 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PARTNERSHIP FOR PROSPERITY: REPORT TO 
PRESIDENT VICENTE FOX & PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH 3-4, 9 (Mar. 22, 2002), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/200251420452981182.pdf [hereinafter PARTNERSHIP 
FOR PROSPERITY]. 
352 1.7% of Mexico’s GDP come from remittances. See, e.g., Issues Regarding the Sending 
of Remittances: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th 
Cong. 41, 42 (Feb. 28, 2002) (testimony of Dr. Manuel Orozco, Project Director, Central America, 
Inter-American Dialogue), available at http://banking.senate.gov/02_02hrg/022802/orozco.htm; 
CHRISTOPHER WOODRUFF & RENEE ZENTENO, REMITTANCES AND MICROENTERPRISES IN MEXICO 
(UCSD Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, Working Paper, 2001), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=282019; see also Ginger Thompson, Big Mexican Breadwinner: 
The Migrant Worker, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2002, at A3.  
353 See, e.g., WOODRUFF & ZENTENO, supra note 352, at 5 (reporting that 20 percent of 
Mexican micro-enterprises studied were funded with remittances, constituting an additional capital 
investment in these firms of about $1.85 billion).  
354 Press Release, Inter-American Development Bank, Remittances to Latin America and the 
Caribbean Reached $32 Billion in 2002 (Feb. 27, 2003), 
http://www.iadb.org/NEWS/Display/PRPrint.cfm?PR_Num=38_03&Language=English. 
355 IADB SURVEY, supra note 298, at 7.  
356 IADB SURVEY, supra note 298, at 5. 
357 See, e.g., Lavonne Kuykendall, New Ideas, Familiar Barriers in Transfer Biz, AM. 
BANKER, Feb. 6, 2003, at 6; Anitha Reddy, Banks Go After Money-Transfer Market, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 17, 2003, at E1. 
358 David Breitkopf, B of A Card for Money Transfers to Mexico, AM. BANKER, Apr. 24, 
2002, at 9. 
359 See Kuykendall, supra note 357 (finding anecdotal evidence that some large banks 
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may also have positive spillover effects for other low-income 
communities. Banks have begun to introduce competition into the 
remittance market with products such as Bank of America’s “Safesend” 
card, in which ATM card holders in a dozen U.S. cities can send money to 
relatives in Mexico by providing them with a debit card to access funds at 
ATMs.360 Wells Fargo introduced its own product, Dinero Instante, in 
which funds can be sent to certain banks and stores in Mexico, for $10 a 
transfer.361 Citibank offers similar products,362 and has recently launched a 
new pilot approach, “Access Accounts,” targeted at Latino immigrants in 
the U.S., in which U.S. customers are offered a low-cost, all electronic 
bank account with no minimum balances, and low cost debit-card based 
transfers to Mexico and other locations.363 The World Council of Credit 
Unions has set up International Remittance Network, through which credit 
union members in the U.S. can send remittances to relatives in Mexico 
using debit cards, at 33% to 50% lower cost than a Western Union 
transfer.364
Enhanced competition from the banking sector has already helped to 
drive down the cost of sending a Western Union wire transfer to Mexico to 
about $15, from $25.365 An impediment to greater competition in this 
market may be a lack of sufficient ATM and POS infrastructure to 
compete with Western Union’s strong penetration in Mexico and other 
recipient countries, although networks appear to be widely available in 
many parts of Mexico.366 The Inter-American Development Bank has 
made a grant to Mexico to improve ATM infrastructure for this purpose.367 
In addition, the U.S. Postal Service offers a product for transmitting funds 
from U.S. post offices to Mexico, using Bancomer’s 2,300 branches 
there.368
Progress on remittances is important for three reasons: First, given the 
high costs of sending remittances, the potential savings to be had from 
 
utilizing remittance programs are converting users into customers). 
360 Breitkopf, supra note 358. But see David Boraks, Safesend Starts Slow, So B of A Tries 
Harder; Struggles in Drawing Mexico Transfer Biz from Noncustomers, AM. BANKER, Apr. 10, 2003, 
at 1 (detailing problems Bank of America had in marketing and anticipating changes in response). 
361 Wessel, supra note 345; Kuykendall, supra note 357. 
362 Kuykendall, supra note 357. 
363 Robert Julavits, Citi’s Access Account Targets the Unbanked, AM. BANKER, Nov. 18, 
2003, at 3. 
364 See World Council of Credit Unions, IRnet, Frequently Asked Questions, at 
http://www.woccu.org/prod_serv/irnet/faq.php (last accessed Dec. 10, 2003).  
365 Wessel, supra note 345. Unfavorable exchange rates embedded in these transactions may 
make the real cost of wire transfers significantly higher than reported. 
366 Interview with Don Hammond, Fiscal Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, in 
Washington, D.C. (Aug. 1, 2002). 
367 See PARTNERSHIP FOR PROSPERITY, supra note 351, at 4. 
368 See U.S. Postal Service, Wire Money to Mexico, at 
http://www.usps.com/money/sendingmoney/wiremoneytomexico/welcome.htm (last accessed on Nov. 
17, 2003). 
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ATM-based products is large. Second, bank remittance products also have 
the potential to bring more Hispanics in the U.S. into the banking system. 
Third, strategies to reduce the costs of remittances have the potential to 
increase the flow of funds for development into Latin America.  
Given the costs of setting up each remittance transaction as a stand-
alone proposition, costs could be reduced by establishing a bank account 
for these customers. Account ownership would let immigrants convert 
income into cash, save, and pay bills—not simply send remittances. 
Although problems with account opening documentation will continue to 
present problems,369 a number of banks have begun to accept Mexican 
consular identification documents for Mexican immigrants in the United 
States seeking to open bank accounts.370 The strategies that I propose to 
expand access to bank accounts more generally would help to reduce the 
costs of sending remittances, and new approaches that a handful of banks 
are now beginning to explore for remittances may help to open up the 
banking system to the unbanked. 
5. International Experience 
A survey of approaches to serving the poor in other countries is 
beyond the scope of this Article, but I highlight a few here merely to 
suggest ways in which other countries have addressed similar problems. 
For example, South African banks were among the first to experiment with 
using technology to reach the unbanked.371 More recently, one of South 
Africa’s largest banks launched a bank that has fifty branches and 100,000 
customers thus far, offering a savings account with an ATM card.372 South 
Africa is beginning to use its post offices to offer online bill payment. 
India is also experimenting in using its post offices to connect savings 
account holders with bill payment and international money transfers.373 In 
the U.K., banks have opened three million basic banking accounts, usually 
without check-writing, for unbanked Britons, regardless of income or 
credit rating, in response to the government’s 1999 report, Access to 
 
369 See supra Section III.A. 
370 See, e.g., Christian Berthelsen, Banking on Mexico, S.F. CHRON., May 14, 2002, at B1; 
Risa Brim, Bilingual Banking, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER (Lexington, KY), June 12, 2002, at C1; 
Laura Mandaro, Mexican ID Gaining Favor with U.S. Banks, AM. BANKER, Nov. 13, 2001, at 2; see 
also Sam Quinones, Chicago S&L Rides Immigrant Wave from the Start, AM. BANKER, Mar. 4, 2003, 
at 4A. 
 371 Standard Bank launched E Bank in 1993 to deliver basic electronically-based banking 
services to South Africa’s poor. See JO ANN PAULSON & JAMES MCANDREWS, FINANCIAL SERVICES 
FOR THE URBAN POOR: SOUTH AFRICA’S E PLAN (World Bank, Working Paper No. 2016, 1998). 
 372 See Cape Banks in Micro War, CAPE BUS. NEWS (Cape Town, S. Afr.), June 18, 2002, 
available at http://www.cbn.co.za/archive/2002-mar/BOE.HTM.  
 373 STIJN CLAESSENS ET AL., E-FINANCE IN EMERGING MARKETS: IS LEAPFROGGING 
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Financial Services.374 Many of the accounts offer bill payment services, 
and some even allow access via mobile phones.375 The British government 
also plans to use post offices to provide banking services.376
IV. Payments Systems and Distribution Networks 
Expanding access to electronic payments systems and distribution 
networks is critical to banking low- and moderate-income households.377 
More widespread adoption of these technologies would make electronic 
banking services more attractive to the unbanked and at the same time 
make it less expensive and less risky for financial institutions to expand 
access to banking services for the poor. With expanded electronic 
networks, both the demand for and the supply of bank services through 
electronic means to the poor would likely increase. 
Checks are costly to process, pose the risk of being overdrafted at 
high cost to consumers and financial institutions, and cause delay in the 
availability of funds deposited. By contrast, direct deposit of income is 
lower cost to employers and permits immediate access to funds for 
consumers. Low-income persons who have access to direct deposit need 
not wait for a check to clear if deposited into an account and need not visit 
a check casher to get immediate access to funds. Yet many low-income 
workers do not have access to or take advantage of direct deposit, in part 
because many of them do not have bank accounts. Similarly, online debit 
for withdrawals at ATMs, and for payment and cash-back at point of sale, 
offer benefits to both low-income households and financial institutions. 
Online debit could provide low-income households with a means to access 
funds and purchase goods and services without the need for checking 
accounts that are expensive for banks to provide and contain the risk of 
overdraft. Online debit also saves time for consumers and labor costs for 
banks, as it reduces the need for teller time in bank branches. If banks offer 
an account with only debit-card access, low-income persons would have a 
convenient means for withdrawal and payment. If ATMs are outfitted with 
the ability to provide money orders, low-income people would have 
another method of paying bills. In addition, expansion of automatic bill 
payment through ATMs or internet access could further reduce the costs 
 
 374 Colin Cottell, Financial Exclusion: How Labour Failed To Hit the Black Spot, 
OBSERVER (London), June 16, 2002, at 10. 
 375 See Jessica Bown, Banks Which Bar Poor Are Called To Account, SUNDAY EXPRESS 
(London), June 9, 2002, at Finance 21. 
 376 See Press Release, eFunds, IBM Chooses eFunds To Deliver Universal Banking Services 
(Mar. 27, 2002), at http://www.efunds.com/us/en/news_and_events/1001465.cnt. 
 377 Payments systems, such as cash, check, or electronic payment, are a means of 
transferring value from one party to another. By distribution networks, such as bank branches and 
ATMs, I mean physical locations for a party to initiate or receive a transaction in the payments system. 
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and increase the convenience of paying bills for utilities, rent, and other 
regular costs, but businesses must overcome high initial costs, customer 
inertia, and lack of customer access to bank accounts in order to expand 
direct bill payment. In combination, these technologies hold out the 
prospect that banks could provide low-cost electronic banking services to 
low- and moderate-income households.  
Despite the potential of direct deposit and online debit, the 
widespread availability of ATMs, and the emergence of direct bill 
payment, the expansion of these technologies may be slower than is 
socially optimal. At least in part, that is because payments systems are 
characterized by positive network externalities.378 Private suppliers of 
network services may be unwilling to pay or lack sufficient incentive to 
provide the socially optimal level of services justified by those 
externalities. Payments systems require both buyers and sellers to accept 
the mode of payment. Sellers will not invest in the infrastructure needed to 
accept a mode of payment unless many buyers use this mode. Buyers will 
not choose a mode of payment not accepted by many sellers. If many 
buyers and sellers adopt the payment system, all users will be better off. 
But because public benefits to all users of the payment system exceed 
private ones to each participant deciding whether to use the system, this 
mode of payment may not be adopted or may be adopted slowly. In 
general, as electronic modes of payment become more widespread, it 
becomes increasingly more efficient and cheaper for others to use such 
payment systems. For our purposes, as networks spread and costs come 
down, low-income customers could increasingly access these modes of 
income receipt and payment.  
Because the type of payment and distribution system significantly 
affects the cost and risk of providing financial services, the Article first 
discusses the network externalities literature, then charts changes in three 
areas: the processing of checks and the use of debit cards, the expansion of 
ATM networks, and the potential for direct deposit and direct payment. As 
payments shift away from paper and toward electronic means of transfer, 
 
 378 Chakravorti & McHugh, supra note 297, at 45. For a discussion of network externalities, 
see Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. 
ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985) [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities] (“[T]he . . . utility 
that a user derives from consumption of the good increases with the number of other agents consuming 
the good.”); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93, 96 [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition] (“Since social 
marginal benefits exceed private marginal benefits—that is, since there are adoption externalities—the 
equilibrium network size is smaller than the socially optimal network size, and the perfectly 
competitive equilibrium is not efficient.”); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in 
the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. OF POL. ECON. 822 (1986) [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, 
Technology Adoption] (discussing “sponsored” network technologies). But see, e.g., S.J. Liebowitz & 
Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 
133 [hereinafter Liebowitz & Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy] (arguing that most network externalities 
do not exist, are better explained by other market failures, or are unlikely to result in market failures). 
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costs and risks decrease, which could significantly benefit the poor if they 
are brought into the banking system. Payment providers cannot capture the 
full social benefit of network expansion, however, and so because low-
income consumers would likely benefit from network expansion to their 
communities more than both the average and marginal consumer, these 
payment systems and distribution networks may not be rapidly adapted to 
meet the financial services needs of the poor absent the type of 
governmental intervention often pursued when there are public goods and 
positive social externalities.379
A. Network Externalities  
Network effects occur when the value to each consumer of a product 
is a function of how many other consumers buy that product.380 Network 
effects fall into two categories. The telephone provides “direct network 
effects” because a user’s utility increases when other people purchase 
phones. A phone only has value to the extent that it can be used to 
communicate with other telephone users. If consumer A possesses the only 
telephone, the product is worthless. But the usefulness of that phone 
increases as more of A’s friends and family make the same purchase. 
Consumers are benefited by “indirect network effects,” when an additional 
consumer of the good alters third-party behavior.381 For example, 
consumer A, who is an Apple Computer user, will benefit if consumer B 
purchases an Apple Computer because it will increase the likelihood that 
computer programmers will create more software that their computers can 
run. The benefit A derives from B’s purchase comes indirectly through the 
incentives it provides for third parties. For both types of network effects, 
the benefit of a network also increases as it becomes commonplace 
because the technology becomes easier to access.382  
Network effects can give rise to externalities. When B decides 
whether or not to buy an Apple computer, B will not take into account the 
additional benefit that A will derive from the purchase.383 Nor will the 
telephone purchaser necessarily consider the benefit that others will 
 
 379 As discussed more fully below, the argument based on network externalities does not 
apply with equal force across all of these areas, and it is the case that there are risks that government 
intervention can exacerbate rather than overcome network externalities.  
 380 Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities, supra note 378, at 424. 
 381 See id. 
 382 Garth Saloner & Andrea Shepard, Adoption of Technologies with Network Effects: An 
Empirical Examination of the Adoption of Automated Teller Machines, 26 RAND J. ECON. 479, 480 
(1995). 
 383 The literature assumes that the transaction costs of negotiations among individual 
consumers are too high for such negotiations to occur. With respect to the example, it assumes that A is 
unable to pay B to purchase an Apple computer. If such negotiation occurred, consumers could 
internalize the network effect.  
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receive from being able to call him. When network effects are positive, 
consumers may also base their purchasing decisions on what their peers 
are consuming regardless of the quality of the good. This presents the 
possibility that an inferior product may become an industry standard, 
deviation from which becomes costly to the individual.384  
Network externality analysis has been employed in antitrust law,385 
and gained prominence in the antitrust suit against Microsoft.386 The 
government argued that network effects tend to produce standardization on 
one format because monopoly profits accrue to the firm that can establish 
its product as the standard. Firms have incentives to “tip” the market 
toward an equilibrium corresponding to its product.387 Once a monopolist 
is established, network effects pose barriers for new entrants.  
Yet network effects may be more benign than this analysis 
suggests.388 First, lock-in on an inferior standard is less likely because 
early adopters will have an incentive to adopt the best technology in order 
to attract others needed for a network.389 Moreover, the owner of a 
superior standard will have a strong incentive to provide subsidies to early 
adopters because such an owner stands to earn high profits if he 
monopolizes the market.390 Second, network effects are posited in high 
technology industries such as computer operating systems391 and video 
players, which feature high rates of technological advancement. As an 
established network standard becomes out-dated, the market becomes 
prone to tipping toward the newer, better standard.392 Third, just as the 
network effect creates a barrier to entry, the possibility of tipping the 
 
 384 See W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by 
Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116 (1989); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, 
Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985). The oft-cited example is the QWERTY 
keyboard, which some have argued is not the best design but became locked-in as the industry 
standard. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & 
PROC. OF THE 97TH ANN. MEETING OF THE AM. ECON. ASS’N, May 1985, at 332. But see S.J. 
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990) (disputing claim 
that QWERTY represents an inefficient equilibrium). 
 385 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-63 
(1992). 
 386 U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 387 Some argued that this occurred when the VCR industry tipped from Beta to VHS. VCRs 
exhibit direct network effects because users of the same format can exchange tapes, and indirect 
network effects because ownership of a VCR encourages third parties to open tape-rental outlets 
featuring that VCR’s format, substantially increasing the value of that format to other owners. See 
Liebowitz & Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy, supra note 378, at 147-48 (disputing such claims). 
 388 See generally William J. Kolasky, Network Effects: A Contrarian View, 7 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 577, 578 (1999). 
 389 S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 205, 215 (1995). 
 390 Id. at 217-18. 
 391 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 34.  
 392 Consider, for example, how the VCR market tipped toward DVD in the late 1990s and 
the video-game market tipped from Atari to Nintendo in the late 1980s. 
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market towards a different standard and reaping monopoly profits makes 
entry more tempting to those with a superior standard. Adherence to the 
inferior technology represents lost profit to those suppliers with higher 
quality products, which implies an opportunity for a shift to the superior 
standard.393 The greater the difference in quality between the locked-in, 
inferior standard and the superior new entrant, the greater the gains to be 
had from entry.394 Fourth, network effects may experience diminishing 
marginal returns to scale after a critical mass is reached. For example, the 
addition of the first few telephones to the network dramatically increased 
its value. But now that the technology is widespread, the network effect of 
each additional telephone sold is negligible. As the full economies to scale 
of one network are realized, and the market continues to grow, it may thus 
be possible for more than one standard to coexist if the market is 
sufficiently large.395
Application of the network externality arguments to card-based 
payment systems requires that there be incentives for the three relevant 
parties to adopt it. Banks must decide to issue the card; consumers must 
decide to use it; and retailers must decide to accept it. This interaction is 
exacerbated (or enhanced) by network effects. When any individual 
decides to enter the card network, the network becomes more attractive to 
potential future entrants. Each additional consumer who uses a card-based 
payment increases the incentive for retailers to accept that form of 
payment. The more retailers that accept the form of payment, the more 
advantageous it is for a consumer to carry it. The more consumers who 
want to carry the card, the more advantageous it is for a bank to issue it. 
The network only has substantial value when it reaches a critical mass of 
participants, however, so consumers and merchants lack sufficient 
incentives for initial entry into the network.396  
In many networks, this momentary inertia is overcome by one party 
sponsoring the format. Katz and Shapiro have demonstrated that when a 
firm owns the property rights to a technology, or when there are barriers to 
entry, a supplier will be willing to make an investment in the form of 
reduced pricing to establish the technology as the industry standard. When 
one form of technology is sponsored and another is not, however, the 
sponsored technology may be adopted too much from the perspective of 
social welfare. Katz and Shapiro demonstrated that a rival, non-sponsored 
 
 393 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 389, at 217-18. 
 394 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 389, at 4 (1990) (“The greater the gap in 
performance between two standards, the greater are these profit opportunities, and the more likely that 
a move to the efficient standard will take place.”).  
 395 Consider, for example, the coexistence of Apple computers and PCs. 
 396 See Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1063 (2002).  
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technology may fail even when all consumers agree that it is superior.397  
B. Checks and Debit Cards 
Because payments systems produce network externalities, they often 
rely on a sponsoring entity to subsidize entry and set uniform rules and 
prices for network participants.398 With respect to checks, the Federal 
Reserve Board sponsored and subsidized the check clearance process, 
beginning at the turn of the last century, helping to establish a nationwide 
means for transferring funds and ensuring the dominance for decades of 
check payments.399 Although they remain the dominant form of retail 
payment, checks declined from 85% of non-cash payments in 1979 to 59% 
in 2001.400 In 2001, there were seventy-two billion non-cash retail 
payments, of which over forty-two billion were by check, and nearly thirty 
billion were by electronic payment.401  
A significant portion of these checks could readily be converted to 
electronic payment. Some 30% of checks that are processed each year are 
cashed by the bank that issued them (“on-us”).402 A portion of these on-us 
checks represent presentment of payroll checks by workers at their 
employer’s bank,403 checks that could be readily converted to direct 
deposit with same day availability for workers—and with a concomitant 
decline in use of expensive bank teller time—as part of a strategy to bank 
unbanked workers. Some on-us checks, however, represent payment for 
informal sector or part-time employment that would be more difficult to 
convert to direct deposit and some of which may persist even if those who 
deposit them become banked. Nearly 20% of all checks are categorized as 
income payments from businesses or the government to individuals. These 
 
 397 See Katz & Shapiro, Technology Adoption, supra note 378; see also Carl Shapiro, 
Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 676 (2001). 
 398 See Robert M. Hunt, An Introduction to the Economics of Payment Card Networks, 2 
REV. NETWORK ECON. 80 (2003). 
 399 See Fed. Reserve Bd., Federal Reserve’s Key Policies for the Provision of Financial 
Services, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/pricing/default.htm (last modified July 3, 
2003).  
 400 RETAIL PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 21. Still, U.S. use of electronic payments 
as a percentage of all non-cash payments is low by international standards. The U.S. has the lowest use 
of cash and the largest number of non-cash transactions per person per year among the U.S., Canada, 
Japan, and Europe, but with electronic payments at fewer than 40% of non-cash payments, far lower 
use of electronic payment than Canada or Europe (where electronic payments make up 67% and 79% 
of non-cash payments, respectively). DAVID B. HUMPHREY, U.S. CASH AND CARD PAYMENTS OVER 
25 YEARS 5 (Conference on Innovation in Financial Services and Payments, Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, 2002), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/conf/innovations/Humphrey.pdf. 
 401 RETAIL PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 15. These figures exclude non-purchase 
transactions, such as wholesale wire transfers, ACH settlement transactions, and ATM withdrawals.  
 402 RETAIL PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 12.  
 403 Some banks have recently begun to charge non-account-holders for cashing checks, even 
those drawn on the bank cashing them. See, e.g., Caroline E. Mayer, Bank Adds a $5 Fee To Cash 
Paychecks, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2003, at E1. 
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checks could be converted to direct deposit for those who now have 
accounts or are brought into the banking system. 
Among paperless, electronic forms of payment, credit cards 
predominate. In 2001, there were fifteen billion credit card transactions, or 
about 50% of all electronic transactions; 8.3 billion debit card transactions, 
or 28%; and 5.6 billion Automated Clearinghouse (ACH) payments, or 
19%.404 The growth rate for debit cards is faster than that of credit cards,405 
and retail transactions using debit cards grew faster than those using credit 
cards in 2001.406 The Nilson Report predicts that debit card transactions 
will surpass credit card transactions in the next decade.407 In 2001, there 
were nearly as many online and offline debit transactions as there were 
ATM transactions.408
Online debit—because it is low cost and low risk—holds out the most 
promise for expanding bank services to low-income households. Online 
debit cards can be used at an ATM, or at retail merchants with POS PIN 
pads for purchases or cash back. Online debit, which is routed through 
EFT networks, provides real-time settlement. Sales made with online debit 
result in a transfer of funds instantly, while offline debit presents a risk that 
the consumer will overdraft and requires the merchant to float the cost of 
sale for days. Online debit fees paid by the merchant to the card issuer are 
significantly lower than offline debit.409 Moreover, because a PIN is 
required for online debit, fraud rates may be lower than for signature-based 
cards. By contrast, offline debit cards can be used for purchases at 
checkouts where Visa or MasterCard are accepted by signing a receipt, do 
not allow cash back, are routed through Visa and MasterCard networks, 
use ACH settlement in one-to-three days, and carry fees paid to issuers 
that are much higher. 
Despite the advantages of online debit, offline debit makes up two 
 
 404 RETAIL PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 19. ACH specializes in higher dollar-
amount transactions than the other payment forms and carries three-quarters of the value of all 
electronic transactions. Id. ACH is a batch-processed, electronic inter-bank system for transferring 
value. See FED. RESERVE FIN. SERVS., FEDACH, available at 
http://www.frbservices.org/Retail/pdf/FedACH-FACT.pdf (last accessed Dec. 17, 2003). 
 405 See, e.g., David Breitkopf, MasterCard To Provide Debit Settlement for Pulse, AM. 
BANKER, Feb. 8, 2002, at 16 (citing MasterCard estimate that growth of debit is twice as fast as growth 
of credit). 
 406 Calmetta Coleman, Debit Cards Look To Give Credit Cards a Run for Consumers’ 
Money, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at B1. 
 407 W.A. Lee, Debating, and Preparing for, the Payments Future, AM. BANKER, Apr. 29, 
2002, at 8.  
 408 TONY HAYES ET AL., DOVE CONSULTING GROUP & NYCE CORP., 2002 ATM DEPLOYER 
STUDY 56 (2002) [hereinafter DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY]; see also Meyer, supra note 69 (describing 
rapid growth of debit card transactions).  
 409 See SUJIT CHAKRAVORTI & ALPA SHAH, A STUDY OF THE INTERRELATED BILATERAL 
TRANSACTIONS IN CREDIT CARD NETWORKS 40 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, Emerging Payments 
Occasional Paper Series EPS-2001-2, 2001); John R. Wilke, Visa, MasterCard Face Huge Potential 
Damages in Suit, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2002, at B1. 
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thirds of debit transaction volume.410 Moreover, less than one-third of 
merchants have online debit capacity.411 Offline debit is dominant in the 
United States, even though other countries generally utilize the more 
efficient online debit.412 Why? 
The answer lies in the history of credit and debit cards in the United 
States. Banks first issued debit cards in the late 1970s, long after credit 
cards had become common,413 and debit cards were slow to catch on 
because relatively few merchants accepted them.414 A major impediment 
was that, to accept debit cards, a merchant had to purchase POS terminals 
to conduct transactions.415 Visa and MasterCard first resisted offering 
debit, then in the late 1980s created a joint online debit venture. The 
project was challenged on antitrust grounds, and the firms settled by 
ending the venture.416 By the mid-1990s, Visa and MasterCard began to 
focus their attention on using the widespread availability of their credit 
card infrastructure to offer offline debit. Visa and MasterCard 
implemented “honor-all-cards” rules that required merchants who accepted 
Visa and MasterCard credit cards also to accept their debit cards. In 
addition, Visa and MasterCard imposed a “one price” policy that 
prohibited merchants from charging a fee to customers for using their 
more costly, offline debit. Lastly, the firms each made their debit and 
credit cards physically indistinguishable. Because the higher interchange 
fees for offline debit could not be passed on to customers, consumers were 
indifferent to the form of payment, and use of offline debit increased at an 
inefficient rate.  
Because most retailers already accepted credit cards, the 
infrastructure for accepting offline debit was in place years before online 
debit became viable. Offline debit, because it did not require a new 
infrastructure, enjoyed a first-mover advantage over online debit, which 
 
 410 RETAIL PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 19.  
 411 See David Balto, Creating a Payment System Network: The Tie That Binds or an 
Honorable Peace?, 55 BUS. LAW 1391, 1395 (2000); Steve Bills, Can Banks’ Clout Break Momentum 
of PIN Debit?, AM. BANKER, June 10, 2002, at 1.  
 412 Plastic Pricing —-Visa and MasterCard Settle with Retailers, ECONOMIST, May 3, 2003, 
(reporting that between 54% and 70% of Canadian merchants have POS terminals, compared to only 
28% of American merchants).
 413 See Balto, supra note 411, at 1392. 
414 Because a payment card network can arise only with concurrent 
participation by three groups of entities, the institutional environment that will 
support the deployment of payment cards must be one that includes favorable 
conditions . . . for participation by financial institutions that issue the cards, by 
merchants that accept the cards, and by consumers that carry them. 
Mann, supra note 396, at 1063. 
 415 See, e.g., Barbara Grondin Francella, Money Market: Debit-Savvy Consumers Ask for 
Cash Back at the Checkout, CONVENIENCE STORE NEWS, July 14, 2003, at 57 (“[B]usiness needs in 
the past haven’t always justified having the PIN pad.”) (quoting a retailer). 
 416 See New York v. Visa, U.S.A., Inc., 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 69,016, 1990 WL 75047 
(S.D.N.Y. May 8, 1990). 
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required installation of POS terminals. Moreover, even though offline 
debit was less efficient, consumers did not face any price differential for 
using offline debit, meaning that true economic costs were not being 
correctly allocated.417 Although consumers increasingly had access to 
cards that could be used for both ATMs and online debit, retailers faced 
higher capital costs for online debit and had lower incentives to purchase 
POS terminals because customers were indifferent to the payment 
method.418  
Competition between Visa and MasterCard, and between offline and 
online debit, actually results in higher, not lower interchange fees, for both 
products. Because they do not directly pay them, individual consumers are 
indifferent to the interchange fee charged by either Visa or MasterCard. 
Banks, however, which receive revenue from interchange fees, strongly 
prefer a high interchange fee and will base the decision whether to issue 
online or offline debit in part on which allows them to charge merchants 
higher fees. Visa and MasterCard have repeatedly responded to each 
other’s interchange increases by themselves increasing fees.419 Merchants 
cannot respond by discouraging consumers from using these costlier forms 
of payment by providing a discount to whichever card association 
provided the lower interchange fee, because, consistent with network 
theory, the association agreements prohibit them from doing so.420
As the interchange fees for offline debit increase, the profit a card 
issuer can make from an online-debit transaction appears small by 
comparison.421 Consequently, some issuers who offer cards with both 
online and offline capabilities charge the consumer a fee for PIN usage, 
actually promoting use of the more inefficient payment format.422 
Merchants counter by promoting the consumer’s ability to receive cash 
 
 417 See David B. Humphrey & Allen N. Berger, Market Failure and Resource Use: 
Economic Incentives To Use Different Payment Instruments, in THE U.S. PAYMENT SYSTEM: 
EFFICIENCY, RISK AND THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 45, 45-46 (David B. Humphrey ed., 
1990).  
 418 See generally Dennis C. Mueller, First-Mover Advantages and Path Dependence, 15 
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 827 (1997). 
 419 For example, in 1998, Visa announced that it was increasing its interchange fee by about 
20%. In response, MasterCard increased its rate by 9%. Visa answered by raising its fee an additional 
5%, and MasterCard responded with another increase. See David A. Balto, The Problem of 
Interchange Fees: Costs Without Benefits?, EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 215, 216 (2000); Pete Hisey, 
How High Can You Go?, CREDIT CARD MGMT., Apr. 1, 1999, at 105.  
 420 The Reserve Bank of Australia has responded by reversing Visa and MasterCard’s ban on 
surcharging customers and requiring a 40% cut in interchange fees. See Robin Arnfield, A Shakeup in 
Australia’s Card Market, CREDIT CARD MGMT., Feb. 27, 2003, at 16. 
 421 See Jeffrey Green, Offline vs. Online Debit, CREDIT CARD MGMT., Nov. 1, 1998, at 17 
(stating that offline debit is “cannibalizing” online debit, not because it is more efficient, but because 
banks prefer to issue offline debit cards to reap higher interchange rates). 
 422 See Burney Simpson, Debit Makes It a Horse Race; Once a Minor Player, the Debit 
Card Is Now Challenging Credit as Americans’ Preferred Payment Card; What’s Ahead on the 
Rapidly Evolving Debit Scene?, CREDIT CARD MGMT., Feb. 27, 2003, at 38. 
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back with PIN usage.423 For online debit networks to compete for card 
issuers, online interchange fees had to rise along with Visa and 
MasterCard’s offline rates.424 Thus, competition between online and 
offline debit in attracting card issuers drove up rates for both products. 
As the advantages of online debit became more apparent, however, 
and debit usage increased, offline debit’s position as the industry standard 
became more tenuous. As debit use became more widespread, the potential 
savings from the installation of a POS terminal increased dramatically. At 
some point, the savings from accepting online debit would exceed the 
costs of installing the terminal.425 The market was prone to tip.  
The resulting honor-all-cards rules and the prohibition of surcharging 
offline debit usage can largely be understood as an effort by Visa and 
MasterCard to “sponsor” offline debit to extend their market power. The 
prohibition on surcharges prevented retailers from forcing consumers to 
internalize the cost of their offline debit usage, thereby dampening 
consumer demand for POS terminals.426 The honor-all-cards rules, which 
effectively tied offline debit acceptance to credit card acceptance,427 
effectively blocked retailers, whose customers demanded the availability 
of credit card usage, from refusing to accept offline debit. By maintaining 
a large base of retailers who accept the offline payment format, the 
incentive for a consumer to demand online debit was maintained at a low 
level. Visa and MasterCard essentially sought to postpone “tipping” to the 
more efficient online standard for as long as possible.428
This tension came to a head with the recent antitrust suit led by Wal-
Mart against Visa and MasterCard. Merchants banded together in a class-
action lawsuit (now settled), alleging that the card companies’ “honor all 
 
 423 Online Double-Digit Growth Loses Its Luster, BANK NETWORK NEWS, Sept. 11, 1998, at 
1 (reporting that Wal-Mart is encouraging consumers to use PIN debit by asking them “if they would 
like to receive up to $100 cash back”). 
 424 Compare Robert A. Bennett, The Retailers’ Home Run, CREDIT CARD MGMT., June 26, 
2003, at 24 (reporting that, in June 2003, the typical online-debit interchange fee for a $40 sale was 
$0.34), with Richard Mitchell, The Debit Card Balancing Act, CREDIT CARD MGMT, Dec. 1, 1995, at 
14 (reporting that, in 1995, online interchange fees typically were $0.02 to $0.08 for a $100 purchase). 
 425 This is especially true for retailers who deal with a high volume of transactions. For these 
retailers, only a small percentage of their customers need use online debit for the savings to become 
substantial. 
 426 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 389, at 3-4. Liebowitz and Margolis state, “There 
is no possibility of excess inertia in their model if all participants can communicate perfectly.” The 
prohibition on surcharging offline debit is really a prohibition on a form of negotiation between 
consumers and retailers and thereby preserves offline debit’s excess inertia. 
 427 Tying in this context is somewhat different to the traditional usage of the term. Tying the 
purchase of one product to another is anti-competitive because consumers are thereby prevented from 
purchasing competing products that substitute for the tied good. See N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). Merchants, on the other hand, are still able to purchase, and still have some use for, 
POS terminals even if they accept offline debit. The tying of offline debit cards to credit cards, instead 
of directly preventing the consumption of a substitute good, prevented retailers from removing 
themselves from the offline debit network. 
 428 For a discussion of tipping, see Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities, supra note 378. 
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cards” policy violated the antitrust laws.429 The plaintiffs argued that the 
rules constituted impermissible tying of products and that Visa and 
MasterCard conspired to monopolize the debit-card market.430  
The “honor all cards” policy reduced the negotiating power of the 
merchants with respect to interchange fees because the merchants could 
not decline to offer offline cards if they wanted to accept credit cards. To 
keep card issuers in the offline network, Visa and MasterCard increased 
interchange fees and retailers were in a weaker position to resist. As 
offline fees increased, online fees increased as well because EFT networks 
had to compete with offline firms for card issuer share. Industry observers 
believed that Visa and MasterCard’s “honor all cards” and “one price” 
policies would have driven out debit cards even though debit cards are less 
expensive and pose less risk to merchants and customers.431 Setting 
network fees within a network for the same product is generally thought of 
as important to establishing a network. Letting one network set prices in 
another, however, may drive the market toward a sub-optimal outcome. 
This instance of path dependence would have done more than created an 
inefficient standard; an added cost would have been borne by low- and 
middle-income consumers, for whom offline debit is a particularly poor 
substitute for online debit. 
The parties ultimately settled the suit on the eve of trial. Both Visa 
and MasterCard agreed to eliminate the honor-all-card rules and to pay 
several billion dollars in damages. The settlement has the potential to 
benefit the poor in several regards. The untying of credit and offline debit 
is likely to result in fewer retailers accepting offline debit and lower 
interchange fees as Visa and MasterCard seek to preserve their market 
share.432 The settlement may lead to the diminution of offline debit and 
faster growth of its online counterpart.433  
For low-income customers, the dispute between merchants and the 
credit card companies had the potential to affect the cost, risk, and 
availability of financial services. A strong surge to offline debit rather than 
 
 429 In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
2027 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting class action certification), aff’d, 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001). The 
parties reached a settlement under which Visa and Mastercard will pay merchants $3 billion over 10 
years and reduce their signature-debit fees. Jennifer Bayot, Visa Reaches Settlement in Debit Card 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2003, at C1. 
 430 In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 192 F.R.D. at 71. 
 431 See Balto, supra note 411, at 1391; Bills, supra note 411, at 1. For the problem of 
inefficient outcomes from sponsored technologies in the context of network externalities, see Katz & 
Shapiro, Technology Adoption, supra note 378, at 825. 
 432 David A. Balto, Life After the Wal-Mart Case, CREDIT CARD MGMT, Aug. 2003, at 48 
(stating that interchange fees for offline debit are likely to decline by one third). 
 433 But see Frederick H. Lowe, A Lift for Recurring Payments, CREDIT CARD MGMT., July 
25, 2003, at 30 (reporting that Visa is predicting that the end of the honor-all-cards rules will boost 
offline debit acceptance with utilities, who would like to accept electronic payments for recurring bills 
but do not want to accept credit cards because of their even higher interchange fees). 
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online debit means higher prices for all consumers (whether embedded in 
goods and services or, less likely, explicitly priced for debit card usage), 
including those least able to afford them. By contrast, most banks do not 
charge their bank customers for using an online debit card at POS.434 
Moreover, many retailers permit customers to get cash back using their 
online debit cards; these transactions are surcharge-free, cost the merchant 
no more than a standard online debit transaction, and reduce merchant 
cash-handling costs.435 Cash-back transactions constitute 20% of online 
debit transactions, or one billion cash withdrawals.436 Merchants benefit 
from the ability of customers to withdraw funds as well. Because the 
transfer into their account is instantaneous, they lose no interest income 
due to the float and, unlike a credit card, the customer cannot revoke the 
transaction.437
A shift to signature-based debit would also increase low-income 
consumers’ risk of overdraft. Offline debit is settled offline—debiting of 
the cardholder’s bank account occurs one to three days later using ACH 
networks. Online debit is settled online in real time—settlement occurs 
instantly when the PIN is entered. Online transactions are lower risk to the 
merchant, issuer, and customer because overdrafts are essentially not 
possible. By contrast, offline debits can cause overdrafts and result in fees 
for insufficient funds. The possibility of high overdraft fees make offline 
debit a potentially worse product for the poor, who, with the risk of 
overdraft, would need to manage their finances quite carefully.438  
Governmental and private sector initiatives to increase the provision 
of accounts and online debit to the unbanked could aid in overcoming the 
excess inertia that is impeding the collective switch from offline debt to 
the more efficient online standard.439 With a growing number of welfare 
 
 434 Eighty-five percent of banks do not charge for POS use, up from 77% in 1999. Laura 
Bruce, Consumers Losing the Fight Against ATM Surcharges, BANKRATE.COM (Mar. 28, 2002). The 
banks that do charge for POS do so to drive their customers to use signature debit on which they earn 
higher interchange fees from merchants.  
 435 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 57; see also Francella, supra note 415 
(stating that many online debit withdrawals from merchants are free, and those that are not are 
generally only thirty-five to fifty cents). To the extent that this feature competes with ATMs, online 
debit may discourage the deployment of additional ATMs. Although this effect will somewhat reduce 
convenient ATMs access, the added convenience of being able to make withdrawals at most merchants 
who accept online debit will likely compensate for this loss. 
 436 Id. 
 437 See RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS: 
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 117 (1999). Also, merchants’ cash handling costs are reduced by 
cash back transactions. 
 438 This comparison may be somewhat overstated, because offline debit could work well 
with stored value cards as an access mechanism; stored value cards may be an effective alternative 
payment mechanism for large employers. Still, stored value cards themselves would not increase 
access to the banking system. 
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recipients receiving payments via electronic benefits transfer programs, a 
merchant with a POS terminal can accept those EBT cards for payment. A 
similar effect could result from a greater portion of employers paying their 
workforce through debit cards that could be used at POS terminals. A 
larger scale initiative to move low-income households into the banking 
system with bank accounts providing for online debit access could help to 
push the payment system towards the more efficient online standard. 
Similarly, governmental initiatives to move the payments system towards 
online debit could help lower the cost and risk of providing bank accounts 
to low-income households. Banked households could take advantage of a 
more extensive POS and ATM network to access funds. The more 
extensive the network, the lower the unit costs of transactions, and the 
higher the utility of having a debit card. 
One drawback of debit cards—both offline and online—is that 
existing consumer protection laws expose debit transactions to greater risk 
than using checks or credit cards. The Truth in Lending Act (TILA)440 and 
Regulation Z441 provide consumer protections for credit card consumers. 
The Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA)442 and Regulation E443 govern 
ACH or debit card transactions. TILA and Regulation Z provide much 
greater protection to credit transactions than EFTA and Regulation E do 
for debit and ACH transactions. TILA and Regulation Z require the 
creditor to advocate for a consumer in a dispute with a merchant over 
items purchased by credit, and the consumer may withhold payment on 
disputed items; no similar protections exist for debit or ACH. Under TILA 
and Regulation Z, credit card holders’ liability for unauthorized use is 
limited to $50; the test is more complicated for unauthorized use of debit 
cards and depends on when the consumer notifies the card issuer. Visa and 
MasterCard have instituted their own policies holding cardholders 
harmless for unauthorized use of both credit and debit cards.444 Congress 
may wish to consider updating these consumer protection laws as online 
debit and ACH retail transactions become more prevalent. 
C. ATMs 
Transactions at ATMs are significantly less expensive than 
transactions with tellers, and the costs of ATMs are significantly lower 
than the costs of a bank branch. ATMs thus offer an opportunity to deliver 
 
 440 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000). 
 441 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2003). 
 442 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2000). 
 443 12 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2003). 
 444 See generally Ann H. Spiotto, Credit, Debit, or ACH: Consequences & Liabilities, ABA 
BANK COMPLIANCE, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 4. 
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financial services to the poor at lower cost than “bricks and mortar” 
branches. Rapid expansion of ATM deployment in the late 1990s has 
dramatically increased the availability of ATMs.445 That growth is unlikely 
to continue as the market matures, but widespread ATM networks present 
possible distribution channels for expanded access to banking services for 
the poor. Given the economics of ATM placement and operation, which 
require high volumes of transactions, a strategy for expanding access to 
banking for the poor using ATMs or POS, or with advanced functions such 
as bill payment, will likely require some governmental incentives to be 
viable in some low-income areas with low penetration of these 
technologies. Moreover, further expansion of ATMs may be contingent on 
surcharge income, but surcharging would significantly increase the cost of 
using ATMs for low-income persons. 
 Bank accounts and ATMs are complementary products that exhibit 
indirect network externalities. Increasing the penetration of bank accounts 
will increase the number of ATM users, giving banks a greater incentive to 
deploy more ATMs. Each individual ATM user is, therefore, benefited by 
the demand created by other ATM users.446 Studies indicate that increasing 
the number of depositors increases the likelihood that a bank will adopt 
ATMs.447 Although ATM dispersal is quite broad now, and network 
effects from additional users are likely to be low, additional account 
holders from low-income communities with low ATM penetration would 
increase incentives to place ATMs in those locations. 
ATMs have become increasingly available as a potential source for 
the delivery of financial services. By 2001, nearly 91% of banks and thrifts 
were offering ATM services.448 The number of ATMs off-premises of 
banks, whether deployed by banks themselves or by independent service 
operators (ISOs), increased dramatically in the late-1990s when Cirrus and 
Plus ATM networks permitted ATM owners linked to their networks to 
collect surcharges from ATM users.449 As of June 2001, there were 
approximately 324,000 ATMs deployed nationwide,450 compared with 
 
 445 ATMs exhibited network externalities in the early period of their growth that diminished 
rapidly once networks achieved scale. See Saloner & Shepard, supra note 382, at 480. 
 446 Id. 
 447 Id. at 500. 
 448 RETAIL FEES STUDY, supra note 150, at 6.  
 449 See TIMOTHY H. HANNAN ET AL., TO SURCHARGE OR NOT TO SURCHARGE: AN 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF ATM PRICING 1 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance & Economics Discussion 
Series 2001-38, 2000), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2001/ 
200138/200138pap.pdf; DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 1 (“In 1996 the national adoption 
of surcharging . . . single handedly altered the nature of the ATM industry.”); id. at 31 (noting that off-
premises ATMs increased at an average rate of 32% between 1999 and 2001); ROBERT E. LITAN, ATM 
FEES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1999) (arguing that surcharging permitted ATM owners to cover 
expenses of off-premises ATMs, which have lower volumes and higher serving costs than ATMs on 
bank premises), available at http://www.aba.com/aba/PDF_Files/GR_atmfees.pdf. 
 450 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 7; see also Press Release, Dove Consulting, 
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86,055 offices of the nation’s 9,757 banks, thrifts, and credit unions.451 
After the post-surcharging rush to deploy large numbers of ATMs, 
deployment has now matured, with net ATM levels expected to remain flat 
for some time.452 In fact, banks and ISOs plan to rationalize ATM fleets in 
the near term by eliminating low-transaction volume ATMs and adding 
new ATMs in retail locations with “high foot traffic” and where 
“consumers have a need for cash.”453 Both banks and ISOs intend to 
continue modest growth in total numbers.454
Over the last decade, ATM cards increased in number from 200 
million to 263 million, while transaction volume more than doubled, to 
13.6 billion.455 With 288% growth in ATM deployment,456 however, 
transaction volume per ATM has dropped significantly, calling into 
question the continued ability of revenue to support this extent of 
deployment.457
ATM fees, which drive deployment strategies, have increased steadily 
over time. Bank fees for its own customer’s use of other banks’ or ISO 
deployer’s ATMs (“on others” fees) averaged $1.17 per transaction in 
2001.458 Surcharges, or fees charged to a non-customer user of a bank’s (or 
ISO’s) ATM, grew dramatically in the late 1990s459 and were charged by 
88.5% of institutions by 2001. Surcharge fees continue to increase, 
averaging $1.32 in 2001.460 Rates are highest in the Midwest and Southeast 
 
New Study Details an Industry Returning to Equilibrium (Mar. 4, 2002), at 
http://www.consultdove.com/PR-2003-03-04atmdeployer.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003) [hereinafter 
Dove Press Release]; David Breitkopf, Retail ATMs Said Losing Money, But Still Find Fans, AM. 
BANKER, Mar. 7, 2002, at 11. 
 451 FDIC, Offices of FDIC-Insured Institutions, at http://www3.fdic.gov/sod/pdf/ 
dnum_2001.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2003). 
 452 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 2; see also Dove Press Release, supra note 
450.  
 453 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 45.  
 454 Id. at 33.  
 455 Id. at 47.  
 456 Id. at 48.  
 457 Id. at 7-8. Average bank monthly transaction volume has held steady at 3,584, while ISO 
average volume held steady at 600 per month. Industry average transaction volume has nonetheless 
declined, because ISOs are deploying at a much faster rate than banks, lowering the industry average. 
Id. at 49-51.  
 458 RETAIL FEES STUDY, supra note 150, at 6. “On others” fees are charged by 78.5% of 
institutions. In contrast, “on us” transactions, by a bank’s customer at the bank’s own ATMs, are 
generally not subject to fees. Similarly, most banks do not charge an annual fee for debit or ATM 
cards. Id.  
 459 Timothy H. Hannan, Retail Fees of Depository Institutions, 1994-1999, 87 FED. RES. 
BULL. 1 (2001).  
 460 RETAIL FEES STUDY, supra note 150, at 6. Bankrate.com’s Spring 2002 Checking 
Account Pricing Study, which samples the 10 largest institutions in each of the 35 largest markets, 
finds higher fees for “on others” ($1.38) and for surcharges ($1.47). See Laura Bruce, Highlights of the 
Spring 2002 Checking Account Pricing Study, BANKRATE.COM (Mar. 28, 2001), at 
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/chk/20020328f.asp. Consumers paid $2.2 billion in surcharges in 
2002. Bankrate’s Checking Account Price Study, BANKRATE.COM (Mar. 28, 2002), at 
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/chk/20020328a.asp. Dove estimates surcharges in 2001 ranging 
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and lowest in New England.461
Where there is intense competition among ATM deployers, 
surcharging is more difficult to maintain because non-customers are more 
likely to be relatively close to an ATM owned by their own bank. Thus, 
surcharging is less prevalent in areas with higher ATM densities.462 
Pointedly, ATM densities are lower and surcharging more prevalent in 
counties and metropolitan statistical areas with higher concentrations of 
ethnic or racial minorities and in areas with higher concentrations of 
persons age 60 and older,463 although data on ATM deployment has not 
been collected on the neighborhood level.  
To avoid costly surcharging, low-income persons would need to 
establish bank accounts with banks that have high penetration of ATMs in 
communities near where they live or work. The need to use a bank with a 
strong local ATM presence would complicate efforts to bank the unbanked 
on a national, rather than local or regional, scale.464 More importantly, the 
goal of avoiding surcharging conflicts with the goal of expanding 
deployment. Both on- and off-premises ATMs require significant 
surcharge income to support themselves.465 The additional security costs 
associated with deployment of ATMs in high-crime areas would also 
complicate efforts to serve the poor. 
The cost of ATM deployment and operation is a key barrier to using 
ATMs to serve the poor. Dove reports average monthly costs to own and 
operate an off-premises machine to be $1,090—or $1,298 once expenses 
and back office costs are included—although these costs vary widely by 
 
from $1.65 for an off-premises ATM of a large bank to $1.09 for off-premises ATMs of non-large 
credit unions; average surcharges were $1.48. DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 12. 
 461 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 81.  
 462 HANNAN ET AL., supra note 449, at 2 (“[T]he probability of surcharging increases with 
both the institution’s share of market ATMs and the length of time period since surcharging was first 
permitted in the state, and decreases with the local number of ATMs per square mile in the market.”).  
463 [O]ther things being equal, financial institutions are more likely to impose 
surcharges in markets where people over the age of 59 or belonging to minority 
groups comprise a greater share of the population. This may reflect a greater 
willingness to pay for convenient access to cash among these population groups, 
perhaps due to higher costs of traveling to avoid surcharges or differences in 
overall cash usage.  
Id. at 22. 
 464 Some small banks and credit unions are overcoming small ATM footprints by forming 
no-surcharging alliances with networks, each other, and larger firms. As of 1999, 8,000 ATMs were 
covered in such alliances. Litan argues that some pre-1996 state laws and network anti-discrimination 
rules hindered growth of suballiances. LITAN, supra note 449, at 19, 25. By 2001, Dove reported that 
about 20,000 ATMs owned by 2,000 financial institutions participated in selective surcharging 
networks. DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 78. No-surcharge alliances are most prevalent 
in the Pacific region and in New England. Id. at 77. For example, NYCE set up a surcharge-free 
cooperative in the northeastern U.S., including 456 depositories and 2,726 ATMs. David Breitkopf, 
Fee-Free ATM Venture Draws Doubt from EFT Community, AM. BANKER, Nov. 29, 2001, at 7.  
 465 Surcharging represents two-thirds of income; interchange fees one-third. DOVE 
DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 88.  
93
Barr:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
C:\Documents and Settings\johnloyd\My Documents\attach\Banking the Poor JREG FINAL PRINTER PROOF (March 7, 2004).doc 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 21:121, 2004 
214 
                                                                                                                        
type of deployer and machine.466 Off-premises machines generate only 
$1,075 in revenue.467 On-premises machines at banks cost $1,254 and 
generate revenues of $1,277.468 These average numbers mask strong 
variation, with ISO deployers using lower-cost, lower-technology, lower-
rent strategies than their bank counterparts but generating lower volumes 
and lower revenues.469 For large banks, on-premises machines generate 
revenue of $1,360, cost $1,349, and thus have a profit of $11 per month. 
Large bank-owned off-premises ATMs generate revenue of $1,835, cost 
$1,534, and have a profit of $301 per month.470 ATM revenue, particularly 
for off-premises ATMs, is likely to decrease in the future. The volume of 
transactions from individuals who are not customers of the bank that owns 
the ATM (“foreign volume”) at both on- and off-premises ATMs has been 
dropping, from 35% in 1999 to 32% in 2002. For off-premises ATMs, 
foreign volume dropped from 57% of transactions in 1999 to 48% in 
2002.471 Most deployers now lose money on off-premises ATMs, and 
credit unions, because of the prevalence of no-surcharge alliances, lose 
money on both on- and off-premises ATMs.472
Income from surcharging and interchange fees, however, is only part 
of the profit picture for banks. Banks also use ATMs to provide convenient 
service to customers, to market the bank’s services to attract new 
customers, and to migrate its existing customers away from using high-
cost branch services towards lower cost ATM services.473 Banks view on-
us transactions as worth $0.55 per transaction in cost savings in reduced 
branch time and revenue gains from customer retention and attraction.474 
Thus, the value to banks of ATMs depends on whether the ATM draws 
customers away from lower-return bank services and retains or attracts 
customers who provide opportunities to the bank for higher-return 
services. 
In addition to the basic functions of income deposit and withdrawal, 
ATMs could be used to provide electronic services of broader potential use 
to low- and moderate-income individuals. For example, 7-Eleven is 
 
 466 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 14. Large credit union costs are much 
higher, at $1624 per month; small ISOs’ costs average $732 per month. Id. at 15. 
 467 Id. at 87.  
 468 Id. 
 469 Id. at 97. ISOs tend to deploy lower functionality machines costing $5,000, while banks 
deploy higher functionality machines costing $15,000-$20,000. With five-year depreciation, this 
results in monthly expenses of $375 for an on-premises ATM, $279 for an off-premises ATM for 
banks, and $100 for ISOs. 
 470 Id. at 105.  
 471 Id. at 8.  
 472 Id. 
 473 See id. at 3, 108. While banks value these benefits, ISOs, without any customers of their 
own, do not benefit from these ATM functions. See also HANNAN ET AL., supra note 449 
(documenting surcharge as strategy for customer retention and attraction).  
 474 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 108. 
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piloting ATMs that cash checks, issue money orders, and wire funds, and 
7-Eleven plans to expand the machines to allow customers to shop 
online.475 Fleet is adding automatic bill payment to its ATMs; Wachovia’s 
machines allow customers to buy stamps or add long distance phone 
time.476 Two firms have announced plans to launch programs to allow 
customers to recharge prepaid cell phone accounts through ATMs, and one 
is considering adding bill payment, money orders, and money transfer 
functionality.477 Another firm is beginning to sell ATMs designed for low- 
to medium-volume locations that will be able to cash checks, transfer 
money, and replenish prepaid cell phones.478 These advanced functions 
could help position ATMs as competitors to both bank tellers and check 
cashers in providing financial services to low- and moderate-income 
customers.  
Despite the potential for advanced functions, however, more than 
three-quarters of all ATM transactions remain withdrawals.479 Moreover, 
while nearly 80% of banks offer deposit taking at their on-premises ATMs, 
only 17% offer deposit taking at most of their off-premises ATMs, and 
fully one third do not offer such services at any of their off-premises 
machines.480 The cost of deposit taking at off-premises machines at present 
is prohibitively expensive, largely due to the need to physically pick up 
deposited checks daily for processing and settlement. Now that Congress 
has enacted the Check Clearing for the Twenty-First Century Act,481 
ATMs with check truncation technology permitting them to capture check 
information electronically could process checks without daily physical 
 
 475 Dave Anderton, 7-Eleven, More Than Food, DESERT NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Jan. 
15, 2003, at C1; David Breitkopf, 7-11, NCR Extend Kiosk Work, AM. BANKER, July 15, 2002, at 8; 
Michelle Higgins, ATMs To Go Far Beyond Cash, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2002, at D1.  
 476 Higgins, supra note 475, at D1.  
 477 See Chris Costanzo, Next on ATM Option List, AM. BANKER, Aug. 12, 2003, at 1. The 
market for prepaid cell phones is disproportionately composed of the unbanked. See By the Numbers, 
BANK TECH. NEWS, July 2003, at 22. 
 478 See David Breitkopf, Triton Making Inroads with New In-Wall ATMs, AM. BANKER, 
Sept. 8, 2003, at 5. 
 479 Withdrawals constitute 77% of transactions. Other services are mostly traditional banking 
ones, including deposits (9%), inquiries (11%), transfers (2%), and “other” (1%). DOVE DEPLOYER 
STUDY, supra note 408, at 9, 59.  
 480 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 104.  
 481 Pub. L. No. 108-100, 117 Stat. 1177 (2003). Under prior law, banks must physically 
process and transport the check through the clearing and settlement system unless the bank depositing 
the check obtains a prior agreement from the other banks individually. Given the large number of 
banks in the U.S., it is infeasible for most banks to obtain such an agreement. The Check Clearing Act 
permits check information to be captured, stored, and transmitted electronically, with a substitute 
check printed if the customer desires. See Check Clearing for the Twenty-First Century Act: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 
(Apr. 8, 2003) (statement of Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2003/20030408/default.htm.  
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transfers, dramatically reducing the cost of providing deposit-taking 
capacity at off-premises machines.482  
While advanced functions could one day prove useful to low-income 
ATM users, current practice suggests that day is a long way off. Mini-
statements and postage stamps currently lead the field in deployment, 
offered by between one quarter and one third of financial institutions.483 
Only 6% of all deployers offer check cashing; 1% print money orders; and 
1% permit bill payment to third parties.484 Some 12% of ISO deployers 
dispense phone cards, a device often used by low-income customers, while 
essentially no financial institutions offer this service.485 ATM deployers’ 
stated interest in adding new functionality focuses on marketing, but there 
is some interest in cash transfers (to compete with wire transfers), check 
cashing, money order printing, bill presentment and bill payment to third 
parties.486 Only 5% of financial institution deployers currently use web-
enabled ATMs that would permit wide scale, efficient re-programming to 
support new functions, such as bill payment, although about a third of 
financial institution deployers plan to upgrade to web-enabled technology 
within the next two years.487 Large financial institutions were twice as 
likely to see marketing and customer satisfaction as business opportunities 
than to see advanced functionality as an opportunity.488 Citibank, which 
had piloted ATM bill payment, discontinued its services in 2001, “citing a 
lack of customer interest.”489 In the near term, increased ATM 
functionality is unlikely to benefit the poor absent significant incentives—
governmental or market—to include these services.490 Yet expanding 
access to bank accounts for low-income persons may stimulate demand for 
some alternate ATM services. 
In sum, the rapid growth in deployment of ATMs in the 1990s 
presents a real opportunity for the delivery of financial services to low- 
and moderate-income consumers. ATMs are far less expensive than bank 
branches and teller time. ATMs could potentially be used to make deposits 
of income, convert income to cash, and pay bills electronically or through 
disbursement of money orders. These three functions are critical financial 
 
 482 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 104. The banking regulators would need to 
consider how such deposit-taking ATMs should be considered for purposes of delineation of the 
bank’s assessment areas for purposes of the CRA. See also infra Subsection V.A.2 (discussing CRA).  
 483 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 10.  
 484 Id. at 63.  
 485 Id. at 64.  
 486 Id. at 66.  
 487 Id. at 10, 66-67.  
 488 Id. at 18 (reporting that 50% identified an opportunity in marketing, while 25% saw one 
in advanced functionality).  
 489 Id. at 71.  
 490 See, e.g., Banks Once Again Turn to ATMs To Reduce Costs, ATM & DEBIT NEWS, Apr. 
10, 2003, at 1. 
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services for the poor. Absent governmental incentives, however, banks are 
unlikely to view expansion of ATM availability in low-income areas, and 
increased ATM functionality useful to low-income consumers, as 
sufficiently profitable.  
D. Direct Deposit and Bill Payment 
Advances in the ACH system can gradually make it easier and 
cheaper to offer banking products, such as direct deposit and bill payment, 
that could reduce reliance on more expensive comparable transactions 
conducted by low- and moderate-income households, such as cashing 
payroll checks and buying money orders. These ACH transactions 
generally require a bank account.491 Expansion of ACH (and lowering its 
price) would make electronically based bank accounts more attractive to 
and useful for low- and moderate-income households. 
While ACH is only the third most commonly used form of electronic 
payment as measured by transaction volume, ACH carries more than three 
quarters of all retail electronic payment value ($5.67 trillion).492 ACH 
activity consists mostly of direct deposit of payroll, and also of 
preauthorized bill payment.493 Direct deposit is already used by more than 
100 million individuals in the U.S. and is offered by more than 80% of 
firms with more than 100 employees. Seventy-one percent of employees 
who have direct deposit available to them at their work use it.494 Direct 
deposits grew by 11.6% from 2000 to 2001, from 3.3 billion to 3.7 billion 
payments.495
The challenge is to bring direct deposit to more workplaces 
employing low-income workers and to more low-wage workers—
including part-time or temporary workers—wherever they work. Direct 
deposit is cheaper (to banks, employers, and employees) than processing 
paychecks,496 involves no risk of bounced, lost, or stolen checks, facilitates 
 
 494 Id. at 45. 
 491 For payroll cards, employers set up a pooled account so no individualized account is 
required. 
 492 RETAIL PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 19. 
 493 See NACHA, 2002 ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS REVIEW AND BUYER’S GUIDE: 
UNDERSTANDING THE ACH NETWORK, available at http://www.roialliance.com/Acrobat/ 
BG_ACH_Primer.pdf. ACH credit occurs when an originator moves its funds into a receiver’s account, 
for example, in a direct deposit of payroll or a home-based Internet-directed bill payment. ACH debit 
occurs when an originator, having been pre-authorized to do so, transfers funds from a receiver’s 
account to an originator’s account, for example, in a mortgage payment.  
 495 Press Release, NACHA, ACH Payment Growth Accelerates to 16.2 Percent in 2001, 
NACHA Announces (Apr. 15, 2002), at http://www.nacha.org/news/news/pressreleases/ 
2002/PR041502_1/pr041502_1.htm. 
 496 NACHA estimates ACH transactions cost 25-30% less than paper transactions for banks 
to process. Id. at 2. For employers, NACHA argues that ACH can help to reduce administrative and 
operating expenses, employee time lost cashing checks, and time and cost for paper handling 
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saving, and provides same day availability for workers. Banks that 
currently issue payroll checks for employers and switch to direct deposit 
services may see reduced lines at tellers on paydays as employees no 
longer wait to cash their employer’s check “on us” at the issuing bank.497 
Payroll cards are designed for just that purpose. For most banked middle- 
and upper-income customers, however, checks remain relatively cheap and 
convenient, and electronic technology for bill payment may appear 
uncertain, effectively delaying deployment of the necessary infrastructure 
to reduce costs and increase availability of electronic payments.498
Electronic bill payment could be more widely used by consumers—
and in particular low-income consumers—at lower cost and risk than 
checks or money orders. Direct payments totaled $2.6 billion in 2001, a 
17.6% increase from 2000.499 Direct bill payment eliminates postage 
expense, the risk of late payment fees and interest charges, and charges for 
checks. NACHA estimates that consumers saved $1 billion in such costs 
by using direct payment. Direct payment is advantageous for the billing 
company as well, as it reduces the risk of non-payment and late 
payment.500 Moreover, one study found that consumers using direct 
payments tend to maintain higher balances in their bank accounts and that 
consumers who use direct payment to put aside funds for saving or 
investment save $140 more per month on average than consumers who do 
not use it.501 Using direct payment may be correlated with a propensity to 
save, however, so it is difficult to determine whether the institutional 
mechanism of direct payment bolsters, or simply reflects, savings 
behavior. Direct bill payment may also increase one’s ability to establish a 
sound credit history because, unlike information about the payment of bills 
with cash or money orders, the bank processing the payment regularly 
captures information about direct bill payment.502
As currently structured, direct payment is used by higher income 
households and direct deposit is offered by large firms. A recent survey of 
consumers and businesses sheds some light on barriers to expanding direct 
 
(predicting an average of $0.115 per payment saved). Id. at 2. See also PAUL W. BAUER & PATRICK 
HIGGINS, POST CONSOLIDATION ESTIMATES OF ACH SCALE ECONOMIES, TECHNICAL CHANGE, AND 
COST EFFICIENCY (Innovation in Financial Services and Payments Conference, Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, 2002), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/conf/innovations/bauer_higgins.pdf.  
 497 Recall that 30% of check volume is currently processed “on us.” See supra text 
accompanying note 402.  
 498 Chakravorti & McHugh, supra note 297, at 44-45. 
 499 Press Release, NACHA, supra note 495. 
 500 DirectPayment.org, Key Benefits, at http://www.directpayment.org/consumers_1_1.cfm 
(last visited Dec. 5, 2003). NACHA estimates that companies on average save 11.5 cents on reduced 
processing costs per payment when consumers use direct payment. DirectPayment.org, How To Get 
Started, at http://www.directpayment.org/companies_2_1.cfm (last visited Dec. 17, 2003).  
 501 DirectPayment.org, For Consumers, at http://www.directpayment.org/consumers_1.cfm 
(last visited Dec. 11, 2003). 
 502 See supra note 56. 
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deposit and direct bill payment more broadly, including to low- and 
moderate-income households.503 Fifty-five percent of consumers use direct 
deposit, while 37% use direct payment.504 Direct deposit users cite 
convenience as the most important reason for using direct deposit (71%), 
followed by reliability (31%), and safety (30%).505 Those not using direct 
deposit feared not knowing how much or when deposits were made, the 
possibility of mistakes, and security concerns. Non-users did not find 
direct deposit convenient, because they would still need to go to a bank to 
get cash. Of the nonusers, 63% do not have direct deposit available from 
their employer.506 Of these, 35% said they would definitely or probably 
sign up for direct deposit if it were made available at work, and another 
30% indicated that they might sign up.507
With respect to bill payment, 37% of consumer respondents use direct 
payment for one or more recurring payments.508 Direct payment has higher 
penetration for insurance (29%) and securities (35%) than for mortgages 
(19%), utilities (13%), telephone (10%), cable TV (5%) or other services, 
suggesting that use of automatic bill payment is linked to income as well 
as market sector.509 Of direct payment users, the potential benefits cited 
were related to time savings and reduced worry of late payment, while 
non-users cited concerns that direct payment would not be reliable, would 
take control away from them with respect to the timing of payments, might 
diminish their privacy, and might increase the risk of fraud. 
On the business side, only 32% of business respondents offer direct 
deposit to employees.510 Direct deposit is offered by 84% of larger 
companies with 100 or more employees; 61% of those with between fifty 
and ninety-nine employees, and only 31% of small employers with fewer 
than fifty employees.511 Only 13% of businesses offer direct payment 
options to customers, although most utility companies offer direct payment 
to their customers.512
Low-income persons are more likely to work in smaller firms and to 
have sporadic, part-time, and/or multiple employment, which would 
complicate efforts to provide for direct deposit. One study found that 
among the low-income banked population in New York and Los Angeles, 
 
 503 FED. RESERVE BANK, A SUMMARY OF CONSUMER AND BUSINESS ATTITUDES ON DIRECT 
DEPOSIT AND DIRECT PAYMENT, A NATIONAL ACH MARKET RESEARCH STUDY (1998), available at 
http://www.stls.frb.org/financial/assets/pdf/summary.pdf (last visited Dec. 11, 2003). 
 504 Id. at 3. 
 505 Id. at 5. 
 506 Id. 
 507 Id. 
 508 Id. at 12. 
 509 Id.  
 510 Id. at 8. 
 511 Id. 
 512 Id. at 16. 
99
Barr:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
C:\Documents and Settings\johnloyd\My Documents\attach\Banking the Poor JREG FINAL PRINTER PROOF (March 7, 2004).doc 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 21:121, 2004 
220 
                                                                                                                        
40% used direct deposit, some fifteen percentage points below the usage 
rates for the general public found in the Federal Reserve Board study, 
while 52% of these respondents received income checks and 8% received 
cash.513 Of course, none of the unbanked had direct deposit. Moreover, 
low-income persons may have a heightened need to control the timing of 
their bill payment—delaying payment on the phone bill to pay the rent, for 
example—given their low levels of liquidity. Thus, direct bill payment 
may make sense for only some low-income persons, or with respect to 
only some critical monthly bills, with discretion retained as to the timing 
in paying other bills.  
More widespread use of direct deposit and electronic bill payment 
would not only lower payment systems costs overall, but also remove 
some key reasons why low-income people need to frequent high-cost 
alternative financial service providers. Given the positive externalities 
from adoption of ACH, there is some evidence that ACH is priced higher 
than is socially optimal by the Federal Reserve Board (which despite the 
presence of private sector competitors, handles 80% of ACH 
transactions).514 Although ACH prices have been declining, data from 
2000 shows that ACH services were still priced at least twenty-four 
percentage points too high relative to check services,515 if one simply 
measures the relative price to cost ratios. This rather crude gauge does not 
take into account, on the one hand, the positive externalities from moving 
towards wider dispersion of ACH networks or, on the other, the difficulty 
of assessing price-cost ratios in two-sided networks and the concern that if 
the Board charged less for ACH services, private sector participants would 
likely lose the small market share they now have.  
In sum, increased efficiency in the payments environment may make 
it easier to reach unbanked households. Direct deposit holds out the 
 
 513 Dunham, supra note 19, at 52 fig.4.  
 514 Fed. Reserve Bd., Automated Clearing House Operations: About, at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedach/default.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2003); see 
also GAUTAM GOWRISANKARAN & JOANNA STAVINS, NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND TECHNOLOGY 
ADOPTION: LESSONS FROM ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS 29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 8943, 2002) (“[There] may be a need for policy interventions such as aggressive marketing 
efforts or pricing below marginal cost.”); Chakravorti & McHugh, supra note 297, at 44 (“[T]he 
provision and usage of payment services exhibit network effects.”); Katz & Shapiro, Technology 
Adoption, supra note 378, at 840 (noting that, given network externalities, “[p]ricing at the marginal 
cost of production in each period may not be socially optimal”). But see Katz & Shapiro, Systems 
Competition, supra note 378, at 113 (noting that given informational asymmetries, the presence of 
network externalities does not imply “a general theory of when governmental intervention is preferable 
to the unregulated market outcome”). 
 515 The unit cost for checks is 150% higher than for ACH (4.0 cents compared to 1.6 cents), 
and the unit price is 126% higher (4.3 cents compared to 1.9 cents). Press Release, Michael Herd, 
NACHA, Federal Reserve Check Volume Decreases, ACH Volume Continues To Rise (Aug. 2, 2001), 
available at http://www.nacha.org/news/news/pressreleases/2003/PR060903/pr060903.htm; see also 
BAUER & HIGGINS, supra note 496, at 3 (calculating a 12.3% reduction in ACH unit costs annually 
over the last decade). 
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promise of reduced reliance on check cashers and the possibility of 
increased involvement by employers in offering bank accounts to their 
workers. Efforts should be focused on how to bring direct deposit to a 
broader range of workers. Payroll cards, through which the employee can 
access her funds in a pooled account, may prove to be a useful bridge to 
direct deposit. Given the ubiquitous need to pay utility companies, low-
income persons may be well positioned to use direct payment. Expanding 
the availability of direct bill payment, at least for some common 
transactions conducted by low-income persons, may reduce the need for 
cash or money orders. Positive network externalities associated with 
technological innovation in payments systems suggest that it may be 
desirable to provide governmental subsidies to financial institutions or to 
third party providers to increase the speed with which these technologies 
are widely adopted. Moreover, the Federal Reserve Board should review 
its pricing for ACH and check clearing services. Given the network 
externalities of payments systems, the Federal Reserve Board’s historic 
sponsorship of check clearance systems, and the positive externalities 
derived from ACH payments, the Board should consider reducing ACH 
pricing further in order to stimulate accelerated use of direct deposit and 
direct bill payment, although a full analysis of ACH pricing is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  
V. Transforming Financial Services for the Poor 
In Parts I through IV, the Article developed specific policy 
recommendations with respect to the alternative financial services sector, 
the banking sector, and the payments system and distribution networks. In 
this Part, the Article focuses on a cohesive strategy to increase bank 
account ownership among low- and moderate-income households: First, 
development of electronically based banking products should be 
accelerated with a tax credit to financial institutions and the providers of 
network technologies. Second, the Community Reinvestment Act could 
shed light on bank and thrift performance in meeting the financial services 
needs of low-income households. Third, workplace-based and community-
based financial education could help to change the financial services and 
savings behavior of low- and moderate-income households if they are 
linked to new products and services for the unbanked. 
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A. Bank Accounts 
1. First Accounts Tax Credit 
a. Background 
Treasury’s First Accounts pilot initiative, and similar efforts by 
philanthropic sources, could play an important role in fostering innovation 
by the financial services sector.516 With the government or non-profit 
funders helping to serve as a catalyst, banks could harness technology to 
reduce costs, lower risk, and democratize access to financial services for 
low-income families. Transaction accounts with debit cards but no checks 
could reduce risk to banks and account holders by preventing accounts 
from being overdrawn; lower the cost of processing each transaction and 
increase the efficiency of the payments system by reducing paper checks; 
expand distribution networks for financial services much more cheaply 
than branches; and decrease the safety risk to low-income customers who 
cash their regular payroll or benefit checks and carry large sums of cash.  
The First Accounts initiative grew out of Treasury’s research on the 
financial services needs of the unbanked for EFT ‘99. Treasury estimated 
that at least half of the ten million unbanked households do not receive 
federal benefit payments and thus would be ineligible to open ETAs. In 
addition, banks participating in the ETA program reported that significant 
numbers of unbanked persons who were not federal benefit recipients had 
sought to open ETAs; these persons are part of the likely target market for 
First Accounts. Treasury research suggests that unbanked persons who do 
not receive federal benefit payments are, on average, younger, more urban, 
more likely to be from a minority community, have larger families, and are 
more likely to be receptive to signing up for electronically based accounts 
than the unbanked federal-benefit-recipient population.517
As initially conceived, the First Accounts initiative had four main 
components. First, Treasury would help to offset the costs financial 
institutions incurred in offering low-cost, electronic banking accounts to 
low-income individuals. Second, Treasury would help to defray the costs 
of expanding access to ATMs, POS, Internet, or other distribution points in 
 
 516 Congress provided $10 million for First Accounts in 2001, with no restriction on the year 
in which funds were to be expended. This Section is derived from Bringing More Unbanked 
Americans into the Financial Mainstream: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & 
Urban Affairs 107th Cong. 42 (May 2, 2002) (statement of Michael S. Barr), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/02_05hrg/050202/barr.htm (last accessed Dec. 11. 2003). The author 
developed this program while serving at the Treasury Department. 
 517 Compare DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 25-29, with CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra 
note 6; Caskey, Reaching Out, supra note 20; Greene et al., supra note 20; Hogarth & O’Donnell, 
supra note 20; Rhine et al., supra note 20; and Hogarth et al., supra note 20. 
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low-income neighborhoods with low access. Third, Treasury would 
support financial institution and non-profit initiatives to provide financial 
education and counseling to low-income households. Fourth, Treasury 
would fund research into the financial services needs of low-income 
individuals and development of financial products designed to meet these 
needs. The First Accounts initiative focuses on the need for incentives to 
get financial institutions started in serving low-income households. As 
discussed above, the costs of research and development, new account 
opening, expanded distribution, and financial education are serious barriers 
today to expansion of account ownership. The First Accounts initiative 
could help to accelerate improvements in this market.  
Treasury launched the First Accounts program in December 2001.518 
The Department received 231 responses seeking nearly $130 million in 
funding from a wide variety of organizations: banks, thrifts, and credit 
unions; employers and labor and employer organizations; community 
based organizations; state and local governments; and others. Treasury 
provided $8.35 million to fifteen projects seeking to bring over 35,000 
individuals from twenty-five states into the banking system.519 Credit 
unions make up one third of the awardees, and other non-profits more than 
one half, while only two banks were awardees. Awardees focus on 
providing financial education and low-cost electronic accounts to the 
unbanked. A number of awardees will work with employers to expand 
banking access. Some of the funds are ear-marked for capital expenditures 
on ATMs, or, in one case, new branches, in low-income areas. In this 
initial round, funding per account appears high, although strategies, cost 
structures, other funding sources, the extent to which capital outlays are 
included, and the intensiveness of financial education vary significantly 
across chosen programs. The average award per account forecasted to be 
opened is $237.78, with wide variation among awardees, ranging from a 
remarkably low $23.13 to an astonishingly high $1,468.32.520 Given the 
small amount of funding available and the large number of organizations 
funded, Treasury will have difficulty determining from this pilot phase 
whether a given strategy is sustainable at scale. A more focused effort in a 
handful of metropolitan areas might have led to adoption of new 
technologies by major firms, not to mention more useful data. 
 
 518 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Notice of Funds Availability (NOFA) Inviting Applications 
for the First Accounts Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,975 (Dec. 17, 2001). 
 519 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, First Accounts Program, at http://www.treas.gov/offices/ 
domestic-finance/financial-institution/fin-education/firstaccounts/grantsummary.html (last visited Dec. 
11, 2003).  
 520 Author’s calculations based on data from the Treasury website, available at 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/financial-institution/fin-education/firstaccounts/ 
grantawards.html (last accessed Dec. 11, 2003). It is difficult to assess whether awardees’ forecasts of 
numbers of accounts to be opened are likely to be accurate. 
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b. First Accounts Tax Credit 
A challenge going forward is to fund First Accounts at sufficient 
levels and for a sufficient time to help transform the market for low-
income financial services and drive down costs. Only a sustained 
commitment to funding the First Accounts initiative, or other 
governmental or foundation support, would provide financial institutions 
with sufficient incentive to make the necessary investments in research, 
technology platform changes, training, marketing, and education to serve 
low-income unbanked and underbanked households. Over time, as 
financial institutions become expert at serving the low-income customer 
segment, the need for governmental incentives may become less 
important. 
First Accounts, private-sector efforts to expand banking services, and 
employer-driven strategies to serve the unbanked could be brought to scale 
by developing a tax incentive for financial institutions to offer low-cost 
electronic accounts for low-income persons.521 Financial institutions could 
receive a tax credit equal to a fixed amount per account opened. Roughly 
speaking, the amount of the credit would be calculated to cover the 
average administrative cost to an average bank of offering the account, 
taking into consideration research and product development, account 
opening and closing costs, marketing and financial education, and the 
training of bank personnel. Banks would report quarterly to the Treasury 
Department on the number of accounts geared to low- and moderate-
income persons that the banks had opened and would receive a 
corresponding credit to their quarterly estimated taxes. Using the Dove 
analysis conducted for ETAs522 would suggest that the tax credit be set at 
an amount between $20 and $50 per account opened. If the initiative 
reached three million households, or about one third of the low-income 
unbanked, a reasonable goal for at least the first five years of the program, 
the tax credits would cost only $60 to $150 million. 
Banks, thrifts, and credit unions could, under the First Accounts Tax 
Credit, experiment with a wide variety of techniques to expand access to 
the unbanked and to provide an increasing range of services to the 
 
 521 See MICHAEL STEGMAN, SAVINGS FOR THE POOR: THE HIDDEN BENEFITS OF 
ELECTRONIC BANKING (1999). Credit unions, which are not-for-profit corporations, could not directly 
take advantage of tax credits. It is possible to structure the tax credit so that for-profit subsidiaries or 
credit union service organizations could receive the tax credit for their services on behalf of the credit 
unions in offering the accounts. It would also be reasonable, however, to take the position that credit 
unions, which are tax exempt, 12 U.S.C. § 1768 (2000), because their mission is to serve “people of 
modest means,” 12 U.S.C. § 1751 (2000), should be able to pass on the benefits of tax exemption to 
low-income persons by offering accounts tailored to their needs. 
 522 See supra note 305. 
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underbanked.523 Low-cost electronic transaction accounts can be attractive 
to the unbanked and can be offered at reasonable cost.524 Banks may wish 
to experiment with accounts with savings features, including payment of 
interest or separate savings “buckets” within accounts; these features are 
also likely to be low-cost and attractive to the unbanked.525 Similarly, low-
income individuals need a convenient and low-cost means of paying bills; 
automated money orders,526 online bill payment, debit-card-based foreign 
country remittance, and other low-cost payment methods can help to 
reduce the cost of transactional services to the poor. Dove estimated that 
adding a savings feature to an electronic account would cost approximately 
$0.06 per month. Adding ACH bill payment would cost $0.65 per month. 
Adding the ability to accept additional direct deposits beyond federal 
benefit payments would decrease net costs by $0.11 per month because of 
added float income.527 Financial institutions could also seek to expand 
ATM availability in low-income neighborhoods, including by co-locating 
with post offices. 
In addition, the First Accounts Tax Credit has the potential to help 
spur “leapfrogging” in technology for low-income financial services, 
adopting low-cost, high-technology solutions without using older, more 
expensive institutions.528 To offer a few examples that could be subjected 
to the test of market feasibility: With sufficient incentives, the 
infrastructure for financial transactions may be induced to explore ways 
that low-income customers could be served by financial institutions on 
shared technological platforms, reducing research and development costs 
and technology platform change costs for each firm.529 As access to the 
Internet expands in low-income communities through efforts to bridge the 
 
 523 Treasury’s notice of funds availability (NOFA) issued in December 2001 barred using 
First Accounts funds for IDA matches or to increase services to those with bank accounts, see U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 518. In my view, neither prohibition is required by the congressional 
appropriations, and neither serves an important program interest. 
 524 See ETA CONJOINT RESEARCH, supra note 51; ETA WATERFALL ANALYSES, supra note 
310.  
 525 See ETA CONJOINT RESEARCH, supra note 51; ETA WATERFALL ANALYSES, supra note 
310. Savings features boosted take up rates by up to one-third and accounted for one-quarter of the 
reasons why an individual might sign up for electronically-based accounts. 
 526 CASKEY, FILENE INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 86, found that 69% of surveyed 
unbanked persons used ten money orders per year, and 39% used more than thirty money orders per 
year to pay bills.  
 527 ETA WATERFALL ANALYSES, supra note 310, at 4.  
 528 Another example of leapfrogging is the developing world’s adoption of cell phones 
without installing a widespread wire-based phone network. See CLAESSENS ET AL., supra note 373, at 
12 (“Mobile phones have made telecommunications available even to the world’s poor, partly because 
of the widespread creation of telecenters and public call offices.”); Simon Romero, A Cell Phone Surge 
Among the World’s Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2000, at C1. 
 529 The Doorways to Dreams demonstration project, which has developed an Internet 
platform for data management in IDA programs, is one such example. See Doorways to Dreams, What 
Is D2D Fund?, at http://www.d2dfund.org (last visited Dec. 5, 2003). 
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“digital divide,” e-finance can increasingly be made available to the poor 
at Internet or other kiosks.530 Companies that are exploring ways to expand 
the use of cellular phones to transact financial services for high-income 
clientele could be encouraged to focus attention on expanding bank 
account access through pre-paid cellular phones commonly used by low-
income persons, perhaps with pre-authorized debit for cell phone fees.531 
Smart cards can be used even by unbanked customers to conduct an 
increasing array of bank-like transactions at relatively low cost.532 
Similarly, payroll cards might serve as a useful starting point in the U.S. 
towards providing an increasing range of financial services—including bill 
payment and savings—to low-income persons. 
A First Accounts Tax Credit could also help to spur employer-driven 
(or union-driven) strategies to expand access to banking services. 
Employer-driven strategies to bank the unbanked have three potential 
strengths: large-scale, consistent access to workers, a structure for 
providing regular savings through direct deposit, and the ability to offer 
financial education. Large employers can reap significant benefits from 
moving more of their workers to direct deposit. Direct deposit would drive 
down their payroll processing costs, increase the effective take-home pay 
of their workers, and reduce problems from theft or fraud associated with 
checks. Employers can help to reduce costs for reaching their unbanked 
employees with financial education regarding new products.  
Many employers have already become active in educating their 
workers about advanced payments under the EITC, or have become 
involved in wide scale efforts to hire former welfare recipients as part of a 
national welfare-to-work strategy.533 At the same time, financial 
institutions already provide important payroll and other banking services 
for employers, and some have been experimenting with employer-focused, 
debit-card or stored-value card-based payroll systems for their clients’ 
 
 530 See, e.g., Value Transfer System for Unbanked Customers, U.S. Patent Application No. 
20020082962 (June 27, 2002). 
 531 Perhaps the Open Mobile Alliance could serve as a forum for this purpose. See Open 
Mobile Alliance, Homepage, at http://www.wapforum.org (last visited Dec. 5, 2003). 
 532 For example, South Africa is using stored value cards to expand banking services in 
remote areas. The cards can be used to receive income, transfer payments, or establish savings for 
particular purposes. CLAESSENS ET AL., supra note 373, at 36. Mondex e-cash, being used in the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, permits individuals to transfer value between cards 
and to download value using a phone. Visa Horizon, being used in Ghana, is an offline payment card. 
Visa Cash in South Africa is being used for transit fares in South Africa. Modex e-cash will be offered 
through South Africa’s post office savings banks, with bill payment and savings pools. In Indonesia, 
MasterCard, Cirrus, and BCA are issuing an on-line debit card. Visa Cash in the Philippines can be 
loaded with value or used to make payments over the Internet or through mobile phones. The 
CashCard in Singapore permits loading value through mobile phones; the cards are expected to permit 
bill payment by mobile phone in the future. Id. at 65-69.  
 533 UPS, Bank of America, and Hewlett-Packard are among those U.S. corporations actively 
and successfully participating in the welfare-to-work program. See generally The Welfare to Work 
Partnership, Homepage, at http://www.welfaretowork.org (last visited Dec. 8, 2003). 
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employees. These employment relationships may provide a solid 
foundation for encouraging direct deposit into low-cost electronic banking 
accounts and systematic savings programs for low-income workers. 
Employers are increasingly moving towards the provision of 
electronically based payroll services. In one model, employees are given a 
smart card that can be used at ATMs or POS by banked or unbanked 
employees. Banked employees can direct deposit funds from their smart 
cards to their personal accounts; unbanked employees can simply 
withdraw funds through an ATM or POS.534 By 2002, 10% of unbanked 
workers used payroll cards.535 Employers could work with banks to make 
available all-electronic bank accounts through which they could use their 
payroll cards. 
In sum, tax credits should also be used to foster employer-based 
strategies to reach the unbanked through payroll-based accounts. 
Employers already have some incentives to shift workers from check or 
cash payment to payroll cards or direct deposit. Payroll cards themselves 
will help to reduce transaction costs associated with converting income to 
cash and, if linked to bank accounts, these cards could open up access to 
depository institutions for low-income workers. These accounts could then 
be used to meet other core financial services needs, including savings and 
bill payment. These efforts, given employers’ economies of scale and 
institutional strength, may present the greatest opportunity to shift large 
numbers of low-income workers to account ownership. Yet there are 
reasons to suggest that employers are unlikely to capture the full benefit of 
their employees shifting to bank account ownership with direct deposit. 
Subsidies to such employers would help them to internalize more of those 
benefits.  
c. Objections and Responses 
The tax credit proposal could be criticized in two layers. The top layer 
of potential criticism follows from the subsidy being a supply-side rather 
than demand-side mechanism to reach the poor with banking services. 
Supply-side approaches are preferable to demand-side efforts only under 
conditions in which efficiency in provision outweighs potential windfalls 
 
 534 See, e.g., Press Release, Ceridian, Washington Inventory Service Picks Ceridian for Pay 
Card Services (June 14, 2002), at http://www.ceridian.com/corp/article/1,2868,10963-52751,00.html; 
COMDATA, How To Use It: Comchek eCash Cardholder User Guide, at 
http://www.ecash.comdata.com/ec-howtouseit.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2003). A drawback of this 
card is that account balances must be checked prior to using ATM or POS using a Voice Response 
Unit (VRU) reached through a “1-800” number; if a withdrawal is requested when funds are not 
sufficient, a fee is assessed. 
 535 SAMUEL FROMKIN ET AL., PAYROLL CARDS; AN INNOVATIVE PRODUCT FOR REACHING 
THE UNBANKDED AND UNDERBANKED 2 (2003), at http://www.occ.treas.gov/cdd/payrollcards.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 11, 2003). 
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to suppliers and the costs of the mechanism. In the other layer of potential 
criticism, the tax credit proposed must be judged as an in-kind mechanism 
as opposed to a direct cash transfer. An in-kind approach will be warranted 
if consumption externalities outweigh the deadweight costs from 
substitution effects and the costs of administrating the program.536 I 
address the costs and benefits of a supply-side, in-kind subsidy, 
particularly drawing attention to the conditions for optimality of such a 
program as compared to a demand-side program or direct cash transfers. 
A demand-side, in-kind program is typically manifested in voucher 
programs.537 The tradeoff between demand and supply approaches builds 
on three issues. First, the relative efficiencies of demand compared with 
supply programs depend on the elasticity of supply in the sector. If supply 
is inelastic,538 a voucher program will raise the price of the good provided 
to those not holding vouchers, thereby reducing welfare.539 In the case of 
low-cost electronic banking accounts, it is reasonable to think that the 
supply of accounts is characterized by a single fixed cost for start-up and 
low marginal costs for additional accounts. Thus, supply is likely to be 
highly elastic. If supply is perfectly elastic, there is no welfare difference 
in a supply-side subsidy or a demand voucher.  
Second, there is a danger that subsidies for the provision of low-cost 
banking accounts could provide a windfall to financial institutions who 
would offer such accounts without the tax credit.540 It is difficult to know 
the extent of this problem without more empirical evidence. There are 
some small-scale private sector initiatives in serving low-income 
customers, but it is difficult to assess the motivation for them. Some of 
these may have been undertaken in response to government programs 
(EFT ‘99, EBT, First Accounts) or regulation (CRA). Others have been 
underwritten by philanthropic contributions. The remaining may have been 
motivated by perceived future profits, either from the customers served 
themselves, or perhaps from providing positive public relations about the 
bank that attract other, more lucrative, customers. I have suggested that 
network externalities may slow the adoption of technologies that would 
better serve the poor; to the extent that these technologies are employed for 
that end, the tax credits are less likely to result in windfalls rather than in 
 
 536 See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 397-403 (3d ed. 
2000).  
 537 For example, the Section 8 program, established by the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1974, provides vouchers to low-income residents that can be used to rent 
apartments from private landlords. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2003). 
 538 Inelastic supply implies that the quantity suppliers are willing to provide does not change 
when the equilibrium price in the market changes. This is often considered a short term effect.  
 539 STIGLITZ, supra note 536, at 400-01. 
 540 On this problem more generally, see, for example, Martin Feldstein, A Contribution to 
the Theory of Tax Expenditure: The Case of Charitable Giving, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION (H.J. 
Aaron & M.J. Boskin eds., 1980) (showing that government spending may decrease private spending).  
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internalizing some of those externalities. An extreme form of misallocation 
of subsidy may result in over-supply of services.541 Conversely, demand 
voucher programs can also exhibit unwanted windfalls. Individuals may 
qualify for vouchers who would otherwise not be target audiences for 
supply-driven mechanisms.542
Third, one must consider the costs of demand compared with supply 
programs.543 I have proposed a supply-side subsidy rather than a demand-
side subsidy because I believe that it is more likely to induce a change in 
the nature of financial services offered to low-income consumers at lower 
cost. If low-income consumers were given a voucher for financial services, 
they would need to invest in sufficient, costly information-gathering to be 
able to find an adequate banking product for their needs, and financial 
services are notoriously difficult for most people (poor and non-poor) to 
understand. Since the voucher would offset some of the costs of existing 
services, financial products might not evolve to meet the needs of other 
low-income persons. Significant collective action and free rider problems 
would further hinder the ability of consumers to appeal for innovation. 
Without the development of new low-cost electronic banking accounts, the 
demand vouchers’ value would be limited to its face value. Of course, 
financial institutions, knowing that low-income consumers had a financial 
services voucher, may invest more in learning about low-income 
consumers and developing products for that segment of the market. It is 
possible that a similar result to a demand-side subsidy could be obtained, 
but the administrative costs of delivering the financial services voucher to 
millions of low-income households are likely to be much higher than the 
administrative costs of tracking account opening by financial institutions 
who already have established relationships for reporting to the IRS (and 
many of whom have such relationships for reporting to the FMS).  
The subsidy is administered through the tax code, rather than as a 
grant program. Tax expenditures have been criticized as complicating the 
tax code, reducing the base in ways that require increasing tax rates that 
 
 541 See STIGLITZ, supra note 536, at 128.  
 542 Consider the job training market. Holland suggests that one key advantage of a subsidy to 
employers over a tax credit for individuals for education expense is that in the tax credit program, it is 
impossible to disentangle the target audience, as the “price” to everyone is the same. This creates an 
excess cost for providing training to those in need. See Daniel M. Holland, An Evaluation of Tax 
Incentives for On-the-Job Training of the Disadvantaged, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 293 (1971). The 
realization of benefits only to target individuals is important for both supply and demand side 
programs. Since the in-kind approaches are essentially symmetrical, identification of the “subsidy 
base,” i.e., the target group of individuals whom the program seeks to benefit, is tantamount to 
identification of the “negative income tax base.” See A.B. Atkinson & Joseph Stiglitz, The Design of 
Tax Structure, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 55, 74 (1976). Thus, the incidence of the program is the essential trait to 
gauge. 
 543 Holland’s empirical estimates of the job training market find little difference between the 
administrative costs of job training tax credits for individuals and those of subsidies to employers for 
training programs. Holland, supra note 542, at 301-02. 
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are themselves distortionary and as costly to administer.544 Tax 
expenditures are not necessarily more or less efficient than grant programs. 
However, the fixed cost of tax administration by the IRS and of tax 
compliance by corporations is already in place and is unlikely to be 
affected in any significant way by the additional tax expenditure. I am 
proposing that the Treasury Department’s Financial Management Service 
compute the amount of the tax reduction owed to each financial institution 
and administer the program because the FMS already has developed a 
system for tracking ETA accounts opened by financial institutions for 
federal benefit recipients under the EFT ‘99 program. This aspect of the 
tax expenditure, which replicates core functions of a grant program, is 
unlikely to be significantly different were the financial institutions to be 
given a grant instead of a tax credit. Raising funds to pay for a grant 
program (through tax increases, borrowing, or other spending reductions) 
would produce similar distortions to those required to run the program 
through the tax system. 
The alternative to some form of in-kind program is a direct cash 
transfer.545 There are three main critiques that have been raised regarding 
in-kind transfers versus cash transfers. I will describe the critiques and 
then offer a theoretically motivated response to why the costs of the in-
kind program should not be greater than the benefits. First, generally 
speaking, in-kind subsidies are thought of as less efficient than cash 
subsidies because the recipient may only use the in-kind subsidy for 
specified purposes.546 To the extent that the recipient undertakes the 
specified actions to the same degree as the recipient would have if given a 
cash grant, the in-kind subsidy does not change behavior but costs more to 
administer, it is argued, than a cash transfer. To the extent that the subsidy 
changes behavior, the subsidy does not increase the welfare of the 
recipient to the same degree as if the recipient had been able to use the 
funds that the in-kind subsidy represents to pursue her own preferences. A 
typical approach to quantifying the benefit of an in-kind program is 
through the Hicksian measure of what an equivalent cash grant would have 
to be to equal the in-kind subsidy. For example, one study of public tenant 
houses calculated that 16-20% of the mean subsidy value was lost in 
 
 544 On the tax expenditure debate, see, for example, STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO 
TAX REFORM (1973); Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Tax Reform, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budget: A 
Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661 (1992); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for 
Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. 
REV. 705 (1970); Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax 
Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973 (1986).  
 545 Over 70% of U.S. welfare benefits are allocated through in-kind programs. STIGLITZ, 
supra note 536, at 397.  
 546 See, e.g., id. at 254-65 (presenting arguments concerning the substitution versus income 
effect). 
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benefit to the recipients.547
The second criticism of in-kind plans over cash transfers is simply 
that they are paternalistic in telling the heterogeneous recipients that they 
should derive utility in particular from the provision of the service for 
which the in-kind benefit is intended.548 In-kind mechanisms are 
disparaged for passing judgment that individuals should value the 
particular benefit more than they might value other benefits with which 
they could have spent an equivalent cash transfer.  
Third, in-kind programs are often more administratively costly than 
direct transfers.549 The marginal cost to the government of increasing the 
dollar amount of income transfers to the poor is low.  
As I will argue below, however, we must consider the externality of 
banking services on the cost differential between the value of the 
government’s check and the realized benefit to the individual.550 The 
process of converting the government check to cash (or stored value) 
reduces the income transfer. However, to make this argument fully, I first 
establish the theoretical basis for when an in-kind program can compete 
with cash transfers. 
There are primarily two arguments that an in-kind benefit may be 
larger than an equivalent cash transfer, even taking account of added costs 
and substitution effects. First, in-kind programs may generate 
“consumption externalities.”551 Consumption externalities are benefits 
accruing because the in-kind program exists. Here, the externality is the 
fixed investment leading to a new form of permanent low-cost electronic 
banking accounts. If it were possible to transfer “cash” to each individual, 
the recipients would have the benefit of the cash instantaneously. The tax 
credit program proposed would establish permanent access to low-cost 
banking, however, which would reduce the consumer’s costs of cashing 
checks, storing value, and paying bills into the future. Moreover, banking 
services help other government programs work more effectively.  
More pointedly, the argument in favor of income transfers as 
compared with in-kind subsidies breaks down when one analyzes how 
“income” gets transferred.552 The federal government does not transfer 
 
 547 Michael P. Murray, The Distribution of Tenant Benefits in Public Housing, 43 
ECONOMETRICA 771, 783 (1975). 
 548 See generally Edgar K. Browning, A Theory of Paternalistic In-Kind Transfers, 19 ECON. 
INQUIRY 579 (1981). 
 549 See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 536, at 349. 
 550 Income can be a bad reference point for evaluating utility of the poor since utility comes 
from consumption and not the cash transfer. See Daniel T. Slesnick, Consumption and Poverty, 106 
ECON. J. 1527, 1528 (1996). In the case here, the income transfer is not even a fair assessment of the 
cash received, since it is conveyed to the individual in a form that requires it to be converted to cash, 
extending this divergence of utility measurement. 
 551 See, e.g., Browning, supra note 548, at 579.  
 552 The public finance literature tends to assume that recipients of income transfers bear no 
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income as cash. Nor, for that matter, do states. Income can be transferred 
as a direct deposit to a bank account, to a debit or stored value card, or as a 
check. Transferring income to low-income persons through a government 
check not only costs the government more than an electronic transfer,553 
but also transfers less value to low-income persons than a direct deposit of 
that income into the recipient’s bank account. Electronic bank accounts 
lower the cost of redistributing wealth. If such accounts are subsidized for 
low-income households, the resultant savings may outweigh the cost of the 
subsidy. Moreover, once established, these accounts provide a repository 
for the receipt of other federal or state government income transfers and 
private earnings in the future. Further, as I have argued, the accounts, once 
provided, may increase opportunities for low-income families to pay their 
bills automatically, to budget and save, and to build positive credit 
histories and obtain access to credit.  
The second situation in which a cash transfer would be less efficient 
relative to an in-kind program involves screening and targeting. In-kind 
transfers have been shown both theoretically and in practice to be effective 
at screening the target service provided, and thus reaching the target 
recipient base.554 Criteria for the in-kind efficiency outcome are worth 
considering in the context of banking. The ability of an in-kind program to 
screen in the optimal potential beneficiaries may require that the good 
provided be in some ways an “inferior good,” a good to which a higher-
income individual would not immediately be drawn.555 In the current 
market, such a goal would be achieved by offering a product that does not 
permit check writing. This result runs contrary to the claims by some that 
in-kind redistribution programs increase or distort the quality of the goods 
that low income individuals might choose for themselves. Along these 
lines, the greater the divergence in goods that can be provided to 
differentiate the target audience, the greater the effectiveness of the 
program will be.  
In sum, there are grounds for believing that the tax credit proposal 
suggested here would be more efficient than a grant program, a demand-
side voucher, or a cash transfer. An additional reason for favoring a tax 
credit to financial institutions for providing financial services, over the 
alternatives is, of course, that tax incentives for such purposes are more 
 
cost on converting income checks into cash. See, e.g., ROBERT H. HAVEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR 59-60 (1970). 
 553 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Proposal Would Implement 
1996 Law Requiring Payment for Federal Salaries, Social Security, Veterans, and Other Benefits 
(Sept. 11, 1997), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/rr1922.htm. 
 554 See, e.g., Charles Blackorby & David Donaldson, Cash Versus Kind, Self-Selection and 
Efficient Transfers, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1988); Albert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 
Targeting Transfers Through Restrictions on Recipients, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 372 (1982). 
 555 See Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 554, at 375. 
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likely to be politically feasible to enact in today’s environment, than cash 
assistance. Political feasibility, like other forms of feasibility, ought to be 
considered in weighing policy options. 
2. The Community Reinvestment Act 
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) could also help to focus 
banks and thrifts on opportunities to provide bank accounts to low-income 
persons. Under CRA,556 federal regulators evaluate bank and thrift 
performance in serving their communities.557 Given the high up-front costs 
associated with the accounts, and the low expected returns, however, CRA 
by itself is unlikely to change behavior. CRA has arguably helped to 
expand access to credit for homeownership in low-income communities.558 
The CRA service test, however, which evaluates bank and thrift 
performance in meeting transaction, savings, and other community needs, 
has received inadequate attention from bank regulators in CRA 
examinations. Michael Stegman has documented that banks rarely receive 
“needs to improve” ratings on the service test, and the service test is often 
used to increase the overall score of borderline banks.559 Examiners should 
focus on the extent to which banks and thrifts are actually attracting low-
income customers with innovative retail products and services. Given the 
importance of technology in serving low-income clients in a cost-effective 
manner, service examinations should move away from an overwhelming 
focus on bank branches towards a more quantitative and qualitative 
assessment of the extent to which technology-based products are 
expanding access for low-income persons.560
The 1995 regulations provide sufficient flexibility for analysis of an 
 
 556 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08 (2003). 
 557 For purposes of this Article, I take as given the existence of CRA and ask how it could 
better evaluate performance in meeting basic financial services needs. CRA itself has been subjected to 
withering criticism. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment 
Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291 (1993). But see ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T 
OF THE TREASURY, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AFTER FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION: A 
FINAL REPORT (2001), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/finalrpt.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 11, 2003). I take up this debate in a work in progress. See BARR, supra note 1. 
 558 See LITAN ET AL., supra note 557, at ES-3.  
 559 See MICHAEL STEGMAN & ROBERT FARIS, CREATING A SCORECARD FOR THE CRA 
SERVICE TEST (Brookings Inst., Policy Brief No. 96, 2002) (revealing that only fifteen CRA 
examinations out of nearly 2,000 conducted over the last five years have resulted in a rating of “needs 
to improve” on the service test, and no bank has ever earned a “substantial noncompliance” rating on 
service activities). 
 560 See Michael S. Barr, Access to Financial Services in the 21st Century: Five 
Opportunities for the Bush Administration and the 107th Congress, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 447, 452 (2002); see also Michael S. Barr, Comment Letter of October 26, 2001, 
Community Reinvestment Act Joint Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (OCC Docket No. 01-
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institution’s performance, but agency examination procedures provide 
insufficient guidance as to how to measure an institution’s activities in 
ways that actually matter to low-income consumers. The service test, in 
practice, has received perfunctory attention from examiners, with public 
evaluations containing little or no analysis of whether low-income 
consumers actually use bank or thrift products or services. Examinations 
under the service test could be vastly improved by taking three steps.  
First, examiners should evaluate the extent to which institutions offer 
low-cost accounts and other products designed to meet the account needs 
of low-income individuals. Low-cost electronic accounts with direct 
deposit, little or no risk of overdraft, the opportunity for the accumulation 
of savings, and bill payments or electronic money orders may hold special 
promise in this regard. Some institutions have gone further, by providing 
financial education and matching funds for Individual Development 
Accounts. Regardless of the form of the account, examiners should attempt 
to make a qualitative judgment about the range of product offerings of the 
institutions, based on the existing state of research into low-income 
consumer needs, and taking into account the costs to institutions of 
providing accounts and the requirements of sound banking practice. Such 
qualitative assessments are, however, difficult to apply consistently across 
examiners and agencies.  
Second, banks and thrifts should be evaluated based on the number of 
low- and moderate-income account holders at their institution, whether in 
a traditional, or more innovative, account. Quantitative measures of usage 
should provide a portrait of an institution’s performance under the service 
test, and data collection on the numbers of accounts provided should not in 
and of itself be burdensome. Requiring data collection and reporting with 
respect to the income of account holders could become significant burdens 
on some banks and thrifts. Banking agencies might consider permitting 
institutions to use certain assumptions about their customers’ incomes 
based on the accounts offered. For example, for reporting purposes, a 
holder of a specialized banking account with no checking privileges might 
be presumed to be low-income. In addition, bank accounts opened at 
branches in low- or moderate-income areas, or held by individuals residing 
in low- or moderate-income areas since statement information is readily 
kept by most institutions, might be presumed to be held by individuals of 
low- or moderate-income. A formula based on the percentage of low-
income population in the census tract could also be used. For other 
institutions that already collect information on income of account holders 
for other purposes, such as cross-marketing, reporting of income might not 
be more burdensome than geographic-coding of accounts. Information on 
account usage is critical to meeting the financial services needs of low-
income communities, and the agencies should work closely with banks and 
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thrifts to determine the least burdensome way to collect this essential 
information.  
Third, the agencies should give negative consideration to activities 
that undermine the provision of quality services to the poor. For example, 
participation by banks or thrifts in arrangements with affiliates or other 
parties that do not provide adequate consumer protection, or raise 
compliance, operational, or other risks, should receive negative 
consideration as part of the performance context under the service test.561 
Agencies should ensure that banks and thrifts are not merely “renting” 
their names or charters to these firms, but are engaged in appropriate 
monitoring and supervision of practices, and that the practices comply 
with applicable law. This may require targeted, risk-based examination of 
these parties or affiliates, as has been conducted by the OCC with respect 
to national bank relationships with payday lenders.562
3. State Policies and Welfare Reform 
As discussed above,563 states should integrate access to financial 
services as a core element of welfare-to-work strategies. High cost 
alternative financial services undermine efforts to improve workforce 
participation by reducing effective take-home pay. Lack of structured 
savings mechanisms makes it less likely that new entrants into the 
workforce will save against liquidity crises from job loss, injury, or other 
family emergencies, and makes it more likely that such crises will push 
families back onto the welfare rolls.564 Over the longer term, lack of access 
to bank accounts and savings mechanisms will reduce the ability of low-
income families to save for homeownership, skills development, or their 
children’s education.565 As a first step, states (and other workforce 
development providers) should encourage account ownership. First, states 
 
 561 For example, OTS gave Crusader Bank a “needs to improve” rating in 2000 in part 
because of its payday lending operations; Crusader abandoned its payday lending relationship in 2001. 
CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 20, 24. 
 562 See OCC, Third-Party Relationships, supra note 172 (advising national banks on risk 
management in dealing with third parties); OCC CONSENT ORDER, supra note 178 (ordering bank to 
cease making payday loans through third party). 
 563 See supra Subsection III.B.2. 
 564 Social insurance (unemployment insurance, for example) could also be used to serve this 
function, spreading the costs of those risks from those least able to afford them to society at large, but 
increasing and widening the scope of social insurance at this time seems politically infeasible. 
Moreover, social insurance may crowd out private savings. See, e.g., COURTNEY COILE & JONATHAN 
GRUBER, SOCIAL SECURITY INCENTIVES FOR RETIREMENT (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 7651, 2000), available at http://dsl.nber.org/papers/w7651.pdf (last accessed Dec. 11, 2003).
 565 The lack of savings may also contribute to borrowing constraints, leading to 
underinvestment in education that perpetrates inter-generational persistence of poverty. See Bhash 
Mazumder, Analyzing Income Mobility over Generations, CHICAGO FED LETTER, Sept. 2002, available 
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should shift EBT to individually owned accounts and permit former 
welfare recipients to retain accounts after they move into the workforce. 
Although such a shift might prove costly to states in the short-run (because 
of lost “float” income), over the long term it is likely to further welfare-to-
work goals. Second, states should assist former welfare recipients with 
having EITC returns directly deposited into a bank account. Third, state 
welfare initiatives should increasingly include Individual Development 
Account (IDA) programs.566 As part of the federal reauthorization of the 
1996 Welfare Reform law, Congress should make funds available to states 
for these financial services initiatives. 
B. Financial Education 
Studies find that financial education can sometimes help to change 
the financial behavior of individuals, particularly low-income persons.567 
Financial education can increase participation in saving plans and increase 
the level of saving. However, financial education conducted apart from 
changes in the availability of product offerings is unlikely to be 
successful.568 Moreover, financial education can be costly, and education 
focused on low-income persons is unlikely to be undertaken in a 
significant way absent governmental and nonprofit support. The Treasury 
Department could expand existing efforts to financial literacy569 by 
supporting community-based financial education focused on account 
ownership and savings. Education is most successful when it focuses on 
life decisions that the individual is facing: for example, how to improve 
credit standing to purchase a home, or how to save for college. America 
Saves, sponsored by the Consumer Federation of America, which 
combines financial education with low-income savings plans building on 
self-identified savings goals, might serve as a model for increasing savings 
 
 566 Some states have linked financial services access goals to state fiscal management needs. 
For example, New York enacted a law under which banks that open new branches in designated low- 
and moderate-income neighborhoods receive property tax abatements as well as the potential for 
deposits of state funds. Thus far, eight banks have opened branches in these areas. See Amanda Fung, 
N.Y. Development Program Gains Traction, AM. BANKER, Dec. 3, 2001, at 6. For other state asset 
building strategies, see generally CORP. FOR ENTER. DEV., STATE ASSET DEVELOPMENT REPORT CARD 
(2002).  
 567 See, e.g., E. Thomas Garman et al., Workplace Financial Education Improves Financial 
Wellness, 10 ASS’N FOR FIN. COUNSELING & PLANNING EDUC. 79, 80-84 (1999); Jeanne M. Hogarth 
& Marianne A. Hilgert, Financial Knowledge, Experience, and Learning Preferences, 48 CONSUMER 
INT. ANN. (2002). 
 568 See JAMES J. CHOI ET AL., DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS: PLAN RULES, 
PARTICIPANT DECISIONS, AND THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 8655, 2001) (noting that one third of self-reported undersavers said that they 
intended to increase their savings but almost none of them did so).  
 569 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Secretary Paul H. O’Neill, 
Keynote Address to Jumpstart Coalition for Personal Financial Literacy (Apr. 23, 2002), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po3035.htm. 
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among low- to moderate-income families.570 Non-profit and faith-based 
organizations can play important roles in partnering with financial 
institutions to expand financial education to low-income households. In 
addition, workplace financial education could be funded as part of tax 
credits covering the administrative costs of setting up payroll direct deposit 
and savings plans for low- and moderate-income workers.571
VI. Conclusion 
Low- and moderate-income households who use alternative financial 
service providers pay a high price to convert their income into cash, pay 
their bills, and obtain credit, and they lack a regular means to save. The 
high cost of alternative financial services undermines key income 
redistribution policies for the poor, including the EITC. Existing banking 
products are often not well designed to meet the needs of the poor, and few 
banks compete with alternative financial services providers for low-
income customers, particularly in low-income neighborhoods. The cost to 
individual financial institutions of research, product development, account 
administration, staff training, marketing and financial education with 
respect to new financial products for the poor, relative to their expected 
financial return, means that the market is unlikely to change quickly on its 
own. In addition, network externalities in electronic payments systems and 
distribution networks suggest that net social benefit could be obtained 
through further expansion.  
Financial and technological innovation has been a hallmark of U.S. 
financial markets. Financial institutions can harness that innovation to 
meet the needs of low-income Americans. Governmental incentives appear 
to be important to catalyze private sector efforts to use financial and 
technological progress to expand access to financial services for low- and 
moderate-income families. By helping these families to enter the financial 
services mainstream, the policies outlined here can help to transform 
financial services for low-income persons. Such a transformation is a key 
to promoting greater economic opportunities for low-income households. 
 
 
 570 See Ben Jackson, Programs Tout Financial Literacy for All Ages, AM. BANKER, Apr. 5, 
2002, at 5. 
 571 This approach builds on SIMPLE 401(k) plans, savings plans offered by small 
employers, which include a small credit offset for plan administration.  
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